One of the most important issues arising from the Human Rights Act 1998 is the degree of its applicability, if any, to relations between private individuals. While the wording of the Act itself provides no clear guidance on the matter, and a wide-ranging spectrum of potential outcomes has been identified, there is an emerging academic consensus that the Act will have some horizontal effect – but limited to enabling development of the existing common law, and not extending to provision of new actions and remedies. This paper seeks to challenge that consensus. Fidelity to the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights requires that the effect of the Act go beyond mere incremental development. There is clear authority that the legal systems of signatory states must provide remedies for infringement of individual rights by other individuals. Nothing in the Human Rights Act 1998 obstructs this interpretation. Further, the paper seeks to identify certain fatal errors in the arguments of the ‘developmental consensus’ .

In Campbell v MGN Ltd, the House of Lords endorsed an expansive interpretation of the breach of confidence action to protect privacy interests. The scope and content of this transformed cause of action have already been subject to considerable judicial consideration and academic discussion. This paper focuses on the remedial consequences of privacy breaches. It undertakes an analysis of the principles which govern awards for pecuniary and non-pecuniary loss, the availability of gain-based relief, in particular an account of profits, and exemplary damages.

Even in its traditional scope, the monetary remedies for breach of confidence raise complex issues, mainly resulting from the fact that this doctrine draws on multiple jurisdictional sources such as equity, contract and property law. The difficulties of determining the appropriate remedial principles are now compounded by the fact that English law also aims to integrate its obligation to protect the right to privacy under Art 8 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 1950 into the conceptual framework of the breach of confidence action.

The analysis provided in this paper supports the contention that not only the scope of the cause of action but also important remedial issues are likely to remain in doubt until the wrong of ‘misuse of private information’ is freed from the constraints of the traditional action for breach of confidence. A separate tort would be able to deal more coherently and comprehensively with all wrongs commonly regarded as privacy breaches.

Frederic Goadby's Introduction to the Study of Law, written for law students in British occupied Egypt and later Palestine, provides a significant record of colonial attitudes about Western law and the legal cultures encountered in the Middle East. Edward Said's Orientalism offers a deconstructive methodology which reveals the legal narrative of Goadby's work as offering an invitation to the students to become spectators, along with the colonists of their own legal culture. Once imbued with the spirit of English law, Egyptian and Palestinian students passed the test of civilisation. Goadby's book reminds us that while colonial occupation of territory may have ceased the impact of cultural occupations continue. For both coloniser and colonised this discourse becomes part of their legal inheritance, which creates much work for contemporary legal scholars.

Advocates of the legal equality of women and men must, sooner or later, address the issues raised by the biological differences between the sexes. Even those who would argue for a completely sexually egalitarian society which does not recognise differences based on sex cannot avoid this issue. Women are child-bearers: this a a biological fact. They are also perceived as child-rearers: a view with origins that are clearly more complex than mere biology. These particular functions have an impact on all aspects of a woman's life within and outside the home. In the workplace pregnancy is treated as a deviation from the male norm or as the price to be paid by the employer for employing women. It is women who are expected to make concessions and it is unsurprising that the claim has been made that ‘the heart of woman's oppression is her child-bearing and child-rearing role’.

This paper considers the principle that it is sufficient to establish causation in fact in tort to show that the defendant's act or omission made a material contribution to the harm. It examines the leading case, Bonnington Castings v Wardlaw, and other authorities and argues that the principle involves an application of the but-for test and not an exception to it. If exceptions to the but-for test are to be made, they should be clearly articulated and justified, as, for example, in Fairchild. A broad interpretation of ‘material contribution’ as establishing in some cases such an exception provides insufficient clarity and is certainly to be supported.

This paper examines the government’s reform of the current system of clinical negligence litigation in England, focusing on an analysis of the redress scheme for low value claims to be established under the NHS Redress Act 2006. The Act establishes a scheme to provide a package of redress to patients in circumstances where they have suffered harm as a result of negligence during the course of medical treatment provided by the NHS. One of the British Government’s central aims in embarking upon reform in this area was to provide a low cost, quick and genuine alternative to the current clinical negligence litigation system. This paper critically analyses this reform of the current system by reference to an examination of what constitutes a just redress scheme in the circumstances. Such analysis shows that the government has missed a golden opportunity to establish a scheme which truly ‘makes amends’ to patients who have suffered harm through medical treatment in the NHS. Instead, the scheme is likely to operate in practice as an administrative scheme for low value claims that serves the institutional and financial interests of the NHS, and therefore fails to address longstanding patient concerns over the provision of redress arising out of harm suffered through medical treatment. As a result, patient confidence in the scheme is likely to be undermined in the long term.

