Parliamentary election law in the United Kingdom has been the subject of much review in Westminster and Whitehall over the past few years. The last Parliament, 1983-87, extended the franchise to British citizens temporarily resident overseas, and allowed for a greater use of postal and proxy voting. The amount of a parliamentary candidate's deposit was increased from the 1918 figure of £l50 to £500, and the threshold below which it is forfeited was reduced from 121/2% to 5% of valid votes cast. The law relating to the work of the Boundary Commissions was consolidated, and most recently the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee has reported its recommendations upon redistribution of seats, including among them a proposal for a stabilisation in the number of constituencies at its present level of 650.

This paper explores the issue of donation of organs from deceased donors for transplantation into a specified recipient. It argues that proper account should be taken of the principles underlying the Human Tissue Act 2004, which grant the donor a form of proprietary control. Three hypothetical scenarios are then used to draw out the implications of these principles for existing regulatory policy and the common law response to excised human organs. The paper concludes that the law should be understood as recognising ownership in organs removed from living and deceased persons and as offering opposition to the prohibition of directed donation that can only be coherently removed by reform of the 2004 Act.

This is a first revision of the Statement of Standards for University Law Library Provision, first published in A Library for the Modem Law School (see Legal Studies, Special Edition 1995). As promised in the introduction to the Statement (ibid, pp 10-11), this revision updates the comments to the standards in the light of a further survey of library provision again undertaken, on behalf of the Society, by Dr Peter Clinch, Legal Specialist in the Library of the University of Wales, Cardiff. This further survey has been jointly organised with the British and Irish Association of Law Librarians (BIALL), and the Society is most grateful to BIALL for its collaboration. The updatings reflect, in particular, changes in the key library statistics contained in the comments and offered as measures by which individual libraries might assess their performance. A full report on the survey may be obtained from the Convener, Professor Daintith, at the School of Advanced Study, University of London. The Libraries Committee is much indebted to Dr Clinch and to his institution for this essential input to its work.

During the 1530s Henry VIII remarried twice, each time annulling his previous marriage. The English laws outlining the prohibited degrees of relationship for marriage were changed upon each marriage in the First and Second Succession Acts. These Acts were passed in Ireland by an Irish Parliament in 1536–7 and became part of the Irish statute book. However, the second Act regulating Henry VIII's marriage to Queen Jane (Marriage Act (no 2) 1537) was never published and was unknown to Irish law for centuries. The Act made its return onto the Irish statute book in 2007, greatly extending the class of relatives prohibited from marrying and potentially annulling many Irish marriages. This paper traces the fate of the lost Act and analyses the consequences of its rediscovery both on Irish marriage law and the legitimacy of the Irish statute book.

This paper advances and defends a ‘constitutionalist’ perspective on the Europeanisation of private law. The first introductory section places the Europeanisation of private law in relation to current debates and then proceeds, in section II, to its practical implications with the help of identifying a significant cluster of conflict. The main part of this paper, however, is concerned with the theoretical issues of the analytical background and normative basis of the constitutionalist perspective.

Labour came to power in 1997 with a commitment to constitutional reform and joined-up government. New Labour has indeed produced significant constitutional change: devolution to Scotland and Wales, the Human Rights Act 1998, partial reform of the House of Lords, elected Mayors, a Freedom of Information Act, an Electoral Commission and more. Joined up it was not. Nothing better illustrated this than the (arguably) botched Cabinet reshuffle on 12 June 2003. On that day, Downing Street announced the resignation (or sacking) of Lord Irvine, the Lord Chancellor since 1997, and the abolition of his post, and, in its place, the establishment of a Department of Constitutional Affairs, and, finally, the creation of a Supreme Court.

As the issue is usually framed, the fundamental issue at stake between mainstream liberal jurisprudence and various forms of Critical Legal Studies (CLS) is, as Jeffrie Murphy puts it, whether there are ‘neutral principles in law and morality. By neutral principles [are] mean[t] those principles that can be agreed to by all rational beings.’ CLS theorists of all sorts typically hold that there are no neutral principles in a society divided into groups with vastly unequal power and status. Socialist Critics assert the class character of the law and morality. Feminist and Critical Race Theorists hold that these are infected with gender or racial biases. Social conflict between groups translates into irreconcilable conflicts of values. But in rejecting liberal neutrality, Murphy claims, the Critics fall into a radical ‘value relativism or skepticism’, which he regards as pragmatically self-defeating given their political commitments to the interests of subordinate groups.

