This paper assesses the current state of English criminal law in relation to the use of physical force by parents as a means of disciplining their children. It does so in the light of the Children Act 2004, the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950, Art 3, pressure from bodies such as the United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child and the law in other parts of Europe. It acknowledges that parents should have a large degree of autonomy in relation to parenting. However, the defence of ‘discipline’ or ‘reasonable chastisement’ is outdated, vague and potentially dangerous to children. It is argued that the response of the British Government to criticism of our law has been far from satisfactory. The reform which was incorporated into the Children Act 2004 as a result of pressure upon the government aims to avoid criminalising ‘ordinary families’ for minor smacks. However, the statement of principle is so diluted that parents might understandably be confused and enforcement may be difficult. Moreover, the pressure for reform has continued unabated. The paper concludes that what is needed is an outright ban, combined with an educational campaign, which can lead the way in changing the cultural tradition of physical punishment.

This article seeks to examine the question of what the essential nature and definition of a mistake is. It examines whether it can be properly distinguished from ignorance. The article then seeks to examine the requirement of provability, first in the context of mistakes of fact and then in that of mistakes of law. A Dworkinian approach is taken, arguing that it is possible to be mistaken as to the law. The article then shows why an opinion or misprediction cannot be seen as a mistake, before turning to the topical issue of the manner of the recent removal of the mistake of law bar. Using Dworkin's analysis it will be suggested that where a case is overruled it can be said to have been u mistake to rely on it. The article also argues that Birks’ analysis of the question is flawed, in that he fails to see the real distinction between a mistake and a misprediction.

This article seeks to unfold the character, scope and trajectory of justifiable property rights within Hegel’s jurisprudential writings. It does so in order to try to make this reputedly ‘difficult’ and much neglected theorist fit for undergraduate consumption on private law courses.

If we accept the need for an intelligible social theory of private law, why should lawyers consider that of Hegel? Hegel devoted his last book to a ‘Philosophy of Right. This text is, however, barely mentioned by even the more comprehensive of modern textbooks on jurisprudence. There could be little ground for complaint if such neglect of Hegel’s legal writings were based upon a fully reasoned consideration and then subsequent rejection due to certain vital and demonstrable flaws within them.

This article examines the ability of the claimant to recover damages for mental distress in the English law of torts. This is an area of law which has received little attention and indeed, the general impression is frequently that such damages are not recoverable. This article seeks to establish that this is far from the case and that damages are frequently awarded for mental distress even if they are not always openly recognised. Most lawyers are familiar with the award of damages for ‘suffering’ within the action for personal injury, but damages for distress are awarded generally, particularly as aggravated damages, as recognised by the Law Commission in 1997. It will be argued that much will be gained by appreciating the true nature of these damages and the policy factors which determine when the claimant will be granted such an award. Whilst there is no evidence to support a right to claim such damages in their own right, there is sufficient authority for a separate head of damages us part of the claimant's general compensatory claim. It is therefore submitted that open recognition of this head will be to the benefit of individual claimants and the system as a whole in clarifying this area of damages.

The aim in this paper is to challenge the increasingly common view in the literature that the law on end-of-life decision making is in disarray and is in need of urgent reform. The argument is that this assessment of the law is based on assumptions about the relationship between the identity of the defendant and their conduct, and about the nature of causation, which, on examination, prove to be indefensible. A clarification of the relationship between causation and omissions is provided which proves that the current legal position does not need modification, at least on the grounds that are commonly advanced for the converse view. This paves the way for a clarification, in conclusion, of important conceptual and moral differences between withholding, refusing and withdrawing life-sustaining measures, on the one hand, and assisted suicide and euthanasia, on the other.

Cuts in the Charity Commission's budget have caused it to retrench in its regulatory activity and re-prioritise its core functions. As a consequence, the Commission has promoted greater trustee self-reliance and charity-sector provision of regulatory services. This paper analyses these regulatory developments alongside a broader analysis of self-regulation in the charity sector. This paper argues that while self-reliance and self-regulation offer opportunities to the charity sector to create nuanced, sector-sensitive regulation, they could also compromise the credibility and quality of charity regulation. This paper further argues that the charity sector needs to address as a matter of priority the drivers for regulatory reform, the purposes and priority of charity regulation, and the shift in the balance of power that results.

Constitutional reform in the UK is usually pragmatic and piecemeal. Occasionally, however, comprehensive changes are proposed which are primarily driven by principle. The current proposals for constitutional change are a rare example of this type of reform. The abolition of the office of Lord Chancellor, the creation of a new Supreme Court and a Judicial Appointments Commission make up a package of measures intended to ‘redraw the relationship between the judiciary and the other branches of government’ and put it on a ‘modern footing’ by introducing a much clearer separation of powers between them.