In a recent study, the influential theorist of higher education Ronald Barnett suggests that one way for academics to address the pressures on their professional lives is to embrace a multidimensional concept of working time. Drawing on the analysis of space by the French philosopher/sociologist Henri Lefebvre, Barnett advocates conceiving academic practice as a continuum of interrelated strands rather than a set of discrete packages of activity subject to bureaucratic domination. This paper examines whether this approach can reassert agency on the part of academics and provide a site for resistance to the obsession on the part of managers and policy makers with outputs and the quantification of working hours. It sets Barnett's analysis in the context of other empirical studies in higher education literature on the management and allocation of workloads, particularly on tensions arising from conflicting demands of research and teaching. It also examines synergies between Barnett and other scholarship on the professional lives of law academics on the part of Bradney, Collier and Cownie. The paper concludes that a Lefebvrean analysis of how time and space are constituted by human activity provides a rigorous theoretical framework within which to reconstitute the coherence in academic practice which is sought by many in higher education.

This essay addresses a perennial theme within the doctrine of common law. It is that of the Englishness of English law or alternatively, as Nietzsche once remarked, the lawfulness of being English. It is, ofcourse, a well-known and ironic historical fact that English law is a rather confused form oflocal French Law. The most obvious feature ofcommon law has been that for most of its history, it was recorded in Latin and argued and reported in a species of French. When William Camden sought to identify the most distinctive characteristic of the inhabitants of the Island Britannia, the only thing he could find about the origin of the word Britain was the ancient Gallic practice of painting the body with woad: ‘Brith… signifies anything that is painted and coloured over.’

The European desire to ensure that bearers of EU rights are adequately compensated for any infringement of these rights, particularly in cases where the harm is widely diffused, and perhaps not even noticed by those affected by it, collides with another desire: to avoid the perceived excesses of an American-style system of class actions. The excesses of these American class actions are in European discourse presented as a sort of bogeyman, which is a source of irrational fear, often presented by parental or other authority figures. But when looked at critically, the bogeyman disappears. In this paper, I examine the European (and UK) proposals for collective action. I compare them to the American regime. The flaws and purported excesses of the American regime, I argue, are exaggerated. A close, objective examination of the American regime shows this. I conclude that it is not the mythical bogeyman of a US class action that is the barrier to effective collective redress; rather, the barriers to effective, wide-ranging group actions lie within European legal culture and traditions, particularly those mandating individual control over litigation.

After the Aberfan disaster on 21 October 1966, which killed 144 people, 116 of them children, the Charity Commission, duty-bound to uphold an outdated and inflexible law, intervened and obstructed payments by the charitable disaster fund to individual victims and for the cemetery memorial. It did not intervene to protect the fund from a government raid on its money to pay for the removal of dangerous coal tips above Aberfan – a raid that seems dubiously justifiable in charity law. The failures of regulation after Aberfan are discussed; some of them have since been remedied, some not.

This article is a response to a series of articles on contract law and distributive justice. In the first article, published in the Yale Law Journal, Professor A. T. Kronman put forward the thesis that the law of contract is necessarily concerned with distributive justice – that is, with the ‘fair division of wealth among the members of society’. In the second article, published in the Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, W. N. R. Lucy rejected that thesis and argued that limits on contracting are based on freedom rather than distributive justice. In this article I argue that contract law is and should be concerned both with freedom and with the substantive fairness of the distribution effected between the parties.

Leslie Scarman was one of the most influential common law judges of the twentieth century. As a judge, he was relatively conventional and sometimes unadventurous. His technique can be contrasted with that of his contemporary, Lord Denning. However, his role in establishing the Law Commission of England and Wales afforded a model that has been copied throughout the world. His early support for a law of human rights encouraged the adoption of the Human Rights Act 1998. This paper explains the essential unity of Scarman’s legal philosophy and the importance of his contribution at a time when basic assumptions about governance in Westminster democracies are being re-examined and sometimes found wanting.

Breach of confidence is in danger of being enveloped by fiduciary doctrine. Law's ability to discipline confidence-breaking by computer hackers and persons unknown to their victims may be lost if this wrong's separateness is not maintained. Distinct moral imperatives and policies arise when confidentiality is protected. However, A-G v Blake casts doubt on the independence of breach of confidence and breach of fiduciary duty. Conflation of the wrongs may have occurred at Britain's highest appellate level. Similar developments can seen in Australia, Canada, Malaysia and New Zealand.

Legal scholars over the last 25 years or so have experienced a growing sense of dissatisfaction with the traditional classifications that segment university curricula and legal textbooks. Contract and tort, for instance, are felt to be not so different after all. The intimate historical links between the tort of negligence and the action of assumpsit may be seen as reflecting the realitics more truly than the later doctrinal separation of voluntarily and involuntarily incurred obligations. The growing impact of public law on the exercise of privatc rights, and the interweaving of public and private law that runs through an evcn greater portion of the legal system, cause still more fundamental doubts.