The statute book bears eloquent testimony that the law has been regarded as an appropriate vehicle for protecting the consuming public. The Molony Report, 1962, has borne much legislative fruit and, 20 years later, enthusiasm for legislation in the consumer interest does not appear to be waning.

‘Revenge pornography’ is a concept which embraces a broad spectrum of the non-consensual distribution of private sexual images. Acknowledging the harms that arise from this practice and the human rights implications of ‘revenge pornography’, this paper focuses on the difficulty of removing those images from the Internet. It considers the legal vehicles which can be employed to force websites and third-party operators to remove private sexual images, including privacy law and copyright notice and takedown systems. It concludes that the piecemeal approach to image removal is insufficient, and that a more cohesive and appropriate approach to image removal is required to ensure that victim-survivors’ rights to private and family life are properly protected.

Death by neurological criteria (DNC) has remained controversial since its introduction over 50 years ago. Objections to the diagnosis of DNC have been coming before the courts in various jurisdictions, including at least seven recent challenges before the UK courts. In responding to these challenges, the UK courts have expressed no doubts as to the status of DNC and have affirmed that following a diagnosis of DNC, the matter of best interests is no longer relevant. Yet, the courts have also, tacitly, acknowledged that DNC is not quite the same as cardio-pulmonary death.

This paper begins by setting out the origins of DNC as a medico-legal construction, and its ongoing controversies. It then analyses the treatment of DNC, including authorisation of DNC testing, by the UK courts. It shows that the courts have been operating a form of ad hoc reasonable accommodation of different views of DNC but have done so without normative engagement. The paper argues that the courts should recognise that DNC disputes are not simply concerned with whether, as a matter of fact, DNC has been correctly diagnosed, but also raise profound questions about rights and interests, both of families and of the DNC dead.

This paper examines in three parts how ADR is being embedded into the English civil justice system. Section 1 discusses how courts encourage settlements, and it argues that while mounting costs in litigation lead to negotiated settlements, the participation in ADR primarily mainly occurs when parties are referred to it in a timely manner. Section 2 investigates the time when disputants are referred to ADR, and it proposes a taxonomy formed by three stages in the dispute life cycle: (1) before parties contemplate litigation; (2) at the pre-action phase as a pre-condition to issue a claim; and (3) after a defence is entered. Section 3 notes that the court digitalisation program is increasing ADR referrals across the above three stages, and it argues that these referrals will be more effective when they are timely and coupled with suitable incentives and sanctions, but the latter must take into consideration the parties’ power asymmetries.

Corporate governance is ‘hot’ in the United Kingdom and legal academics have written widely on the subject. Still, the topic has been virtually ignored as an academic discipline for law students. This article argues that corporate governance is a subject which should be included in the law curriculum and describes how a course dealing with the topic might be structured.

In this paper, I use Dworkin's distinction between rules and principles to analyse the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty. I argue that, inherent in many conceptions of the doctrine, is an assumption that it operates in the conclusive manner of a Dworkinian rule. I then submit that the doctrine actually functions in the flexible way characteristic of a Dworkinian principle. In support of this contention, I argue that Acts of Parliament may be balanced against competing principles or statutes; that they possess the dimension of weight or importance; and that the degree to which they will be adhered in any particular case will be contingent upon the importance attributed to any competing principle or statute. I finish the paper with an evaluation of my arguments and an attempt to anticipate potential counter-arguments.

In most countries and universities, few legal scholars pursue their academic careers in a country that is different from their home jurisdiction. However, the UK is a rare exception, as its universities have shown a great willingness to appoint legal scholars from any legal tradition and any part of the world. As the topic of foreign-trained legal scholars is underexplored in the current literature, this paper aims to fill the gap. It identifies 539 foreign-trained legal scholars at Russell Group universities, which amounts to 36.69% of their academic staff in law. Subsequently, the paper presents the results of a survey which explored how respondents deal with the challenges of being based at UK universities, such as the possible expectation to assimilate to the UK legal environment, and considering the impact of the result of the Brexit referendum. Overall, the paper finds that foreign-trained legal scholars should not be regarded as (negative) ‘irritants’ to UK legal scholarship and education, but that they can be rather be seen as (positive) ‘change agents’ in their universities.

