‘I am very conscious of the difficulties confronting social workers and others in obtaining hard evidence, which will stand up when challenged in court, of the maltreatment meted out to children behind closed doors. Cruelty and physical abuse are notoriously difficult to prove.”

‘My Lords, I am anxious that the decision of the House in this case may establish the law in an unworkable form to the detriment of many children at risk.’

In Hungary, a comprehensive amendment to the 1949 Constitution took effect on 23 October 1989. According to the new preamble of the considerably amended Constitution, the revision was needed ‘in order to promote the peaceful political transition into the rule of law realizing the multiparty system, parliamentary democracy and social market economy’. This amendment changed not only the state organisation, but also the regulation of human rights.

The intention of distancing itself from the historical period of the past 40 years is expressed in para 1 of the amended Constitution, which proclaims that Hungary is a republic. With this, Hungarian constitution-making went back to a number of legal institutions incorporated in Act I of 1946 which is on the state form of Hungary adopted by the National Assembly, formed after the frst free elections after the Second World War.

In what circumstances, if any, can a person be held liable in tort for failing to prevent another person from causing harm?

Different legal systems answer the question in different ways. In many US jurisdictions, for example, although theoretically there is a presumption against liability, a great number of categories of citizen (including doctors, bar-keepers and psychologists) are held responsible for the harm caused by others to whom, for example, they have prescribed medicines or served alcoholic drinks or offered advice.

In the pantheon of approaches open to participants in the pacific settlement of disputes, good offices holds a noteworthy place. The evolution of good offices over the past century is concurrent with a trend of considerable transformation within international law, including – amongst other changes – a move away from a state-led legal order, including in good offices following the emergence of the heads of international organisations as its prime users, and a process of legalisation and specialisation within the subject that has entirely altered its character. These changes have led to a redefinition of good offices that stresses the actor carrying out the role above the form that it takes. To accompany these changes in practice, there is a need for a transformation in the legal analysis and definition of good offices. One potential option in achieving this end is Bell's lex pacificatoria. If good offices is to continue to play a significant role in the settlement of violent conflicts, a fully developed legal analysis is necessary to grasp both its historical development and its potential future role.

One of the few areas of the law in which there is a significant and serious dispute between the United States and its Western Allies concerns the nature and scope of national regulation of international trade. This long-standing and mutually damaging dispute first arose in connection with the extraterritorial enforcement of US antitrust laws through the effects doctrine as elaborated by US courts commencing with the Alcoa case in 1945. Since then the dispute has progressively widened and deepened: it has extended to such matters as international shipping and civil aviation, commodity markets and securities and it has been aggravated by the extraterritorial application of US investigatory and other pretrial procedure.

This paper examines the developing and complex legal relationship between universities and students, or would-be students, who have mental health problems. Discussion takes account of the wider social and policy contexts, including the extent of mental ill-health among the student population, the market for higher education, and government policies towards universities. It contends that the legal position of students with mental health problems demonstrates that there is a need for the relationship between students and universities to be conceptualised with reference to the citizenship ideal rather than the consumer paradigm with which it has tended to become associated in public policy terms.

This paper examines fundamental issues concerning a corporation's right to sue for defamatory attacks on its reputation, the scope of the right and the remedies available. It first outlines the opposed positions in England and Australia, respectively. It also argues that a corporation, save for a government corporation that exercises governmental functions based on markedly different rationales, should have the right to sue in defamation premised on the concept of corporate reputation as property and for the purpose of vindicating its reputation. On the question of remedies, a corporation should be entitled to recover special damages as reparation for damage to reputation provided they are proved. This paper considers, instead of presumed damages, alternative remedies for vindicating corporate reputation. Finally, it examines the business and non-business reputations of both trading and non-trading corporations in relation to claims for damages.

This paper interrogates the predisposition in favour of informal, low-intervention control styles of enforcement advocated by the ‘better regulation’ movement, and which resonates throughout the Hampton Report recommendations which are currently being implemented in the UK. It focuses on three practices that reflect the trend towards diverting regulatory enforcement action away from the courts in favour of reliance on formal administrative sanctioning powers ranging from ‘hard’ to ‘soft’: the use of negotiated penalty settlements, the acceptance of administrative undertakings (‘enforcement undertakings’) and the provision of firm-specific compliance advice by regulators. Each practice is explored through various analytical lenses which enable the underlying constitutional tensions to be identified and interrogated. In so doing, it demonstrates how the emphasis on bargaining, negotiation and discussions between regulators and those they are responsible for regulating advocated by the UK better regulation movement may antagonise several constitutional values, including transparency, accountability, due process and participation, as well as several values associated with formal conceptions of the rule of law. On the other hand, resort to negotiation and discussion in regulatory enforcement can generate important benefits, largely in facilitating the timely, creative and cost-effective resolution of enforcement disputes while avoiding the formality, delay and hostility associated with formal court adjudication. This ‘clash of logics’ can be traced to inherent differences between bargaining, on the one hand, and adjudication on the other. Bargaining and adjudication represent two quite different and distinct forms of ordering through which disputes can be resolved, and it is these differences that lie at the foundation of their respective virtues and shortcomings when employed to resolve disputes concerning regulatory violations.

