In a previous paper in this journal I responded to Professor John Keown’s criticisms of the British Medical Association guidance on withholding and withdrawing life-prolonging treatment, arguing that the sanctity of life principle he endorses is indefensible as a juridical and moral guide. Professor Keown replied recently, also in this journal, alleging that I wrongly caricatured the sanctity of life position he supports, which continues to illuminate the proper decision-making path in relation to the withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining medical treatment. In this present paper it is submitted that Keown’s riposte is misconceived and disguises the true nature of the sanctity of life stance, which both rests upon unconvincing premisses and tends towards unacceptable repercussions, thus leading to its inevitable and rightful rejection.

There is, it seems, a revival of interest in anarchist theories of law. But then there is always a revival of interest in anarchist theories of law. In the 1960s Wortley began his text, Jurisprudence, with a study of anarchism, and the early 1980s saw a succession of papers and articles on anarchist critiques of law. Despite this, discussion of anarchist legal theory has rarely moved beyond the introductory stage. Basic tenets have been outlined but detailed analysis eschewed. Part of the reason for this may lie in basic difficulties of definition. The concern has been with ‘anarchist theories of law’, but what is anarchism?

Most writers, whether they be anarchist theorists or academic commentators, begin with the proposition that the word anarchism is derived from the Greek anarchos and means either ‘no government’ or ‘no ruler’. Such etymology cannot take the place of definition but, beyond the bare fact that anarchism involves the rejection of rulers, no further definition seems possible.

The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 purports to move away from the identification doctrine, towards a genuinely organisational model of corporate liability. There is a risk, however, that insistence upon the involvement of senior management in corporate manslaughter will reduce the Act to doing no more than aggregating individual misconduct. Such an approach would fail both to encompass the culpability of the organisation as more than just a collection of individuals, and to offer an effective tool for the prosecution of large organisations. I argue that the senior management requirement should not be interpreted as focusing on individuals, but on the authoritative systems of work that organisations impose upon their employees. Inherent in large organisations is a corporate structure, determining the meaning and value of what employees perceive and the boundaries and direction of their work. These structures emerge from the involvement of senior managers, whose rank and role within organisations enables them to contribute to the development of corporate structure. Through insistence on the involvement of these corporate architects and surveyors, the 2007 Act may be seen to emphasise the role of the organisation in corporate manslaughter, identifying truly corporate culpability.

Paternalistic forms of regulation for the retail investment market have been gradual and restrained, even though significant gaps exist between investors’ needs and market-based provision. As ordinary citizens reckon with a variety of savings needs and become financial citizens responsible for their own financial welfare provision, financial health is not merely an issue of individual fortunes but a social need. Adverse financial welfare consequences can at scale become a social issue, as is reflected in the social demands and critique entailing from the collapse of London and Capital Finance in the UK. The need for more regulatory paternalism goes beyond preventing mis-selling, and the outworking of welfare beyond point-of-sale remains relatively unconsidered. Post-sale welfare is, however, increasingly recognised for consumer credit and is slower to catch on in relation to savings needs and investments. This paper advocates that the regulator should not remain ambivalent about the need for more paternalistic interventions. Paternalistic protection is not only about shifting more burdens to the industry but also about the provision of public goods where there are standardised baseline needs for retail investors. This paper unpacks the roles of both the public and private sectors in addressing retail investors’ financial welfare needs.

The distinction between primary and secondary victims confirmed by Page v Smith has caused major problems in English psychiatric damage law. The House of Lords has suggested that the search for principle has been called off, and that the only sensible strategy is to say ‘thus far and no farther’. This paper suggests that one way forward is to recognise that it is not only persons who are physically proximate to an ‘accident’ who should be put in a special category: any case in which there is some sort of pre-existing relationship between claimant and defendant should be regarded as different from the standard secondary victim scenario. The relationship concept, first recognised in the USA and now adopted by the Court of Appeal, can be found in embryo form in the early cases.

A significant issue in combatting the Covid-19 pandemic is the need to enhance developing states’ access to Covid-19 vaccines. The present paper considers the request for a temporary waiver of intellectual property rights in relation to Covid-19 technologies and treatments submitted to the World Trade Organization and analyses a key argument against the proposed waiver: that the compulsory licensing provisions set out in the TRIPS Agreement are sufficiently flexible to help states get access to vaccines. The compulsory licensing flexibilities set out in TRIPS, including the amendment to TRIPS in Article 31bis, are evaluated, to explore whether compulsory licensing could be an effective tool in helping developing states to access Covid-19 vaccines. Key issues are explored from a human rights perspective to examine whether a rights-based approach to the compulsory licensing provisions could offer further insights as to how the provisions could be more workable, to enhance access to medicines and vaccines for developing states.

