One of the problems which arises in the tort of negligence is where the plaintiff is aware of certain characteristics of the defendant which indicate that the defendant is incapable of achieving the usual standard of care, and yet the plaintiff enters into or continues a relationship with that person. Entering a car driven by a drunk driver is a simple example. There seems to be a common feeling that such a plaintiff is ‘less deserving’ and that it is a necessary consequence of the fault system that he should bear at least part of the responsibility for his loss. Recent developments, particularly in Australia, have suggested different approaches to this problem which raise issues about the nature and role of the standard of care, as well as about the relationship between the standard of care and various defences to negligence.

The introduction of the Green Development Mechanism (GDM) as a governance tool for biodiversity conservation is presented as a legal transplant, originating in the Clean Development Mechanism from the climate regime. The case provides an instance of a transplanted legal idea not from one jurisdiction to another but between two transnational regimes. The legal transplantation approach highlights the motives for replication and factors that hinder it. In this context, the discussion reveals that while the GDM was constructed for effectiveness concerns, it was presented as a transplant in order to import to the newly established model legitimacy from the original one. Yet, a uniform acceptance of the transplant was prevented because of divergent evaluations of the original model. The existence of several, not one, ideologies and perceptions explains why transplanting is a highly unpredictable strategy for fostering acceptance of a legal idea in the transnational space, and ultimately for its implementation. Following the recognition that legitimacy cannot be inherited, the initiative employed a mixed strategy to ensure its acceptance, based on the democratic principles and effectiveness that are expected from non-state authorities, as well as the consensus-based, treaty-grounded ‘rules of the game’ of state actors. The case highlights how the universal endorsement of all states, and the appearance of alignment with international norms and intergovernmental institutions, remain significant goals of transnational initiatives.

The Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) in 2014 ruled in Digital Rights Ireland that the Data Retention Directive was invalid for exceeding the limits of proportionality in light of Articles 7, 8 and 52(1) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Charter). Subsequently, preliminary references from the England and Wales Court of Appeal and the Swedish Administrative Court of Appeal sought clarification from the ECJ as to whether EU law permitted a general obligation to retain traffic data covering all persons, all means of electronic communication and all traffic data without any distinctions, limitations or exceptions for the purpose of combating crime. The ECJ in Tele2 and Watson ruled that in light of Articles 7, 8, 11 and 52(1) of the Charter, EU Member States were precluded from adopting national measures which provided general and indiscriminate retention of traffic and location data of all subscribers and registered users relating to all means of electronic communication. The ECJ also ruled that Member States were only permitted to adopt data retention measures for the purpose of fighting serious crime, and only when access to retained data was subject to prior review by a court or an independent administrative body.

In 2018, the issue of the UK's data retention regime envisaged in Part 4 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 came before the England and Wales High Court. The High Court ruled that Part 4 was incompatible with EU law because access to retained communications data was not limited to the purpose of fighting serious crime, and it was not subject to prior review by a court or an independent administrative body. This judgment was regarded by the claimants, Liberty, as a ‘landmark victory for privacy rights’. However, this paper questions whether certain aspects of the High Court ruling are indeed a victory, by assessing its compatibility with EU law and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

It is difficult to capture, even metaphorically, the nature of law as practised in the criminal appellate courts when considering the fundamentals of the subject -the basic principles of mens rea. If law is treated metaphorically as a science, allowing, as Lord Denning suggested, its principles to be revised by the demands of justice, in the way that scientific principles are revised by the demands of experimental data, then there should at least be a coherent development of the subject where identifiable principles of law are matched to a more sophisticated grasp of the requirements of justice.

Of course, such a formal image is less fashionable today than it once was, and a more ‘critical’ perspective of legal materials may be taken. But here, too, we lack a suitable image to convey the current state of the law.

Litigation is a tactical business. The recognition of the tort of malicious prosecution of civil proceedings in Willers v Joyce in 2016, by the barest of majorities, adds to the tactical intrigue, for it is now feasible that failed civil proceedings could be swiftly followed by a counter-suit for malicious prosecution against the original unsuccessful claimant. The tort requires proof of ‘malice’. As a concept, malice may have a 400-year history, but insofar as the new tort is concerned, it has proven to be opaque. In this paper, a critical evaluation of the tort since the Supreme Court gave it the ‘green light’ in Willers is undertaken. As a cause of action, it has been sparsely used, and beset with difficulties and unforeseen consequences. Whilst tort law, as the rubric of civil wrongs, must remain ‘on the move’, it is important that judicial reform achieves desirable and useful outcomes. It is argued in the paper that the tort recognised by Willers has not met that objective to date. However, a detailed law reform study of this and other related torts, leading to a statutory tort of ‘abuse of litigious processes’, would serve to bring order to the present disarray.

