Coexisting and eye-watering levels of food abundance, waste, overconsumption and hunger are symptomatic of a broken food system punctuated by vested interests in systematic overproduction. Against that backdrop, this paper evaluates England's ‘new’ approach to food waste in light of concerns that policy-makers have framed food waste as a consumer behaviour problem, rather than a structural challenge. The Resources and Waste Strategy's acknowledgement of normalised overproduction is thus remarkable, but unexpected. However, frame critical analysis reveals how an apparent departure from preoccupations with economic growth, combined with promises of government action, obscure an ongoing reluctance to intervene against powerful interests and the causes (not symptoms) of food waste. Legislative proposals, rather than reducing surplus, shift the burden of redistributing food away from the state and retailers, on to charities and farmers. With England, perhaps wrongly, seen as a world-leader on food waste, this has implications for other jurisdictions, as well as forthcoming consultations.

Among its many provisions, the Criminal Justice Act 1991 contained, in its original s 29(1), a prohibition on the use of previous convictions in the determination of sentences for current offences. This particular provision was the subject of much criticism before and after its coming into effect, so much so that within a year of its implementation it was replaced by a new section which, arguably, could have precisely the opposite effect. What follows is an attempt to chart the short life and sudden death of the original s 29( 1). The importance of such a prohibition to a 'deserts-based' sentencing framework will be discussed and some possible explanations for its removal will be suggested. Some of the implications of the change will also be examined, both in terms of its impact on the coherence of the sentencing framework that remains, and its possible impact on future sentencing trends.

In December 1996 Classification of Obligations formed the topic of one of a series of SPTL seminars under the general title of Pressing Problems in the Law. It may, perhaps, be asked quite why classification is a pressing problem, for it is by no means clear from the papers themselves that common lawyers have suddenly become more concerned about the internal structure of the ‘seamless web’. Nevertheless the seminar was a valuable opportunity to reflect upon a subject that is at least a useful vehicle for thinking about legal knowledge. Legal classification, in other words, raises questions of an epistemological nature. The purpose of this present paper is to pursue this epistemological point in an attempt to reveal how classification of symbolic knowledge (legal propositions or rules) hides much deeper issues about the role of non-symbolic knowledge (symmetries, images and isomorphs) in the formulation of legal solutions in the law of obligations.

The paper examines the controversial issue of referral fees for personal injury claims. It looks at the function of referral fees in the civil justice system, their relationship to the guarantees of access to court and the right to seek legal assistance in ECHR Art 6, and the debate about promoting access to justice or a litigious society. It examines the experience of the referral fees market in England and Wales, where the costs of referrals have risen dramatically and there is concern that referrers are auctioning their customers to the highest bidder rather than helping them find competent lawyers. Sir Rupert Jackson recommended banning referral fees in his report on the costs of civil litigation, and the Government has announced it will implement this recommendation. The paper considers the potential effects of a ban on competition in the legal services market and its compatibility with UK and EU competition law. The paper argues that a combination of better regulation of the industry and proper regulation of costs rules is a better and more proportionate way of controlling legal costs and the quality of legal services than an outright ban. While referral fees have not delivered all the benefits one would expect from a for-profit independent referrals service, they can help people obtain information about their legal rights, and competent lawyers to enforce them. This service is particularly valuable given that the state has substantially cut public funding of the civil justice system in recent years.

Family law has not only become a specialism in its own right, but family law practitioners have claimed for themselves special characteristics. This article reviews the attributes and skills to which the legal profession, and particularly the solicitors branch, aspires. It notes that the ‘specialist’ forms of client care and case management, familiarity with rules and procedures and a conciliatory approach are not unique to family lawyering. Family lawyers also require themselves to have knowledge of ‘non-law’ matters, especially those relating to the welfare of children. On reviewing recent empirical research studies about the work of solicitors, the article asserts that, for family lawyers, non-law norms control their practice and form the framework for a very particular type of client care. The article then goes on to examine - by using research on solicitors attitudes to the ‘meaning’ of the concept of parental responsibility - how practitioners cope with the tensions inherent in modern family legislation. It concludes that solicitors in practice convey policy messages rather than clear messages about legal rights and remedies.

In this paper, I explore the sanctity of life doctrine and consider the scope of s 4(5) of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, a provision designed to give statutory effect to the sanctity principle. Rather than question the intellectual validity of the doctrine, I examine the legal and practical problems created by this limited section. I argue that it necessarily creates dilemmas for medical practitioners, which could only be avoided by a wholesale adoption of the principle. I conclude, therefore, that the provision fails to ensure a coherent moral and intellectual shape to the law.

