The Court of Session decision in Pringle, Petitioner again raises the issue of what constitutional effect, if any, is to be attributed to the Treaty of Union between Scotland and England. Specifically, is it competent for the Court of Session to find that an Act or a provision in an Act of the United Kingdom Parliament is invalid because of an inconsistency with an Article of the Treaty of Union as enacted in Scots law by the former Scottish Parliament in the Union With England Act 1707 (c 7)? This is the first case since MacCormick v Lord Advocate in which the Inner House of the Court of Session has commented on this favourite question of Scottish constitutional lawyers and, although hardly answering the question any more revealingly than it did in that case, the court's latest reservation of opinion on the answer is worthy of some further discussion.

The liability of public authorities in negligence continues to be a problematic area of the law. Some of the difficulties have been caused by the adoption by the courts of unnecessary and unworkable tests, in addition to the ordinary principles of the law of negligence. This is normally done to restrict liability, as with the policy–operational dichotomy, and the propositions that no liability can arise in respect of an act that ‘falls within the ambit of a statutory discretion’ or where the matter is non-justiciable. Sometimes the intention seems to be to extend liability, as with the suggestion that, generally, a duty of care may arise where there is an irrational failure to exercise a statutory power. Recent cases have helpfully continued the process of removing these special rules, leaving matters to be dealt with by the ordinary principles of negligence. Those principles enable proper account to be taken of the particular functions and responsibilities of public authorities. However, the cases remain difficult and the outcomes can still give rise to debate and disagreement. Insofar as there is a good case for extending the range of situations in which compensation is available in respect of the careless or unlawful acts of public authorities, it would be better to develop ex gratia schemes and the provision of remedies through ombudsmen than to extend the law of tort.

Despite recent attempts at judicial reformulation, the question of the effect of a plaintiffs illegal conduct on his right to pursue a common law negligence action for personal injury damages remains largely unsettled, and on an uncertain policy and doctrinal foundation. There is a continued obsession with public policy, whether expressed, as it is in England, as a matter of public conscience, or in Australia, as a proximity consideration preventing the finding of a duty of care. However formulated, public policy, in particular the public conscience, as an ad hoc means of determining the effect of a plaintiff's illegality, is unsatisfactory for this purpose, and has proved problematic and unmanageable for the courts. It is here submitted that personal injury negligence law, properly understood and deployed, does not require, nor is served by, the continued application of the illegality defence.

Law is a social institution. Indeed, it is more: it is one of Man's better inventions in that it has made co-existence possible between large numbers of people and has enabled them to achieve within a framework of control and co-ordination more than individuals could achieve on their own. Law is not by any means the only mode of social regulation, nor may it even be thought paramount; but it is important and pervasive and, as such, deserves to be respected by every society. If a society falters in respect of its law, that could be heralding its undoing. Is that an extravagant statement? Let us see what has been taking place of late in the industrial sphere, which is vital enough to national existence.

This paper explores the implications for English law of the decision of the European Court of Justice in joined cases C-46/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur v Germany and C-48/93 R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p Factortame (No 4) and subsequent decisions developing the principles enunciated therein. More specifically, it examines how the English law of torts is to accommodate the European law obligation to compensate, in appropriate circumstances, individuals suffering a loss as a result of a breach by the state of Community law. In confronting this question English law is engaged in the unfamiliar exercise of attempting to match a remedy to an already recognised right: the history of the common law, and the law of torts in particular, is of defining rights in the light of the existing remedies under which they could be asserted.

It is an established principle that an individual who is adversely affected by a public nuisance may not sue in tort unless he can show that he has suffered ‘particular damage’ over and above that suffered by the general public. Traditionally the principle has been justified on the ground of prevention of multiplicity of suits. It is argued that unless the complainant's injury is in some way distinguishable from that suffered by the general public, the proper plaintiff is the Attorney General as the public's representative; otherwise the wrongdoer could be punished ‘a hundred times for the same cause’.