In 2012, the Ministry of Justice asked the Law Commission to examine the case for extending the racially and religiously aggravated offences in the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, so that they also cover disability, sexual orientation and transgender identity. The terms of reference for the project were narrow, and did not include an examination of whether the existing offences are in need of reform. The Commission recommended that before a final decision is taken as to whether the offences should be extended, a full-scale review of the operation of the existing offences should be carried out. This paper contends that, in determining the future of the aggravated offences, consideration should be given to the procedural difficulties that can be encountered during the prosecution stage of the criminal process. The paper highlights a number of significant procedural problems that arise from the structure of the existing aggravated offences. These problems are largely related to alternative charges, whereby the prosecution charge both the aggravated offence and the lesser offence encompassed within it, and alternative verdicts, whereby the jury can convict of the lesser offence if the aggravated element is not proven. This paper argues that the procedural problems, coupled with a failure to properly understand the offences, can lead, and have led, to unfair outcomes. If the offences cannot be prosecuted effectively, they become little more than an empty gesture to those affected by hate crime, and this may be counterproductive. Procedural problems also put defendants at risk of wrongful conviction. The paper concludes that the preferred way forward would be to repeal the racially and religiously aggravated offences and rely on sentencing legislation to deal with hostility-based offending.

Substantial numbers of criminal offences are created in the UK in delegated legislation, often carrying heavy maximum penalties. The majority are created in statutory instruments passed under the negative resolution procedure, which offers very limited opportunity for scrutiny and does not involve a parliamentary vote. This phenomenon has slipped under the radar of orthodox criminal law scholarship, where debate has focused primarily on the criteria that should be used to determine the content of the criminal law and on the principles to which such offences should conform, rather than on the process of creating criminal offences. Creating offences in delegated legislation raises questions of democratic legitimacy and has resulted in criminal offences being created which do not conform to basic principles of fair notice and proportionality of penalty. To address this, we propose that parliamentary approval should be required for all serious offences. It would be impractical to do this for all criminal offences, and direct participation in the legislative process via consultation can act as an alternative (or additional) legitimating principle. This does, however, require that the consultation process complies with certain basic minimum requirements, and we explain how these requirements might appropriately be framed.

This paper contends that a feminist legal curriculum is necessary for legal education, and that it is also necessary for feminism. It argues that feminism is more than simply one of a number of useful critical perspectives, and that it must be located centrally within the law school and the legal curriculum in order to be effective. In accepting that a black-letter training has many merits and that the current core curriculum has value, the paper nevertheless suggests that both require substantive modifications and new critical dimensions. Specifically, to meet its obligations to our students, the legal curriculum needs to incorporate subjects relevant to women's experience, to make space for women's viewpoints and to offer feminist perspectives in every area of law - and these must be compulsory, not optional, additions. Finally, the paper concludes that implementation of such a curriculum is not only desirable, but also possible, and may indeed become a policy imperative as well as a feminist one.

In 2009 the legislature, judges and Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) each turned their attention to issues around assisted suicide. The legislature decided not to change the law. The judges decided the existing law was insufficiently clear and required the Director to clarify it. The Director flirted with reforming the law, but then drew back from such a legislative role. His published prosecution policy has been considered as a contribution to the regulation of death and dying, and as such has been found wanting. However, considered in the context of the proper roles of Parliament, courts and prosecutors, and seen as an exercise in constitutional restraint, the Director's approach should be appraised rather differently. From this perspective, the decision of the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords in R (Purdy) v DPP raises significant concerns for the legitimacy of decision making in the contested moral issues that arise in healthcare ethics. In our democracy, courts should be wary of usurping legislative authority in areas where the Parliamentary position is clear. They should be reluctant to take sides in the protracted war over access to a ‘good death’.

This commentary updates the paper ‘Excluding evidence (or staying proceedings) to vindicate rights in Irish and English law’ by analysing the recent decision of the Supreme Court of Ireland in DPP v JC. It argues that although the court has relaxed the exclusionary rule in one major respect, it has strengthened it in others, and that Ireland's approach to unconstitutionally or illegally obtained evidence remains very different from that of England and Wales.

