The rule in O’Reilly u Mackman is well known. As a result of Lord Diplock’s speech in that case, the scope of the application for judicial review procedure under s 31 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 and RSC Ord 53, has been dominated by attempts to distinguish between public and private law. According to Lord Diplock, public law cases must normally be pursued under the special Ord 53 procedure whereas private law cases even though involving substantive principles of judicial review must be pursued in ordinary courts. There are also hybrid cases - chimeras which combine features both of public and private law. In such cases the challenger is apparently free to proceed either under Ord 53 or by way or ordinary action or defence. These hybrids are not easy to reconcile with the purposes and policies behind the O’Reilly rule.

This paper evaluates the role being adopted by the European Court of Human Rights when confronted with claims arising from the extreme restriction of access to abortion services in certain Member States. It will be argued that in response to such claims the Court has been prepared to find that the suffering of the applicants can be captured as forms of rights violation, but it has sought to avoid taking a stance as to foetal life, leading it to adopt a highly deferential approach and to avoid the substantive issues at stake, of protection for female reproductive health, dignity and autonomy, in favour of focusing mainly on procedural ones. Having considered such issues as the missing gender-based aspects of the abortion jurisprudence, this paper concludes that its restrained and largely procedural stance has enabled the Court to provide some limited protection for women, on healthcare grounds, but that the opportunity to recognise that highly restrictive abortion regimes systematically and persistently create especially invidious discrimination based on gender has so far been missed.

The function and effectiveness of legal rules as instruments of social organisation have become an important focus of attention for those interested in financial architecture. This paper offers a critical overview of the policy of rule use of the Financial Services Authority (FSA) in the UK and considers the background of this policy, its nature and some problems pertaining to its implementation. The aim is twofold: first, to describe how current policy trends interact with and shape the FSA's policy of rule use and, secondly, to assess the impact of these trends on the effectiveness of this policy. Special attention will be given to developments such as the policy of making more intensive use of rules termed in a high level of abstractness and generality, the fostering of a discursive and participatory character of regulation, the shift towards meta-regulation and the adoption of a risk-based approach to regulation.

Racism has climbed the political agenda at national, European and international levels. Reports from national and international non-governmental organisations (NGO’s) and inter-governmental organisations have focused considerable attention on racism and xenophobia and document an increase in racism, xenophobia, anti-Semitism and race-related activities. As racism has climbed the political agendas, so there has been a substantial increase in the number of national, European and international legal instruments devoted to it. In particular, race-related restrictions on freedom of expression (‘hate-speech’) are increasing and seem likely to continue to do so. Such restrictions give rise to controversy in terms of constitutionality, legal policy and consistency with European and international human rights law. There are also differences of views between the policies of NGO's on restrictions on racist speech.

While much has been written about American legal realism, the nature of its decline is comparably less carefully documented. Jurisprudential lore has it that ‘we are all realists now’. Although it is far from clear who ‘we’ might be, the statement is commonly taken to mean at least three things: that academic and practising lawyers alike have heard and heeded the message that law is not a certain system of rules; that legal doctrine is nowadays conceived in the context of the wider legal process; and that the legal process is nowadays understood to be part of the wider social system. The supposition, in essence, is that modern lawyers think like realists, even if they do not commonly consider themselves to be realists. While the weaker ideas and arguments developed by so-called realists have been discarded, the better ones have been absorbed into modern legal thought.

This paper sets out the distinctive harm caused and wrong done to child pornography victims. It presents a paradigm of reparation within a restorative justice framework that explains the significance of material reparation for these victims. The paper demonstrates that because of the particular nature of child pornography offences and the harms and wrongs occasioned, existing avenues for legal redress in England and Wales and the USA are generally inadequate and ill-fitting, and that a new mechanism for effecting suitable reparation is required. It concludes by sketching a new mode of restorative justice for victims of child pornography, emphasising significant matters that must be addressed alongside financial redress in order to facilitate victims’ restoration.

This paper considers how employment laws are being used in response to what we have termed ‘the eldercare–workplace conundrum’. It is well known that people are now living longer but health is still failing in a significant percentage of older people, meaning that many adults require care for longer, albeit to varying degrees and for varying amounts of time. Many of these individuals will receive care from relatives or close friends who are participating in the labour market: this is increasingly likely as adults are expected or want to remain in paid work for longer, often into their sixties and seventies. The requirements of elderly dependants can cause these workers huge difficulties and dilemmas as they attempt, across time, to accommodate the particular needs of the person for whom they wish to provide care, often a loved one, and meet the particular demands of their employment relationship. In this paper, we consider why this is an area of social policy that warrants effective legal engagement and consider, drawing on various examples of legal responses in other countries that face similar conundrums, what might improve legal engagement in this area.