The constitutional and political implications of a United Kingdom Supreme Court are far-reaching. This paper suggests that its establishment represents an increase in judicial independence, both in terms of the individual judge and institutionally. In so doing, it draws attention to the continued infringement of judicial independence, most notably through the use of senior judges to chair inquiries, and to the need for judicial independence to be safeguarded by the judges themselves. It argues that, somewhat paradoxically, the independence of the Court may increase the extent to which it is perceived as a political player and used for political purposes. It also argues that the requirement for greater transparency in the appointment of judges and the processes and decisions of the Court needs to be matched by the improved accountability of the Court and the Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs. The paper ends by speculating on the longer-term constitutional implications of a Supreme Court, suggesting that it could result in the further diminution of parliamentary sovereignty, a more even distribution of power between the constitutional actors and the development of the United Kingdom into a constitutional democracy.

Recently in this journal John Keown attacked the BMA Guidance published on ‘Withholding and Withdrawing Life-prolonging Medical Treatment’, arguing that it was, fundamentally at odds with the sanctity of life doctrine as properly understood, condemning the intentional termination of individuals' lives. In riposte it is asserted that even this modified version of the doctrine cannot support a defensible moral or legal standard for decision-making here, being founded upon an excessive emphasis on the mental state of the clinician and an inappropriately narrow focus on the effects of the proposed treatment on the ‘health’ of the patient, as opposed to being primarily driven by the (best) interests of the patient. The attempt to divorce treatment decisions from broader evaluations of the net benefit or other otherwise able to be attained by the patient from such treatment, including the taking into account of the individual's handicapped state, accordingly fails. Acceptance of such reality is, at the least, the first step toward a common language for further dialogue even between those with polar opposite opinions in this sphere.

The relationship between criminal law and regulatory techniques in responses to corporate crime is complex and changing. The Serious Fraud Office's increased proactivity in relation to economic crime is precariously balanced on the fulcrum of criminal and regulatory rhetoric. In this paper I note significant developments and suggest that the similarities and differences between regulatory and criminal law approaches to corporate accountability are ripe for re-examination.

In this journal Harry McVea recently has asked ‘What's Wrong with Insider Dealing?’ One imagines that many readers will have thought the question rather supererogatory, but Mr McVea more than adequately shows that just this question is very live in many of the leading works on the economics of stock markets. One is here dealing with seminal works such as those of Easterbrook, Fischel, Hirshleifer and Manne which are identified with the discipline of financial economics as such. Mr McVea, in my opinion rightly, concludes that insider dealing is wrong, but does so in a way that I think is wrong headed, particularly in the way that one fears his conclusion will be interpreted by most readers of this journal. Though there is much that is admirable in Mr McVea's paper, his conclusion is uncompelling, and is so for a reason with which I think it important to take issue.

Three connected processes make up the UK corporate rescue regime: the formal, legal regime, informal approaches and the quasi-formal system, as exemplified by the pre-packaged administration. These three processes not only operate through different procedures but they are also attuned to the pursuit of different objectives and values, they are subject to different controls and they involve different roles for, and relationships between, the parties affected by corporate rescues. A number of negative and identifiable consequences flow from such divergences. An understanding of the tensions between these three systems and an awareness of the challenges posed by transition through different procedures does, however, help to explain many of the deficiencies of current corporate rescue processes and it also provides an enhanced basis for considering current proposals for reforming restructuring and working towards an improved rescue regime.

Since the decision of the House of Lords to overturn its earlier judgment in the case of Re Pinochet (No 2) the courts have closed the floodgates to further claims of judicial bias by adopting a restrictive approach to the rules on judicial disqualification. In the light of these restrictions on claims of individual bias, this paper reviews the institutional mechanisms for safeguarding impartiality at a collective level through the appointments process and the system for allocating cases to judges. It highlights weaknesses in these arrangements such as the lack of openness, the potential for inappropriate political control and the lack of diversity in the composition of the judiciary. It argues that as the concept of impartiality is increasingly linked to these institutional arrangements the continuing legitimacy of the judiciary requires that these problems are addressed.

This paper explores the relationship between the concept of the ‘identity of the child’ and legal parenthood. It examines the role of identity in the determination of legal parenthood in three contexts: (a) parental orders after surrogacy arrangements; (b) disputed paternity cases; and (c) the statutory rules in cases involving gamete donation. This paper argues that the concept of ‘identity’ plays an inconsistent role in the attribution of legal parenthood, because the concept lacks substantive content within judicial reasoning and the statutory framework. The understanding of identity, and the role it plays, appears to change in these different contexts to serve the different purposes that the law is trying to achieve. The reason for this inconsistency is that, despite the utilisation of the language of the ‘child's identity’, legal parenthood remains adult-centric and premised upon replicating the binary, two-parent model of the nuclear family. We argue that instead of appealing to this incoherent concept of ‘identity’, the courts should explicitly engage with different types of parenthood and acknowledge the importance of each for both children and parents. Such an approach would result in more truly child-centred reasoning and serve to diminish the predominance of the binary, two-parent model.