The usage of delegated legislation as a means of governance deserves significant attention, in view of the enormous impact that it is capable of having on the lives of citizens. While reforms to the process of parliamentary scrutiny are an important means of minimising the inappropriate usage of delegated legislation, this paper explores the possibility of drawing more fruitfully upon judicial review as an additional control mechanism. It undertakes a theoretical analysis of what makes delegated legislation distinct from primary legislation and other types of executive action for the purposes of judicial review, with a view towards identifying the proper normative orientation of judicial review of delegated legislation – upholding the moral requirements of delegation relationships and safeguarding democratic accountability and the rule of law. It then argues that existing grounds of review applied towards delegated legislation go some way towards but are inadequately directed at this normative orientation. Drawing inspiration from Irish and US jurisprudence, the paper critically evaluates several possible means of filling this doctrinal space, and concludes that the non-delegation doctrine and a rule of law-based ground of judicial review directed at exercises of delegated law-making power can supplement the law of judicial review of delegated legislation.

Unequal voting rights arrangements under dual class share structures are increasingly favoured by entrepreneurs and founders of technology companies, in order to retain a degree of control over the company that is disproportionate to their equity shareholdings. The rise of such share structures around the world has put competitive pressure on the UK Government and the country's financial regulator to relax the one share, one vote principle in the premium listing regime of the London Stock Exchange, to ensure the UK equities market remains world-leading and fit for the future development of the economy. There is, however, a long tradition of institutional investors’ distaste for dual class share structures. In fact, the near extinction of dual class listings in the UK capital markets can be largely attributed to the opposition of large British institutions. Therefore, this paper will critically discuss the conflict between the demands to attract listings from high-tech and innovative companies and concerns of a race to the bottom in the UK context. It rebuts criticisms based on investor protection and argues that if dual class companies were permitted to list in the Premium Segment, the higher level of regulatory protection provided in the premium listing regime would help enhance minority shareholder protection and shareholder engagement. The additional safeguarding measures, as we have seen from other global financial centres, would also help to restrain the potential abuse of controllers’ weighted voting power. Together with the market mechanism, permitting dual class listings in the Premium Segment should be welcomed.

The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (hereafter the Convention) has been in operation for almost 40 years, the Commission and the court for more than 30 years. In the meantime, recourse to Strasbourg has become a built-in mechanism of judicial review in the Member States. In particular, art 25 of the Convention which entitles individuals to plead a violation of the Convention has turned into a corner-stone of a working system of human rights protection, since the court's first decision in 1960. Even though the court's output cannot compare to internal state jurisdictions, applications to Strasbourg have risen dramatically over the years.

First and foremost, I welcome the move to establish a new Supreme Court for the United Kingdom, separate from the House of Lords. I have favoured this for years, and I regard the Government's proposals as a real step forward. It is a piece of long-unfinished business nearly achieved by the mighty reformers of 1873-75. Their shades must rejoice to see it at last being tackled. All my other comments hereafter should be seen in that positive context.

This paper argues that shadow directors, as defined in English law, ought to owe the full range of directors' duties, both fiduciary and non-fiduciary, enacted in the Companies Act 2006 (CA 2006), ss 171–177, to the relevant company under their influence. Following the enactment of the recent Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act (SBEEA) 2015, these general duties are likely to apply to shadow directors, although there is still a case to be made as to why shadow directors should owe fiduciary duties to the relevant company. It is argued here that such a relationship is fiduciary in nature, but the current approach deployed in the English courts, based upon the application of Finn's originally formulated ‘undertaking’ test alone, is inadequate. Given these inadequacies, it is proposed that the Canadian ‘power and discretion’ test be deployed alongside the ‘undertaking’ test, in order to provide a far more comprehensive justification for the application of fiduciary obligations to shadow directors. This position is supported by establishing a theoretical basis for the ‘power and discretion’ test, via Paul Miller's ‘fiduciary powers theory’, as well as considering the application of such a test to shadow directors.

I will argue that – as an exception to the general rule adopted in England and Wales – third parties, including victims, should in some circumstances be permitted to bring proceedings for (inter alia) judicial review of sentences, and other measures, imposed on offenders. Such proceedings should not be ruled out when parts of sentences, or other orders, are meant to affect the interests of individual third parties themselves, and the prosecution cannot reasonably be expected to be solely responsible for protecting those interests. However, I will also conclude that, from a public law perspective, there is a preferable solution. Third parties who may be adversely affected by sentences or orders imposed on offenders should sometimes be given a limited degree of involvement in the process leading up to the imposition of those sentences or orders. Recent legislation takes us some way towards this goal.