This paper proposes a model for designing consumer dispute resolution (CDR) mechanisms (including conciliation, adjudication, arbitration and ombuds schemes). This field has expanded significantly in recent years, replacing courts as the primary forum of dispute resolution in some areas of consumer-to-business activity. This expansion has been ad hoc, with a lack of consistency in the design of CDR mechanisms and in the overall shape of the CDR landscape. In light of the recent implementation of the EU's Directive on Consumer Alternative Dispute Resolution and Regulation on Consumer Online Dispute Resolution, Dispute System Design (DSD) requires urgent attention to ensure that the design of future mechanisms is based on coherent principles. A failure to address this issue risks undermining the legitimacy of state-sanctioned dispute resolution. The model described in this paper proposes a systematic approach and aims to: synthesise existing DSD models; apply the concepts of DSD to the field of CDR; and provide a framework that may be of use in other disputing contexts.

The paper argues that the margin of appreciation (MoA) doctrine of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR, or Court), should be understood as, inter alia, an underenforcement doctrine, according to which Convention rights should not be applied to their full conceptual limits. Underenforcement is justified by institutional considerations relating to the Court's role and competence. Although institutional considerations have been theorised normatively, the paper claims that ‘low‐level’ empirical inquiry into the comparative institutional competence of different decision makers across the Council of Europe is critical in explaining MoA. Such comparative empirical analysis ties shared institutional responsibility and subsidiarity with certain traits of decision makers when determining Convention rights. In this context, the paper briefly compares the decision making abilities of different institutions. It concludes by stressing that under certain circumstances the Court can be worse placed than national authorities to decide on violations of Convention rights. This is corroborated by the Court's case‐law concerning Convention rights impinging on the economic and social policies of States Parties.

Although cartel behaviour is almost universally (and rightly) condemned, it is not clear why cartel participants deserve the full wrath of the criminal law and its associated punishment. To fill this void, I develop a normative (or principled) justification for the criminalisation of conduct characteristic of ‘hard core’ cartels. The paper opens with a brief consideration of the rhetoric commonly used to denounce cartel activity, eg that it ‘steals from’ or ‘robs’ consumers. To put the discussion in context, a brief definition of ‘hard core’ cartel behaviour is provided and the harms associated with this activity are identified. These are: welfare losses in the form of appropriation (from consumer to producer) of consumer surplus, the creation of deadweight loss to the economy, the creation of productive inefficiency (hindering innovation of both products and processes), and the creation of so-called X-inefficiency. As not all activities which cause harm ought to be criminalised, a theory as to why certain harms in a liberal society can be criminalised is developed. It is based on JS Mill's harm to others principle (as refined by Feinberg) and on a choice of social institutions using Rawls's ‘veil of ignorance.’ The theory is centred on the value of individual choice in securing one's own well-being, with the market as an indispensable instrument for this. But as applied to the harm associated with cartel conduct, this theory shows that none of the earlier mentioned problems associated with this activity provide sufficient justification for criminalisation. However, as the harm from hard core cartel activity strikes at an important institution which permits an individual's ability to secure their own well-being in a liberal society, criminalisation of hard core cartel behaviour can have its normative justification on this basis.

This paper makes two claims. First, it claims that there are various trends within academic law that discourage legal scholars from learning about their predecessors. These trends are explained. Secondly, it claims that there are a number of benefits which could flow from addressing this neglect. Several of these benefits have been acknowledged elsewhere. For example, some scholars maintain that ideas are best treated historically before being dealt with analytically. The more scholars read whole bodies of their predecessors' works, the better their interpretations and understandings of such works become, thus strengthening the intellectual integrity of the discipline. While agreeing with this argument, the purpose of the second section of this paper is to articulate other, perhaps less obvious, benefits. It is argued that by learning about a wider range of past academic endeavour, legal scholars are encouraged to challenge existing notions of academic standing and consider not only what the legal academy has become but also what it ought to be. Learning about scholarly predecessors could help scholars better contextualise current challenges. Such learning could be empowering in the context of a discipline whose scholarly practices have meant that there has been little reason to look to the past.