The Legal Services Act 2007 effected major changes in the disciplinary system for solicitors in England and Wales. Both the practice regulator, the Solicitors Regulation Authority, and a disciplinary body, the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal, were reconstituted as independent bodies and given new powers. Our concern is the impact of the Act on the disciplinary system for solicitors. Examination of this issue involves consideration of changes to regulatory institutions and the mechanics of practice regulation. Drawing on Foucault's notion of governmentality, empirical evidence drawn from disciplinary cases handled by the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal and the Solicitors Regulation Authority in 2015 is used to explore potentially different conceptions of discipline informing the work of the regulatory institutions. The conclusion considers the implications of our findings for the future of the professional disciplinary system.

From the 1970 decision of Corbett onwards, legal narratives established two modes of categorising complex social identity in relation to sex and gender. These narratives responded to complex identity questions by attempting to simplify identity by limiting it to biological factors or anatomical and psychological factors.

I demonstrate that the law's struggle to ‘make’ sex is reflected to a certain extent by feminism's trajectory, in that feminisms have also attempted to grapple with these complex questions, and often opted for the same simple solutions to the problem of understanding gender, sex and identity. The aim of this paper is to show that some strands of feminist theory, specifically post-structuralist feminist theory, can produce a more progressive and constructive approach to determining sex in their ability to illuminate the complexities of identity. In particular, my aim is to urge those courts that ‘make’ sex to consider these complexities and the implications that flow from placing transgender people into rigid and narrow categories.

Harmonisation and legal convergence are core tasks of the EU. This paper explores the question about the determinants for national convergence of EU law, specifically applied to the ever-growing body of European consumer sales law. The measurement of national convergence is based on a unique coding of five directives in seven Member States. Using the fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) method, the paper finds that differences in national convergence can partly be explained by favourable features of the corresponding directives; however, mainly, they are the result of a combination of domestic political factors and, to a lesser extent, the country characteristics. This has important policy implications, for instance, on the need to ‘bring in politics’ in the debate about convergence, harmonisation and consumer sales law.

Despite the limited exception introduced by statute in 1974, the principle that truth is and ought to be a complete defence to all actions in defamation is typically regarded as self-evident in modern English law. The fact that England stands here against not only the whole of the civilian tradition but also a number of common-law jurisdictions suggests, however, that it is not. This paper, after surveying the history of the principle in English law and the debates that it has spurred in the past, argues that English law is right on this question, but needs to understand more cogently why. This, in turn, requires an examination of the interests protected by the cause of action. It is only if we accept that it is, and is solely, reputation founded in character that the defence of veritas will be secured.

Shareholder say-on-pay voting allows institutional investors to influence the incentives of managers and, consequently, corporate behaviour. Surprisingly, the preferences of investors on executive compensation have been largely overlooked in the ongoing debates on the role of say-on-pay in corporate governance and the impact of shareholder stewardship on sustainable corporate behaviour. The analysis of investor disclosed explanations of say-on-pay votes in the FTSE 100 companies during 2013–2021 shows that institutional investors rely repeatedly on several dominant themes aimed at improving the incentives of corporate managers and controlling managerial rent extraction. But shareholder interests remain the core focus of say-on-pay votes, with only few investors demanding that companies reward executive directors for protecting the interests of a broader range of affected stakeholders. Additionally, most investors can be grouped into several clusters formed around the voting recommendations of proxy advisers. A group of UK-based institutional investors stands out by taking a more individualistic and diverse approach to the stewardship of executive compensation. These findings highlight the role of local investors in the oversight of executive pay, the growing influence of proxy advisers along with the increasing share of foreign institutional investors, and the influence of best practice governance codes in driving investor stewardship preferences.

Part I of the Prosecution of Offences Act 1985 has established a Crown Prosecution Service for the whole of England and Wales. The Service is, inter alia, responsible for the conduct of all police prosecutions (except minor motoring matters) following the institution of proceedings by the police. Police officers no longer present their own cases in court, but the new Service is not intended merely to replace them with professional advocates. The White Paper on which the Act is based declared that an independent prosecution service should be established. This was in order to give crown prosecutors complete freedom to veto, or to modify, the initial decison of the police to prosecute.