The constitutional referendum is often conceptualised as the ultimate institutional expression of popular sovereignty. However, ‘direct democracy’ is viewed apprehensively by many political and legal theorists, particularly republican scholars. They argue that referendums risk engendering a dangerous ‘populism’ while detracting from the deliberative and moderating virtues of parliamentary democracy. In this paper, I defend the political value of the constitutional referendum from within republican theory, arguing that there is a misplaced focus on parliamentary supremacy within much of the literature on ‘political constitutionalism’. However, I argue it should be valued neither as a mechanism for giving expression to popular will, nor as an intervention by the mythologised ‘constituent power’ – or indeed, contra Tierney, as a ‘sovereign’ exercise in any sense. Rather, it has two main, overlapping virtues: first, its role in facilitating the contestation and checking of executive power in the area of constitutional change, and secondly, its instrumental role in fostering a wider culture of civic participation.

This paper considers the impact of the Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000. It focuses on the kind of situation presented by the Stephen Lawrence murder investigation where racist stereotypes and assumptions infect both police inquiries into serious violent crime and the treatment of victims or their families. It first demonstrates the limited scope of individual redress available prior to the Act in such situations (examining police complaints mechanisms, private prosecutions, misfeasance in public office, judicial review and negligence). It links limitations in the scope of individual redress to a traditional priority accorded to public interests. The Race Relations (Amendment) Act 2000 gives individuals a general right to sue the police for racial discrimination in investigations. It is argued that a similar right probably now exists – at least in the context of life-threatening violence – under the Human Rights Act 1998. These developments seem to signal a shift in the balance between individual rights and the limiting claims of public interests. But the singularity of the 2000 Act is that, in introducing the mechanisms and logic of anti-discrimination law into the criminal process, it creates the potential for a more interactive relationship between individual complaint and the public interest in the collective promotion of change.

Recent high-profile convictions have called attention to the common law offence of preventing a lawful and decent burial. This offence, which can only be found in its modern incarnation since 1974, is being used with increasing frequency. We argue that there is, however, little justification (or need) for criminalising the prevention of burial per se. The historical context of the need to regulate the disposal of corpses is no longer relevant. Moreover, the ambit of the offence is such that it cannot be argued to be targeting acts of intentional disrespect to deceased bodies. We suggest that acts which intentionally impede the administration of justice are rightly criminal, but other offences already deal more appropriately with these. We conclude that the contemporary use of the offence of preventing a lawful and decent burial contributes to an unnecessary proliferation of overlapping offences, providing prosecutors and juries with a way to assign liability to a person whom they suspect, but cannot prove, is guilty of more serious charges.

The European Court of Human Rights (the Court) has been invoking the vulnerability criterion to overcome the drawbacks of cases concerning Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the prohibition of discrimination. This new criterion, allowing the Court to favour the applicants, highlights the applicants’ group affiliation. However, whether this criterion is effective in protecting vulnerable applicants against discrimination is doubtful. To examine this, I divide the Court's approach to Article 14 before and after the application of the vulnerability criterion. I argue that vulnerability criterion was used to fix the drawbacks of Article 14, but eventually backfired. The concept of vulnerability has been ambiguous, inconsistently used by the Court, and paternalistic. I suggest the Court focus on individual autonomy rather than grouping the applicants to improve their legal reasoning of Article 14.

Legislation has been enacted in both England/Wales and Scotland which criminalises smoking in certain places. This paper uses these prohibitions as a way of exploring two prominent theories of criminalisation which were employed in the parliamentary debates on the legislation, namely legal paternalism and the liberal ‘harm principle’. The paper argues that the creation of these offences cannot be justified by paternalism, and that the risk of harm to non-smokers from ‘passive smoking’is a preferable justification. This latter rationale could be used in support of more extensive smoking prohibitions in the future. The paper recognises the desire of many to limit the use of the criminal sanction and concludes by suggesting that unwarranted criminalisation can only be avoided if legislatures proposing new offences clearly articulate their reasons for believing that the criminal law is the best mechanism for reducing or deterring the conduct at issue, and demonstrate that the behaviour cannot adequately be deterred by non-criminal measures.

Following the Gillick case in 1986, it was recognised that mature minors were owed a duty of confidentiality in respect of their medical information. Subsequent cases confirmed that the duty was also owed to non-competent children, including infants, but without explaining the basis for finding the existence of such a duty and its scope. It is particularly unclear when and upon what legal basis a doctor could disclose information to parents when their child wished to keep it confidential. This paper will examine the law of confidentiality as it applies to children, identifying issues which are problematic. Developments in the law of personal confidences which have taken place as a result of the Human Rights Act 1998, and the recognition of Article 8 rights as part of the law, will be reviewed and analysed from the perspective of the duty of confidence owed to children in respect of their medical information. Finally, the paper will offer an explanation of a basis for disclosure to parents which minimises violations of a minor's autonomy.

Drawing on the findings of a year-long empirical study of 15 charities in the county of Merseyside, this article examines some of the implications for charities of entering into the ‘contract culture’. Although not the focus of the empirical study as a whole, the particular aim of this article is to consider the effect of the contract culture on the typically small charity. After a brief consideration of the legal status of charities funding documents within the contract culture, a number of problems faced by small charities that are embraced by the contract culture, together with their legal consequences, are examined. A number of survival tactics for small charities are then discussed. In the light of the publication of the government Compact on relations between itself and the voluntary and community sector, a plea is made for more equal partnerships to be forged between charities and their funders within the contract culture.