The Government's Consultation Paper Constitutional Reform: A Supreme Court for the United Kingdom (July 2003) is interesting in that it is written as an argument for a technical ‘fix’. The argument essentially is that we need to separate the Appellate Committee from the political House of Lords and abolish the Lord Chancellor. The discussion then focuses on how this can be done with the minimum change to the jurisdiction and composition of the existing courts. There is no attempt at strategic thinking. It is constitutional reform by way of incremental change. What I want to do here is to use some continental European experiences to suggest a number of strategic questions which either do not appear in the Consultation Paper from the Department of Constitutional Affairs or which are handled too rapidly, but which are important for the future functioning of a Supreme Court. There are only a limited number of lessons which can be learnt from any comparative survey. In this inquiry, as in many, the contrasts between legal systems only raise questions, rather than offering solutions. It is an agenda-setting exercise.

This paper engages with a changing politics of male circumcision. It suggests that various shifts which have occurred in how the issue is debated challenge legal constructions of the practice as a private familial issue. Although circumcision rates have declined in those Western nations which have traditionally practised it, the procedure is now being promoted as a medicalised response to the HIV/AIDS pandemic in sub-Saharan Africa. Such initiatives propose a new biomedical rationale for the practice and have been difficult to confine to the African context or to adult bodies, prompting a resurgence of enthusiasm for neonatal male circumcision on the part of professional bodies in the USA and elsewhere. Although we have reservations about such public health policies, which we suggest downplay risks inherent in the procedure both for the individual and for the advancement of public health, we argue that such strategies have the potential to move debates about circumcision beyond the parameters of traditional ‘medical law’, with its focus on the doctor–patient nexus and the issue of who can validly consent to medical procedures. We suggest that, as with female genital cutting, male circumcision ought to be debated within a paradigm of social justice which gives adequate weighting to the interests of all affected parties (including women whose health may actually be compromised by the procedure) and which renders visible the socio-economic dimensions of the issue. In line with a social justice approach, we argue that public health initiatives must comply with international ethico-legal standards and be attentive to the emergence of an international human right to health. The shift in analytical frame that we propose has the potential not only to make us re-think our approach to the ethics and legality of male circumcision by challenging its construction as a familial decision but also to impact on the need for a broader conceptualisation of health law as rooted in social justice.

This paper addresses how the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency has been implemented and interpreted in the US and the UK. The Model Law has attained a measure of international acceptance and is intended to achieve greater efficiencies in the administration of insolvency cases with transnational dimensions. But different manners of implementation in different countries and differing interpretations may hinder the prospects for harmonisation and coordination of laws. The paper will address in particular whether US interpretations differ from those in the UK and whether the US decisions are so infused with ‘American exceptionalism’ that they cannot be relied upon as sure guides in other countries.

Gig work and other flexible labour practices have been subject to unprecedented levels of attention recently. While this topic has attracted significant interest from employment lawyers, it remains relatively underexplored from other pertinent legal and inter-disciplinary angles. This paper will adopt an alternative perspective on flexible work inspired by Coase's theory of the firm. Focusing on the implications of flexible work for the relative allocation of control, risk and reward within the firm, it will highlight how both task-oriented (gig) and on-demand (casual) work practices typically entail workers assuming most of the positional disadvantages associated with orthodox employment and self-employment, while enjoying none or few of the corresponding advantages. Using a hypothetical contract analysis, it will highlight the structural similarity between flexible work and unsecured financial investments in business firms by reference to key strands of institutional economics and law and finance literature. On this basis, it will enquire as to optimal forms of compensation that rational flexible workers can (counter-factually) be regarded as bargaining for in the absence of impediments to efficient contracting, and as the price for trading off their traditional employment guarantees.

It has long been argued that the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords, now the UK Supreme Court, is characterised by Justices who are white and male, with a public school and Oxbridge education. Despite continuous debate and reflection on the lack of diversity, by academics, government and the popular press, little has changed. These debates have centred on explicit diversity, overt characteristics that are easily codified and reflect how the judiciary is seen. Drawing on the psychological theory of decision making, this paper argues that judicial decisions are subject to tacit influences that are not limited to overt characteristics. Personal values serve as one such tacit influence on decision making. Personal values are formed by life experiences and reflect many of the characteristics identified within the explicit diversity debates. However, personal values are influenced by more than simple demographic variables. This paper uses the example of personal values to highlight the fact that despite the lack of explicit diversity, there is an element of tacit diversity in the Supreme Court, which is reflected in judicial decisions. The impact of these findings serves to extend the debates surrounding diversity, highlighting the limitation of debates centred on explicit diversity alone.

