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Transnational legal transplants and legitimacy: the example of ‘clean’ and ‘green’ development mechanisms

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2018

Jerneja Penca
Jerneja Penca*
Affiliation:
Euro-Mediterranean University (EMUNI)
*
Correspondence to:Euro-Mediterranean University (EMUNI), Kidričevo nabrežje 2, 6330 Piran, Slovenia. Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

The introduction of the Green Development Mechanism (GDM) as a governance tool for biodiversity conservation is presented as a legal transplant, originating in the Clean Development Mechanism from the climate regime. The case provides an instance of a transplanted legal idea not from one jurisdiction to another but between two transnational regimes. The legal transplantation approach highlights the motives for replication and factors that hinder it. In this context, the discussion reveals that while the GDM was constructed for effectiveness concerns, it was presented as a transplant in order to import to the newly established model legitimacy from the original one. Yet, a uniform acceptance of the transplant was prevented because of divergent evaluations of the original model. The existence of several, not one, ideologies and perceptions explains why transplanting is a highly unpredictable strategy for fostering acceptance of a legal idea in the transnational space, and ultimately for its implementation. Following the recognition that legitimacy cannot be inherited, the initiative employed a mixed strategy to ensure its acceptance, based on the democratic principles and effectiveness that are expected from non-state authorities, as well as the consensus-based, treaty-grounded ‘rules of the game’ of state actors. The case highlights how the universal endorsement of all states, and the appearance of alignment with international norms and intergovernmental institutions, remain significant goals of transnational initiatives.

Type
Research Article
Information
Legal Studies , Volume 36 , Issue 4 , December 2016 , pp. 706 - 724
Copyright
Copyright © Society of Legal Scholars 2016

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Footnotes

*

The research for this publication was done during my PhD studies at the European University Institute, Florence, and the paper was finalised during a postdoctoral fellowship at PluriCourts, University of Oslo.

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88. Ibid, p 4.

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91. Cbd Cop Rules of Procedure, Rule 40, para 1. Note, however, that the entire paragraph is bracketed ‘due to the lack of consensus among the Parties concerning the majority required for decision-making on matters of substance’; UNEP/CBD/COP/10/27 ‘Report of the Tenth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity’, available at https://www.cbd.int/cop10/doc/ (accessed 1 March 2016) Item 1.6, para 65.

92. GDI, above n 59.

93. See GDM About Us, available at http://earthmind.org/gdi/aboutus/ (accessed 1 March 2016), where a previous member of a Steering Committee represented the CBD.

94. For a list of the presence of the GDI initiative up to 2010, see GDM Events, available at http://gdm.earthmind.net/events/ (accessed 1 March 2016).

95. GDI GDI4 Outcome Statement for the CBD Process, available at http://gdi.earthmind.net/files/gdi4-outcome-statement-cbd-process.pdf (accessed 1 March 2016).

96. GDM, above n 32, at 4.

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