The doctrine of insurable interest grew out of eighteenth-century anxieties over fraudulent seafarers and habitual gamblers. It was created by the courts, entrenched by statute and remains in place to this day despite the fact that it serves no practical or legal purpose. It was hoped by many that, when the English Law Commission and Scottish Law Commission established their joint review of insurance contract law in 2006, the doctrine would be consigned to the proverbial dustbin of history. Eight years later, these hopes have been dashed. The doctrine is here to stay. This paper asks ‘Why’ and finds the answer to be elusive.

This article addresses the potential advantages and disadvantages of codifying the grounds of judicial review of administrative action. The four principal legal values associated with codification are described: certainty; clarity; democratic legitimacy; and rationality. The extent to which codification might further these values is considered in the light of two comparative models: the United States Administrative Procedure Act 1946 and the Australian Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth). It is concluded that codification offers no solution to the practical and theoretical problems of judicial review. Codification places the content of the principles of judicial review in the hands of politicians. Australian legislation limiting the grounds of review available in migration cases shows the danger to the separation of powers inherent in codification. If it is thought desirable to foster the further development of the principles of judicial review, this can best be achieved by leaving the task to the judiciary.

This paper examines the standard of proof applicable in proceedings for imposing pecuniary penalties for violation of competition rules. Australia, New Zealand and the UK have chosen the civil standard. This unfortunately overlooks the safeguards required by the relevant human rights treaties in proceedings that involve the determination of a ‘criminal charge’. Conversely, Hong Kong has adopted the criminal standard, which may prove unworkable in these proceedings in which economic analysis is key. After analysing whether one may set this quagmire aside by asserting that these proceedings do not involve the determination of a criminal charge, it will be argued that the more plausible solution is to accept the criminal charge characterisation, limit the civil standard to the effects-based elements of the charge and apply the criminal standard to other elements. This will achieve a permissible proportionate derogation from the human rights safeguards. Similar bifurcated models have been adopted for charges such as public nuisance and harassment, and have successfully withstood human rights challenges.

Terms such as sanctity and inviolability have failed to provide a legally coherent or ethically sound principle upon which to determine the scope of the intrinsic value of life against extrinsic, quality-of-life considerations in a medical context. In their recent work, Margaret Brazier and Suzanne Ost introduce a new term, reverence for life, which they suggest may be more appropriate when attempting to navigate the murky waters of the meaning of life and the value that should be attached to it. They suggest that reverence should be utilised as an alternative that better reflects the nuances and the realities of the dilemma. This paper explores the existing difficulties before considering how the principle of reverence might provide a principled compromise over when the presumption in favour of preserving life should be rebutted.

Are company executives greedy? Recent reports reveal that executives’ pay no longer corresponds with corporate performance. The earnings gap has also continued to widen since the 1980s and senior executives in public companies are regularly criticised for taking too much from the corporate purse. The press has highlighted large salary figures and, during a period of economic recession, headlines which accuse corporate bosses of riding a gravy train have considerable impact. This is an issue for corporate governance. We are forced to ask why company law has seemingly failed to control levels of pay at the top of the corporate hierarchy.

Civil forfeiture is playing an increasingly prominent role in the fight against organised crime. While this tool is attractive to law enforcement agencies, it does give rise to concerns under Art 6 of the ECHR. Such proceedings ought to attract the full range of enhanced procedural protections inherent in the criminal process. Even if the Strasbourg Court decides otherwise, there is an argument that the presumption of innocence ought to apply where civil forfeiture proceedings are instituted against a person subsequent to that person being acquitted in criminal proceedings. The Strasbourg jurisprudence, though, is permeated by confusion and inconsistency, which does not inspire confidence that the rights of the individual will be protected. The final section of this paper, then, considers whether civil forfeiture represents a proportionate response in the fight against organised crime. Ultimately, though, given lack of information on such crime, we cannot provide an answer either way – what can be said, though, is that civil forfeiture has had a significant impact on the rights of the individual.