The focus of this paper is upon the educational background of academic lawyers in England and Wales and the extent to which qualifications from certain institutions may be seen as acting as a proxy for social class. In recent years higher educational background and socio-economic background have been significant topics of research relating to entry to the legal professions and judiciary in England and Wales. There is a relative absence of such research relating to academic lawyers. The research discussed in this paper aims to close that gap. The paper argues that critiques relating to the elite nature of the traditional legal professions in terms of educational background have parallels within the academic legal community, evidenced by a dominance of those educated at Cambridge, Oxford and other Russell Group institutions, with relatively lower proportions of graduates from other sectors, most notably the post-1992 universities. The paper further argues that economic hurdles to entry to an academic legal career are significantly higher than those for other law related careers, potentially exacerbating issues of socio-economic exclusion. The conclusion drawn is that law schools should engage proactively with measures to expand opportunities for entrants into the academic legal community from candidates from a much wider range of educational backgrounds.

This paper explores certain questions regarding whether the law concerning relief upon the dissolution of civil partnership and cohabitation should parallel that of marriage. It will be contended that while the principle of compensation does have an important role to play in the aftermath of de facto relationships, there remain reasons not to assimilate cohabitation fully with marriage – and in particular, not to apply the key principle of equal sharing that now informs divorce settlements in many jurisdictions, including England. On the other hand, an argument against assimilating marriage with civil partnership can be grounded in the fact that a civil partnership involves two parties of the same gender. This point generates room to argue that a presumption of equal sharing – to the extent that it rests upon compensatory rationales – may be less powerful in civil partnerships. Nonetheless, that claim can be circumnavigated by the argument for equal sharing as an independent principle – one applicable to civil partnership just as much as to marriage.

In law and discourse, it has typically been assumed that the religious freedom of state-funded religious schools must trump any competing right to non-discrimination on grounds of belief. For example, the Irish Constitution has been interpreted as requiring the broad exemption of denominational schools from the statutory prohibition on religious discrimination in school admissions. This stance is mirrored in the UK Equality Act 2010. Thus, religious discrimination in the public education context has been rationalised with reference to a ‘liberty-equality dichotomy’, which prioritises the integrity of faith schools' ‘ethos’, as an imperative of religious freedom. We argue that this familiar conceptual dichotomy generates a novel set of absurdities in this peculiar context. We suggest that the construction of religious freedom and non-discrimination as separate and antagonistic values rests on a conceptually flawed definition of religious freedom itself, which overlooks the necessary dependence of religious freedom on non-discrimination. Furthermore, it overstates the necessity, to religious freedom, of religious schools' ‘right to discriminate’. We argue for an alternative ordering of the values of religious freedom and non-discrimination – which we locate within the neo-republican theory of freedom as non-domination.

The importance of the subjects of litigation being able to tell their story directly to the decision maker is widely recognised as offering therapeutic benefits to all involved in the decision-making process. The Court of Protection makes life changing decisions for individuals on health and welfare matters, and it is clearly critical that the person at the centre of those proceedings (known as ‘P’) is given the opportunity for ‘direct engagement’ with the judge deciding their case. This paper interrogates the under-explored domain of the prevalence and forms in which ‘P’ has engaged directly with the judge (particularly by meeting with the judge without giving formal evidence) with the aid of a database of over 200 ‘health and welfare’ judgments. An integrated approach is adopted, drawing from these judgments, but also cross-referencing the far more advanced literature and case law on children meeting judges in the Family Court to explore some of the issues. This paper finds that the transplantation of practices from the Family Court to the Court of Protection has been problematic, has sometimes obscured P's direct contact with the judge in their own case, and jars with recent moves in the Court of Protection towards modelling empathetic judging and ‘standing in P's shoes’.

This paper critically evaluates clause 106 of the Adoption and Children Bill that permits for unmarried fathers to acquire parental responsibility on joint registration of the child's birth. I will argue that there are two factors influencing the proposed expansion of the ways in which fathers may acquire parental responsibility. First, current law recognises the automatic parental responsibility of mothers but only of married fathers, and so is said to contain an imbalance in favour of mothers. Secondly, there is a perceived need to recognise the father's commitment to the child, which is allegedly demonstrated through the act of registration. This paper examines these two themes by reviewing recent case law relating to section 4 applications. It will show that the current law does at least place an emphasis on fathers showing some merit to the court and will argue that the reform in itself will do little to enhance and promote the relationships between children and fathers. However, as a result considerable incursion will be made into the control that women, as primary carers, have in relation to their children.