Universities have increasingly become aware of the fact that the intellectual property (IP) rights that attach to the work of their academics could become significant and valuable assets to the university as an institution and economic organisation. The study involved analysis of the copyright and intellectual property policies of universities in the UK and the interviewing of specialised representatives of universities in relation to the policies of their respective institutions. The principal question of the study was the way in which university policies deal with the issue of ownership of copyright generated by academic staff, which proved to be a sensitive area. University policies presume that, by default, they own all work that academics create as their employees. There seems to be insufficient appreciation of the differentiated legal interpretation of the employees' copyright rule. At least in relation to core academic work (scholarly books and journal articles in particular), initial copyright ownership by the university, by virtue of the statutory employee-copyright rule, is highly doubtful. As a result of the universities' principal position with regard to ownership, university IP policies have resorted to complicated and artificial assignment and licencing provisions, with questionable enforceability.

Mistakes in assisted human reproduction procedures such as IVF, egg, sperm and embryo donation are surprisingly common, but tortious liability for such mistakes has not been addressed in the courts of England and Wales, or Ireland. This paper presents an argument in favour of a vindicatory approach to tortious claims arising from mistakes, where the claimants are the parents of the resulting, healthy, child. Drawing on the analogous tort of wrongful pregnancy, the paper provides a vindicatory account of the case of Rees v Darlington Memorial Hospital, and argues that Rees signposts the correct approach for tortious claims arising from mistakes in assisted human reproduction. It is argued that while the law should not compensate ‘loss’ flowing from the birth of a child, parents should be entitled to an award of damages to vindicate their right to reproductive autonomy. The paper explores vindication of the right to reproductive autonomy through the tort of negligence, but argues that vindication may be more effectively achieved through the creation of a separate tort which is actionable per se, strict liability, and expressly focused on vindication rather than compensation.

Recent governments have introduced a plethora of reforms seeking to decentralise power to local government in England. Invariably, however, these have fallen short of stated objectives, leaving councils at the mercy of central supervision and with insufficient local autonomy. This paper explores the reasons underpinning this concern. It identifies a top-down approach to localism and considers the culture of centralism that persists as a consequence. It then discusses how a bottom-up approach might be achieved, exploring how political and legal mechanisms can protect councils from centralised interference in the future.

This paper challenges the traditional assumption that punitive damages are unavailable for breach of contract. It is shown that Addis v Gramophone provides weak authority for this assumption. The paper considers whether there is a logically coherent argument for retaining punitive damages in tort, while denying them for breach of contract, and it is shown that there is not. The main arguments advanced against punitive damages in civil proceedings are examined and shown to be unpersuasive. Finally, the efficient breach theory is considered and rejected on the ground that it significantly underestimates the costs associated with breach. In conclusion, the paper recommends that punitive damages should be exceptionally awarded to deter outrageous breaches of contract in cases where compensatory damages are inadequate and gain-based damages are unavailable.

Streaming services now provide the dominant way in which music is distributed and consumed online. Digital rights management (DRM) lies at the heart of this trend and has evolved alongside a movement from copy-based to streaming-based consumption. This shift poses a number of new and unique issues. Music streaming services have changed the nature of the product offered, with musical content becoming de-bundled and reduced to a series of permissions covered by DRM and associated licences, leaving users trapped in a permission-based system. This may create tension with copyright law principles regarding personal ownership and exhaustion of rights in relation to secondary markets, but through analysing relevant US and European case law it can be demonstrated that there is little, if any, legal opportunity for digital secondary markets to emerge. There are also further specific consequences which may affect artists relating to musical diversity and the composition of popular music and, also, consequences regarding the changing nature of the Internet itself. In this context copyright remains centrally important, but only in establishing the initial proprietary rights that enable subsequent DRM and licence-based online exploitation, indicative of a re-establishment of record industry power that is now allied to streaming platforms.

The area of corporate disregard has a poor reputation for certainty of reasoning. To provide an alternative way of approaching the issue, we conducted an empirical study of the relationship between rationale and outcome within UK corporate disregard cases from the nineteenth to the twenty-first century. We examine the evidence from three perspectives. First, we examine the broad range of instrumental rationales found in the case law by disregard rates in order to identify where issues might be arising with individual rationales. Secondly, as suggested in the wider empirical literature, we examine the rationale rates by jurisdiction in order to see whether there were problematic interpretation issues concentrated in particular parts of the court levels. Thirdly, we examine the rationale rates by substantive claim to see whether contextual aspects of the doctrine, as the court identified with family law in Prest, were influencing outcomes. By providing an empirical study on the rationales instrumental to corporate disregard outcomes we aim to introduce a broader evidential view of where concerns may lie, which can both aid critique of key judicial historical developments such as Adams and Prest and provide a broader evidence base that might aid future judicial reform of the area.