Vaccines have continued to play a crucial global role in preventing infectious diseases in the twenty-first century. The Covid-19 pandemic has underlined their importance, with vaccines seen as the best way to protect the public from coronavirus. A longstanding problem of governments has been the extent to which they should assume responsibility for the compensation of those injured by vaccines. This paper reappraises the vaccine damage schemes currently available in the US and UK in the light of the Covid-19 pandemic. It argues that any improvements to both US and UK schemes should be included in a revised national vaccine policy which takes into consideration their respective long-term national vaccine strategies to prepare for future pandemics. It supports the adoption of a UK-wide National Vaccine Injury Compensation Programme, similar to the one in the US, to be administered by the Secretary of State for Health and Social Care. To balance the need for rigorous criteria to determine causation with the need for fairness, the programme should adopt the US practice of allowing negotiated settlements between parties in circumstances where review of the evidence has not concluded that the vaccine(s) caused the alleged injury but there are close calls concerning causation.

In the past two decades, it has become commonplace for legislative–judicial engagement on contested constitutional questions to be described as a dialogue. This paper argues that the time has come to abandon the notion of dialogue. The first part of the paper describes the difficulties with dialogue theories. Despite the existence of many different versions, these theories share certain constitutionally problematic characteristics. Dialogue theories promote a view of government that is unrealistic, susceptible to normative bias and that overlooks the critical importance of disagreement and institutional differences to a system of democratic government based on the rule of law. The second part of the paper argues that Christopher Ansell's idea of collaboration-as-fruitful-conflict provides a more descriptively and normatively appropriate account of the relationship between the legal and political branches of government.

Where a defendant wrongfully detains the claimant’s goods the standard remedy in conversion permits the defendant to pay the value of the goods to the claimant instead of returning the goods. This amounts to legally sanctioned compulsory purchase. It will be argued that such a remedy is both muddled and unfair. It is muddled because it confuses a proprietary claim with a claim in tort. The action exists in a state of arrested development, never having advanced in step with the action of ejectment, which long ago ensured that wrongfully detained land could be recovered. It is unfair because it sanctions the purchase of the claimant’s goods against their will without any overriding public interest justification. The remedy in conversion needs to be unravelled to produce two distinct actions. One would be a true proprietary action that guarantees the recovery of wrongfully detained goods; the other would be a claim in tort providing personal remedies for wrongful interferences with title to goods. This can be achieved by reviving detinue but confining its ambit to the recovery of goods, leaving conversion to act as a tort.

This article describes an empirical study that was undertaken to see whether lawyers possess the statistical and, more particularly, probabilistic understanding that they need for their professional duties. Their earlier training in mathematics might have been expected to provide them with the relevant understanding, but was found to be wanting. The implications for legal decision making are discussed, and recommendations are made for preparing lawyers with the necessary skills.

The purpose of this article is to examine the nature and potential impact of s 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998. The article draws upon the experience of courts in other Commonwealth jurisdictions which operate a similar provisions. The author analyses the nature of the interpretative technique, reading down, that s 3 requires and illustrates its potential by reference to a number of situations involving statutory imperfections such as ambiguity and overbreadth. The author also outlines the impact that s 3 may have on the exercise of statutory discretion. The author further argues that reading down should not be confused with more intrusive remedies, such as reading in, which are not available under the Human Rights Act.

In a Notice on cooperation between national courts and the Commission published in early 1993, the European Commission made the following policy pronouncements about its future role in the enforcement of the competition rules contained in the EC Treaty:

‘As the administrative authority responsible for the Community's competition policy, the Commission must serve the Community's general interest. The administrative resources at the Commission's disposal to perform its task are necessarily limited and cannot be used to deal with all the cases brought to its attention. The Commission is therefore obliged, in general, to take all organizational measures necessary for the performance of its task and, in particular to establish priorities.’

The Lord Chancellor's Advisory Committee on Legal Education and Conduct (ACLEC) has recently called upon academic law teachers of the undergraduate degree in law to take more of an interest in professional ethics. This means that academic law teachers can no longer set the subject aside as something to be dealt with during vocational legal education. Professional ethics must be taught pervasively, ie at each stage of legal education. This paper argues, however, that professional ethics must be taught pervasively in a further sense: even within the undergraduate curriculum, the task of educating tomorrow's lawyers in professional ethics cannot be left to one or more specialists in the subject.