This paper compares and contrasts state emergency responses to national security crises with responses deployed in a period of economic crisis. Specifically, this paper challenges the appropriateness and legitimacy of the standard emergency response of legislative (as distinct from judicial) deference to the executive when confronting such economic crises. This will be done by questioning the significance in periods of economic crisis of the two principal factors that justify deferring to the executive during a state of emergency pertaining to national security: (i) the necessity of the action taken; and (ii) that the executive has an expertise in decision making in the specific area in question. Ultimately, this paper questions the application of the emergency paradigm to economic crises, arguing that such responses are rarely temporary and instead usher in a ‘new normalcy’.

Sexual harassment litigation may be thwarted by judges failing to address the acts in question from the perspective of the victim, thus legitimising behaviour acceptable to men but unacceptable to women. This paper shows how this problem may be overcome by adopting a ‘reasonable woman’ standard to decide if: (i) objectively, the acts in question constitute harassment; and (ii) subjectively, whether the victim suffered injury. Using US case law the paper shows how the reasonable woman standard, which has been accepted in some courts, can allow women's perspectives to be heard. The paper suggests that a reasonable woman standard should be adopted in UK tort law, specifically in litigation under the Sex Discrimination Act, but also for litigation under trespass torts and under the Protection from Harassment Act. Doctrinally, the proposed standard fits within the fabric of tort la; and does not challenge the principle of corrective justice. From a feminist perspective, the reasonable woman standard can successfully redirect tort law to address gender-specific harms.

Does the law of estoppel remedy reliance loss, or protect and grant expectations? In 1983 it was said that:

‘This is a question that the courts must decide once and for all, and … they must not shirk from providing an answer by pretending that that answer will vary according to the facts of each particular case.’

This article examines a view about this question which I shall call the ‘reliance loss theory’, which states that the normal response to a successful plea of estoppel is to compensate the claimant's reliance loss rather than to fulfil his expectations; in other words, that the court will, if possible, remedy the detriment he has already suffered in reliance upon what the other has said, without going to the lengths of obliging that other to abide by, or fulfil, what he has led the claimant to believe by his conduct or silence. The reliance loss theory has been presented as a description of what actually happens, but it also appears as an argument for what the law should be.

This article critically appraises the UK government's recently published Consultation Paper on the future of the anti-terrorism laws. The author considers the likely effect of the Human Rights Act 1998 on the impact of any legislation that might flow from the government's proposals. The interaction between human rights law and anti-terrorism legislation provides a useful case study of the likely effects of incorporating the European Convention on Human Rights into domestic law. The author argues that many of these effects have not been anticipated by the drafters of the anti-terrorism proposals, with the result that many of their suggested changes to the law will be vulnerable to legal challenge if not sharply modified before enactment. The author concludes by considering the likelihood that, over time, successive governments will learn to tailor their legislation to the requirements of the Convention, even in the anti-terrorism field, but that in the short-term a period of legislative instability is to be expected.

The legal framework concerning liability of communication intermediaries for defamation is under-conceptualised. The paper thus develops a holistic doctrinal approach to liability of speech intermediaries, such as Internet service providers (ISPs), booksellers and newspaper vendors, for defamation. It views intermediary liability for defamatory speech against the backdrop of communication theory and freedom of expression doctrine. If properly conceptualised, as suggested in this paper, the law of defamation can accommodate the cyberspace-specific legislation in Arts 12–15 of the e-commerce Directive and s 5 of the Defamation Act 2013, as well as the innocent dissemination defence in s 1 of the Defamation Act 1996, now to be read together with s 10 of the Defamation Act 2013. The paper establishes six tenets of intermediary liability for defamatory content. In particular, it argues that ‘publication’ is to be conceptualised as a merely factual requirement for defamation, whereas the defence of ‘innocent publication’, also known as ‘innocent dissemination’, is a fault-based concept. Communication intermediaries are thus to be considered ‘publishers’, even if they have a merely automatic role in the publication process, but they may avail themselves of the defence of ‘innocent publication’. This defence has to be applied in compliance with the human rights of the parties involved.

Categorising something as a business judgment can provide directors with a powerful shield from accountability. It has been said that the courts in England and Wales defer to directors’ business judgments and directors’ decisions are protected from review in other jurisdictions by a business judgment rule. Yet what a business judgment is has never been addressed, and so precisely what is being protected, and why, is unclear. This paper analyses case law in England and Wales and key Australian and US cases to answer this question. It argues that the courts use the term judgment in two senses: an ability, and a decision sense, and that business judgment in both senses can be linked to Knight's concept of entrepreneurial judgment, and directors’ wealth creation function. Conversely, decisions that are linked to directors’ corporate governance function and are less easy to categorise as entrepreneurial are less likely to be viewed as business judgments.