Relational contract theory holds that the interpretation of a contract must take full account of the context and surrounding circumstances of the parties’ bargain so as to give effect to their respective intentions. This paper argues that if a relational treatment of contracts is to be institutionalised, in the sense of being utilised in a contract dispute to determine and give effect to the parties’ intentions, then it must operate at an abstract level. That is to say, rather than using relevant context to determine what the actual parties intended in the circumstances at hand, the contextualist enquiry should ascertain the relevant context by reference to what the parties would have agreed to in the circumstances, had they properly reflected on what their self-interest requires. I discuss the merits of this proposition by reference to a number of appellate judgments, which already endorse contextualism as a response to contractual ambiguity, and I ultimately apply it to the Supreme Court's judgment in Rainy Sky SA v Kookmin Bank.

This paper explores the impact of cuts and continued fee stagnation on publicly funded criminal defence in England and Wales. In so doing, we take an explicit focus on Wales, which has been neglected in socio-legal scholarship on criminal justice matters. Drawing on 20 interviews with criminal defence lawyers in south Wales, we examine how they have experienced the changes to criminal legal aid in recent years. The lawyers in this study largely considered underfunding as a key political issue, with criminal legal aid identified as an easy target, also highlighting concerns around the impact of underfunding on their practice and how they can work for clients. As such, lawyers queried whether there is a viable future for criminal legal aid. These findings have implications for Wales, and the whole England and Wales jurisdiction, as we will discuss throughout.

This paper explains how the concept of personal data should be delimited. Certainty on this matter is crucial, as it determines the material scope of the data protection obligations. The primary boundary delimiting the scope of personal data is the requirement that personal data ‘relate to’ an individual. The courts of the UK and the EU have sought to delineate this boundary, but there are serious difficulties in the present approaches that have emerged thus far. Two possible ways forward are suggested, taking into account the implications of the direct application of the GDPR in the UK.

In UK and US company law and corporate governance, a highly influential economic theory views the company, and the rules related thereto, as a nexus of contracts for organising business activity. This so-called contractarian theory of the company depicts fundamental corporate governance arrangements as a form of private ordering, in which rules are spontaneously produced in the absence of formal legal intervention. This paper draws upon broader empirical evidence of real world private ordering to make two essential arguments, which provide much-needed nuance to the idealised view of spontaneous governance found in the contractarian analysis. First, it emphasises the significance of a distinctive and essential correlative and causal connection between hierarchy and the development and nature of private orders. Secondly, it highlights the ways in which the state positively interacts with the purported self-regulatory capability of the market to produce these uneven endogenous rules.

In recent cases English, Australian, and New Zealand courts have been called on to deal with apparently similar fact situations of a woman entering into a mortgage, guarantee or joint loan contract with respect to a husband’s, partner’s or child's business debts, placing her home at risk. Yet the results and reasoning in the cases appear to be markedly different. The question is whether the apparent differences can be resolved to yield a coherent policy approach. It will be argued, drawing on an economic-feminist perspective that the cases can be resolved in terms of the courts’ preparedness to acknowledge only limited categories of behaviour and circumstances, when measured against the paradigm of the ‘rational economic man’, as displacing the assumption that contracting increases welfare.

Much family law scholarship in recent years has been focused on the recognition of different types of family relationship. Often, the rationale for the grant of rights and duties to new forms of relationship is said to be because the parties have shown commitment, or the same degree of commitment, as those in formally recognised unions, such as marriage. But there has been relatively little consideration of why or how commitment can provide an adequate rationale for the imposition of legal consequences, in particular, legal obligations, especially when such commitment may be lacking on the part of one of the parties, or comes to an end. This paper explores the meanings of obligation and commitment within the family and questions whether commitment provides a necessary or sufficient justification for the imposition of legal obligations in family relationships.

Theoretical discussion of the question of whether and under what circumstances ignorance of law should be a defence from criminal liability has had a peculiar history in Anglo-American law. Commentators have been more convinced that ignorance oflaw should generally not serve as a defence than they have been persuaded by any particular rationale in favor of this rule. When one argument is shown to be unsound, another emerges to take its place, preserving the conclusion intact; the weight of scholarly opinion does not shift to embrace the position that ignorance of law should typically be a defence from criminal liability.