This paper discusses the role of theory in legal education. It builds on an exchange between the author and Neil MacCormick and upon the discussion of the place of theory in legal education in William Twining’s symposium. The paper will move from some fairly concrete issues about the place of jurisprudence in the law curriculum towards some wider problems about the place of theory in legal studies and, finally, will consider some issues about the relationship between theory and jurisprudence. On the way it discusses the relationship between theory and philosophy in a manner which focuses upon the controversy about the foundational claims and pretensions of the theoretical and philosophical enterprise.

In December 2005, the Civil Partnership Act 2004 came into force, thereby enabling same-sex couples to obtain formal legal recognition of their relationships. By modelling the provisions for dissolving such partnerships on divorce law, the government effectively transposed into the new regime both a fault-based ‘system’ and the accompanying sense that the law is vested with a role beyond that of simply ending relationships. In view of the recent, but ultimately failed, attempt to introduce no-fault divorce, this paper explores the role of law in this context. Drawing on a series of interviews with key individuals involved in the reform process, it explores how no-fault divorce was hijacked in a vain effort to provide simultaneous means of saving and ending marriage. In particular, the veto wielded by an influential group of idealistic conservatives during the latter stages of the reform process is identified. Given the inability or unwillingness of reformers to confront such conservatism with either a thoroughgoing defence of diversity, or the reality of the limited capacity of states to legislate for morality, the paper calls for a re-evaluation of the law’s role. It questions whether the Civil Partnership Act 2004 represents a missed opportunity to conduct such a re-evaluation and thus to point the way for future divorce reform.

This paper considers some of the difficulties arising from how English law conceptualises certain types of security interests over IPRs, and the problems arising from dual registration systems. This analysis is informed by a critical comparison of the current English doctrine, alongside the US system and the proposals from UNCITRAL. It is argued that attempts to regulate a world of integrated goods (whereby goods and software are inextricably interconnected), through unintegrated regimes of legal governance of security interests over goods and IPRs, is unsustainable. It will thus be argued that reform of security interest law generally (to bring about a functional system of security) and a single register for security interests whether over goods or IPRs is necessary. Specific recommendations to deal with problems concerning purchase money security interests, and third-party purchasers, are put forward.

This paper attends to writing practices by way of examining how a professional regulator engages with research activities conducted by doctors. In order to explore regulatory responses to alleged research misconduct, I use a specific calligraphic practice shared by researchers and regulators. The paper shows that taking this calligraphic practice as an analytical focus can offer surprising dividends to the study of regulation across fields. Via the practice of strikethrough, the General Medical Council effectuates three gestures as it engages with research activities: display, authentication and isolation. Understanding them requires asking what literal and metaphorical meanings travel in the strikethrough.

The leading recent authority on beneficial interests in shared homes is Lloyds Bank plc v Rosset, where the House of Lords clarified what had become rather a confused area of law. By no means all the problems were resolved, however, and the House proceeded on the basis of a now commonly-held but nevertheless fundamental misapprehension, that common intention is relevant to the creation of a trust. It is our contention that once it is clear precisely whose intention is relevant, and why, many of the conceptual difficulties in this area disappear.

For the purposes of the discussion, we consider the two situations, where legal title to a home is vested in A alone, and where it is vested in A and B jointly. In each case, the question is whether B can claim a beneficial interest, and if so, what is its nature and extent.

This paper advances a functional analysis of the UK constitution. It explores how the UK constitution discharges three minimum ‘constituting’, ‘legitimating’ and ‘limiting’ functions that citizens living in modern liberal democracies may legitimately expect all constitutions – irrespective of form – to perform. This functional enquiry breaks with dominant trends in the legal scholarship that remain focused on theorising the constitution's underlying political or legal nature or, likewise, identifying its ultimate source of authority. In addition to offering a richer descriptive account of constitutional practice, this paper identifies, normatively, an institutional responsibility for Parliament to discharge the UK constitution's three minimum functions. Recognising that institutional responsibility unlocks fresh insights into two constitutional conundrums: the legitimacy of judicial review and the status of ‘constitutional statutes’. At the same time, it also exposes deficiencies and tensions in relation to the quality of Parliament's institutional performance on matters of minimum constitutional functioning.

The Government's Consultation Paper does not have a question mark in its title. It does not purport to be a serious discussion of the role of a Supreme Court in a democracy. This is scarcely to be expected of such a document or its respondents, so I propose to respond in its own terms rather than on the loftier plane usually adopted by contributors to this journal. More unexpectedly, the Consultation Paper does not even put forward a serious set of options to consider. At the Law Commission, we always had (at least a metaphorical) question mark in our title because we almost always put forward two options which do not appear in this consultation: the ‘do nothing’ and the ‘let’s abolish it' options. Both have a lot to be said for them here.