Litigation is a tactical business. The recognition of the tort of malicious prosecution of civil proceedings in Willers v Joyce in 2016, by the barest of majorities, adds to the tactical intrigue, for it is now feasible that failed civil proceedings could be swiftly followed by a counter-suit for malicious prosecution against the original unsuccessful claimant. The tort requires proof of ‘malice’. As a concept, malice may have a 400-year history, but insofar as the new tort is concerned, it has proven to be opaque. In this paper, a critical evaluation of the tort since the Supreme Court gave it the ‘green light’ in Willers is undertaken. As a cause of action, it has been sparsely used, and beset with difficulties and unforeseen consequences. Whilst tort law, as the rubric of civil wrongs, must remain ‘on the move’, it is important that judicial reform achieves desirable and useful outcomes. It is argued in the paper that the tort recognised by Willers has not met that objective to date. However, a detailed law reform study of this and other related torts, leading to a statutory tort of ‘abuse of litigious processes’, would serve to bring order to the present disarray.

The introduction of the Green Development Mechanism (GDM) as a governance tool for biodiversity conservation is presented as a legal transplant, originating in the Clean Development Mechanism from the climate regime. The case provides an instance of a transplanted legal idea not from one jurisdiction to another but between two transnational regimes. The legal transplantation approach highlights the motives for replication and factors that hinder it. In this context, the discussion reveals that while the GDM was constructed for effectiveness concerns, it was presented as a transplant in order to import to the newly established model legitimacy from the original one. Yet, a uniform acceptance of the transplant was prevented because of divergent evaluations of the original model. The existence of several, not one, ideologies and perceptions explains why transplanting is a highly unpredictable strategy for fostering acceptance of a legal idea in the transnational space, and ultimately for its implementation. Following the recognition that legitimacy cannot be inherited, the initiative employed a mixed strategy to ensure its acceptance, based on the democratic principles and effectiveness that are expected from non-state authorities, as well as the consensus-based, treaty-grounded ‘rules of the game’ of state actors. The case highlights how the universal endorsement of all states, and the appearance of alignment with international norms and intergovernmental institutions, remain significant goals of transnational initiatives.

A host of activities jeopardise the safety of an excised organ: an organ transported across local, regional, state or national boundaries could be damaged or lost in transit. A thief might snatch the organ from the possession of the transplant team; a transplant surgeon could use the organ for the treatment of their relative or patient, a celebrity or an influential political figure, instead of transplanting the organ into the properly selected and designated recipient. Also, the organ could be damaged maliciously by a third party. Furthermore, a live donor might change their mind after the organ had been retrieved, or the intended recipient might die before a scheduled transplant, after the organ had been retrieved from a live donor. In the above cases, the organ is in a state of limbo, prompting an enquiry into the appropriate remedial responses of the law for a claimant. Non-proprietary remedies might be helpful in the above scenarios, but fail to provide the necessary continuing control. Accordingly, the first section of this paper considers whether positive law recognises the existence of proprietary interests in excised organs; absent such protection, this paper suggests that the law should recognise proprietary interests in excised organs.

Much has changed in the four decades since United City Merchants v Royal Bank of Canada, in which Lord Diplock established the fraud exception in transactions financed by documentary credit. In particular, the introduction of the UCP 600, case law on nullity documents and amendment to the American fraud exception justify a reconsideration of both the policy arguments underpinning Lord Diplock's rule and the fate of documents known to be forged or null at the time of presentation. Accordingly, two arguments are made in this paper. First, a consideration of the broader exception in the US should prompt a modern Supreme Court to re-examine his Lordship's insistence that a narrow exception was required to preserve the efficiency of the credit mechanism. In addition, it further argues that banks should be entitled to reject known nullities and forgeries as non-complying. This argument would reinstate the doctrine of strict compliance, which was overlooked in United City Merchants, and is based on the clarified definitions in the UCP 600, more recent judicial consideration of nullities and the existence of the ICC's International Maritime Bureau.