Three forms of ‘material contribution’ are discussed within the context of the traditional ‘but for’ test of causation. The NESS test (Necessary Element in at least one Sufficient Set) is shown to offer a more appropriate approach when causal over-determination is present as in, for instance, Fairchild and other cases involving multiple sources of asbestos. The particular problems posed by the recent Sienkiewicz case are then examined. It is argued that removing the incoherence in the common law of causation in personal injury will require the judiciary to overcome its antipathy to statistical evidence.

This paper explores the implications of D v Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis [2016] QB 161, a recent decision of the Court of Appeal in which two victims of a serial rapist successfully sued the Metropolitan police for investigative failures relying on Art 3 of the European Convention of Human Rights and the Human Rights Act 1998. The paper reflects upon the extent to which English courts are willing to recognise a duty to investigate within the wider context of civil claims against the police, particularly with regard to failures arising from the investigation of crimes of sexual and domestic violence. The comparative scope of tort and human rights claims is also considered, along with the evolving jurisprudential trend towards drawing a firm line between the two kinds of claim.

Much has changed in the four decades since United City Merchants v Royal Bank of Canada, in which Lord Diplock established the fraud exception in transactions financed by documentary credit. In particular, the introduction of the UCP 600, case law on nullity documents and amendment to the American fraud exception justify a reconsideration of both the policy arguments underpinning Lord Diplock's rule and the fate of documents known to be forged or null at the time of presentation. Accordingly, two arguments are made in this paper. First, a consideration of the broader exception in the US should prompt a modern Supreme Court to re-examine his Lordship's insistence that a narrow exception was required to preserve the efficiency of the credit mechanism. In addition, it further argues that banks should be entitled to reject known nullities and forgeries as non-complying. This argument would reinstate the doctrine of strict compliance, which was overlooked in United City Merchants, and is based on the clarified definitions in the UCP 600, more recent judicial consideration of nullities and the existence of the ICC's International Maritime Bureau.

The challenge that delegated legislation poses to parliamentary sovereignty and associated supremacy in the UK is purportedly addressed through what we term the ‘constitutional bargain of delegated law-making’. This has three elements: the proper limitation of delegation by Parliament through well-designed parent legislation; the exercise of self-restraint by the Executive in the use of delegated authority; and the enablement of meaningful scrutiny by Parliament. As a paradigm situation in which delegated law-making might be said to be necessary, the first year of the Covid-19 pandemic is an apposite context in which to assess the robustness of that bargain. Our analysis uses a sample of Westminster-generated pandemic-related secondary instruments as a peephole into the broader dynamics of this constitutional bargain and further reveals its significant frailties; frailties that are exposed, but not created, by the pandemic.

The regulatory protection of credit consumers, in general, is paramount due to the considerable use of credit, the imbalanced bargaining positions of the contracting parties and the adverse effect of over-indebtedness on individuals and society alike. These concerning factors are worsened in the case of High-Cost Short-Term Credit (HCSTC) consumers owing to their disadvantaged financial position and other recognised vulnerabilities. In this respect, the paper argues that direct regulatory intervention, despite its importance, is not always a silver bullet. Through the analysis of the overhauling of the UK HCSTC regulatory framework, this paper demonstrates the shortfalls of these regulatory changes. Accordingly, the paper shifts the argument towards improving the decision-making mechanisms of HCSTC consumers, ie the role of ‘libertarian paternalism’-based interventions. By using a bespoke experimental survey, the paper demonstrates the type of behavioural interventions that can assist in this endeavour and which the regulator could possibly mandate.

It is conventionally argued that because an artificially-intelligent (AI) system acts autonomously, its makers cannot easily be held liable should the system's actions harm. Since the system cannot be liable on its own account either, existing laws expose victims to accountability gaps and need to be reformed. Recent legal instruments have nonetheless established obligations against AI developers and providers. Drawing on attribution theory, this paper examines how these seemingly opposing positions are shaped by the ways in which AI systems are conceptualised. Specifically, folk dispositionism underpins conventional legal discourse on AI liability, personality, publications, and inventions and leads us towards problematic legal outcomes. Examining the technology and terminology driving contemporary AI systems, the paper contends that AI systems are better conceptualised instead as situational characters whose actions remain constrained by their programming. Properly viewing AI systems as such illuminates how existing legal doctrines could be sensibly applied to AI and reinforces emerging calls for placing greater scrutiny on the broader AI ecosystem.