The common law restraint of trade doctrine continues to provide valuable protection in a variety of business contexts. This paper analyses an incompatibility problem that has arisen between that doctrine and EU competition rules (in particular Art 101 Treaty on the Functioning of the EU [TFEU]) as implemented by EU Regulation 1/2003, which, amongst other matters, delineates the interface between national law and EU competition law. According to the High Court, once a court has applied Art 101 TFEU, Art 3 of the Regulation prevents a court from reaching a contrary finding under the restraint of trade doctrine. Thus, the court cannot find a clause is void under the doctrine if the clause comes within the scope of, but is not prohibited by, Art 101 TFEU. In effect, this conclusion displaces the restraint of trade doctrine for parties who are subject to unreasonable restraints that fall foul of the doctrine but are not prohibited by Art 101 TFEU. The interface problem and the possible solution are presented as issues of Europeanisation. The negative impact on national law deriving from an EU measure is portrayed as a ‘top down’ Europeanisation scenario. A contrary ‘uploading’ perspective reveals how and why Art 3 and associated Recitals in Regulation 1/2003 were ‘constructed’. These findings on the intended scope of Art 3 are used to challenge the High Court's view on the negative implications of the Regulation for the restraint of trade doctrine. Finally, this paper offers specific proposals as to how courts in the United Kingdom and Ireland could ensure that the restraint of trade doctrine is not an inevitable casualty of Europeanisation. It argues that when looking for a solution to the ‘top-down’ Europeanisation problem faced by the restraint of trade doctrine, the ‘uploading’ perspective of Europeanisation suggests a solution.

The enactment of the Charities Act 2006 is widely viewed as one of the most momentous events in the recent history of English charity law, and the impact of the Act on the pre-existing law is still being debated. This paper inquires into the operation of the Act within the religious sphere. It seeks to explore the basis upon which charitable recognition was accorded within this sphere before the Act and to assess how far the law that was previously in force has been preserved, modified or rendered inoperative by the provisions of the Act. Three fundamental dimensions of the legal regime governing religious charities are especially relevant to this inquiry. The first dimension encompasses the elusive quest for the meaning of religion in the charitable sense. The second focuses on the long-standing requirement that religious purposes must be beneficial to the public in order to be charitable. The third is concerned with the human rights implications of conferring or withholding charitable status within the religious domain. Each dimension is examined in turn with a view to providing an insight into the complexities and difficulties inherent in the pre-existing law and the extent to which these have been addressed by the reforms contemplated by the Act.

This paper provides an in-depth case study of the enforcement of copyright in photographs by certain rights-owners today: freelance professional photographers who derive income from the exploitation of photographic copyright. Referring to the theoretical framework of Guido Calabresi and A Douglas Melamed, the paper reflects on the implications of the case study for the nature and function of copyright in a specific context today. Bringing the experience today into conversation with the enforcement of copyright by professional photographers in past times (the late nineteenth/early twentieth centuries), the paper notes the influence of the bureaucratisation of copyright exploitation (ie exploitation through picture libraries) on legal decision making in a particular forum today: the Intellectual Property Enterprise Court Small Claims Track. The paper concludes with more general reflections on the case study's implications for the courts and copyright policy-makers today.

The recent litigation arising out of the Spycatcher affair was bound by the very nature of the issues at stake to be controversial; yet whatever view is to be taken of the rights and wrongs behind these issues one aspect of the litigation that was always likely to give rise to difficulties and to leave the common lawyers open to criticism was the conceptual framework in which these issues were handled. Ought serious constitutional questions like press freedom - questions that involve not just the public ‘interest’, but also the public’s ‘right’ to information in a democracy - to be debated at the level ofprivate ownership? Indeed is it actually rational to treat a government body, in relation to another government body or to the press, as if it were a private citizen entitled to the same rights (for example a ‘right to privacy) the human legal subject?

The idea that psychoanalysis might be of use in the study oflaw and legal activity is by no means anything new. At the beginning of this century, the Russo-Polish jurist Leon Petrazycki proposed a theory of legal psychology, arguing that law, as an intuitively intelligible component of the human mental process, is in essence constituted by individual feelings of moral obligation and responsibility. Around the same time, psychoanalytical theory was beginning to make a slight impact on American and European jurisprudential thinking. This impact was to become all the more significant when, in the 1930s, Thurman Arnold and Jerome Frank presented arguments about the nature oflegal reasoning, and the roles of both academic lawyers and judges, which were very clearly founded upon broad interpretations of psychoanalytic ideas and concepts. In the continental tradition, Hans Kelsen, though in his early work drawing a distinction ‘between pure legal theory and psychological-sociological speculation,’ nevertheless attempted on occasion to conceive of the sovereignty of the state in Freudian psychoanalytic terms