This is the first work to explore the possibility of holding sports governing bodies and competition organisers vicariously liable for the tortious behaviour of athletes that compete under their auspices. In contrast to other scholarly contributions on vicarious liability in sport, this paper examines the scope of responsibility for athletes in individual sports (as opposed to team sports). It begins by drawing upon the recent tribunal proceedings between professional cyclist Jess Varnish and British Cycling to analyse the employment status of government-funded individual athletes. In calling for a contextual and policy-sensitive approach to the definition of an ‘employee’, this paper argues that certain normative and theoretical considerations ought to be granted more or less weight depending on the particular legal issue animating the dispute. Thereafter, and with one eye on the overly intrusive regulatory provisions found in sports such as tennis and golf, this paper also demonstrates that the vicarious liability of governing bodies and competition organisers could equally be extended to cover the tortious conduct of non-funded individual athletes. In making these claims, it is demonstrated how a sport-specific application of the doctrine may help to teach us a few broader lessons about vicarious liability more generally.

The Court of Justice of the European Union (ECJ) in 2014 ruled in Digital Rights Ireland that the Data Retention Directive was invalid for exceeding the limits of proportionality in light of Articles 7, 8 and 52(1) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (Charter). Subsequently, preliminary references from the England and Wales Court of Appeal and the Swedish Administrative Court of Appeal sought clarification from the ECJ as to whether EU law permitted a general obligation to retain traffic data covering all persons, all means of electronic communication and all traffic data without any distinctions, limitations or exceptions for the purpose of combating crime. The ECJ in Tele2 and Watson ruled that in light of Articles 7, 8, 11 and 52(1) of the Charter, EU Member States were precluded from adopting national measures which provided general and indiscriminate retention of traffic and location data of all subscribers and registered users relating to all means of electronic communication. The ECJ also ruled that Member States were only permitted to adopt data retention measures for the purpose of fighting serious crime, and only when access to retained data was subject to prior review by a court or an independent administrative body.

In 2018, the issue of the UK's data retention regime envisaged in Part 4 of the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 came before the England and Wales High Court. The High Court ruled that Part 4 was incompatible with EU law because access to retained communications data was not limited to the purpose of fighting serious crime, and it was not subject to prior review by a court or an independent administrative body. This judgment was regarded by the claimants, Liberty, as a ‘landmark victory for privacy rights’. However, this paper questions whether certain aspects of the High Court ruling are indeed a victory, by assessing its compatibility with EU law and the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

War crimes allegations have dogged the UK military for decades. Yet there is no settled process to deal with them. Different legal responses deployed have all suffered from complaints of unfairness. This paper proposes foundations for a more satisfactory approach based on an existing three-part consensus. First, that norms governing individual and systemic conduct in military conflict are relatively undisputed; secondly, that the state has a non-negotiable investigatory duty should a suspected breach occur; and thirdly, that any investigation should take into account the context within which it is conducted. The paper then advances three propositions: (1) first order principles of practicability, expertise, and investigator independence should provide the non-negotiable foundations of any response; (2) second order or subsidiary principles including promptness, adequacy, reasonable transparency, and respect for basic standards of natural justice should apply when practicable; and (3) a standing institution designed to comply with the first and second order principles would provide a fairer process for all participants (accused, victim and the wider national and international communities) whilst also fulfilling coherence and legal certainty requirements. The paper concludes that current structures cannot fulfil these demands and it explores the basis for a better alternative.

This paper examines the law of fixtures and chattels which governs the circumstances in which items of personal property that are attached to land become part of that land. Whether a chattel has become a fixture is crucial in a range of contexts including when land is sold or mortgaged. However, the law of fixtures has long garnered a reputation for complexity and obscurity; a position that endures today. Through examination of historical accounts and decided case law, this paper explores the reasons for this reputation; identifies the central deficiencies and defects inherent in the law and argues that the existing approach is anachronistic, inconsistent and incoherent. Building on this, the paper concludes by proposing a new framework for rationalisation and reform which would bring long-overdue certainty and clarity to the law in this area.

The regulatory protection of credit consumers, in general, is paramount due to the considerable use of credit, the imbalanced bargaining positions of the contracting parties and the adverse effect of over-indebtedness on individuals and society alike. These concerning factors are worsened in the case of High-Cost Short-Term Credit (HCSTC) consumers owing to their disadvantaged financial position and other recognised vulnerabilities. In this respect, the paper argues that direct regulatory intervention, despite its importance, is not always a silver bullet. Through the analysis of the overhauling of the UK HCSTC regulatory framework, this paper demonstrates the shortfalls of these regulatory changes. Accordingly, the paper shifts the argument towards improving the decision-making mechanisms of HCSTC consumers, ie the role of ‘libertarian paternalism’-based interventions. By using a bespoke experimental survey, the paper demonstrates the type of behavioural interventions that can assist in this endeavour and which the regulator could possibly mandate.