What are the prospects for research in the area of labour law in the 1980s? This article argues that the main concern of research should be with legislative intervention in labour relations and should address itself to two inter-related questions: what lies behind the legislation? and how does the legislation function? We make some suggestions about the methodologies and theoretical perspectives of this research.

The urgent need to focus upon legislation requires little justification in view of the fundamental changes in the content of labour law in the last 17 years, particularly since 1971.

Specialist environment courts and tribunals (SECs) are, in the main, reflective of highly dynamic forms of adjudication, mixing judicial forms with powers more traditionally found in the executive. However, despite their novel legal nature the literature on SECs is predominantly promotional and it fails to address the challenges to legitimacy and governance engendered by these institutions. Nor does it evince a robust theory of environmental adjudication. These omissions not only impoverish the discourse but practice unsupported by theory is creating an unstable edifice. To illustrate this point the difficulties experienced in New Zealand are examined. The argument is made that only by confronting the challenges created by SECs can we begin to lay the foundations for a new theoretical model capable of explaining and accommodating environmental adjudication.

In this article I wish to deal with a problem about the analysis of intention in criminal law. The issue I want to take up has arisen primarily in the context of theft and theft-related offences. However, there is no reason to suppose that it is a problem confined to theft. It could arise in any area of the criminal law which involves intention as constitutive of mens rea.

The general problem can be stated very briefly. How is the law to deal with an accused who intended to perform some act which, if performed with simple intention, would be an offence, when he intended to perform that act only if some contingency occurred? The case law on theft demonstrates that, far from being an arcane question, this is a live issue. This is for the simple reason that a great many intentions are intentions of this conditional nature.

It has been said that ‘the law of limitation is a subject which peculiarly involves an enquiry into first principles.’ That is particularly true in registered land. Section 75 of the Land Registration Act 1925 grafted into registered land a concept inimical to it, namely the possibility of defeat by adverse possession of a flawless documentary title. That endeavour has on the whole been successful; but there remain problems, concerning such fundamental concepts as trusts, the nature of legal estates after 1925, and ‘title absolute.’ This article seeks to explore those problems; at the same time, the opportunity will be taken to look again at the decision in Spectrum Investment Co v Holmes and to suggest that it need no longer be regarded as a major source of difficulty.

This paper examines the legitimacy element of the doctrine of legitimate expectations in English administrative law. It argues that the underlying principle is the voluntary assumption of responsibility that comes from analysing a promise as a social convention. From this underlying principle, it argues that the current ‘clear unambiguous representation’ test is insufficiently certain and instead advocates a three-stage test centred round the courts' ability to make an order, the objective construction of the promise and the decision makers' intent. This test, it is argued, explains the decided cases, as well as providing a robust structure for future decisions.

The need for certainty about the scope of the court's jurisdiction to interfere with a mortgagee's right to possession of a dwelling house following default by the mortgagor needs little emphasis. Much is at stake, and unless the mortgagor can plead some substantive defence such as undue influence, the mortgagor faces losing what is usually the family home. Until relatively recently, this certainty has existed and the extent of the court's jurisdiction to control or deny a mortgagee's possessory rights has not been in issue, the focus being instead on the narrower question of how the court's recognised powers should be exercised. However, a number of recent decisions, including Cheltenham and Gloucester plc v Krausz; Cheltenham and Gloucester plc v Booker and Bristol & West Building Society v Ellis and Ellis, have prompted more fundamental questions.

This paper explores Dworkin's ‘law as a chain novel’ analogy and considers the recent work of Dworkin and MacCormick through close scrutiny of two recent judgments of Lord Hoffmann, in Barlow Clowes v Eurotrust International [2005] UKPC 37 and Barker v Corus [2006] UKHL 20. The aim is to examine Dworkin's theory in the context of recent English private law decisions and determine whether Lord Hoffmann's approach to interpretation is consistent with that of Dworkin (as his Lordship has contended in the past). It is argued that Lord Hoffmann's treatment of recent decisions on which he himself sat raises significant questions regarding fidelity, coherence and the institutional structure of the House of Lords.

The use of emergency legislation and the accompanying modification of the ordinary criminal justice process in Northern Ireland have formed the subject of prolonged debate in academic and political circles. The authorities have, in turn, responded persistently by reference to the special justificatory circumstances which have grown to prevail since the onset of the present ‘troubles’. The focus of attention of this article, however, will not be that controversial legislation but another aspect of the emergency which is said to remain subject to the ordinary law of the land. This is the use of force by the security forces and in particular those instances where death or serious injury results therefrom. The primary contention of this paper is that the ordinary criminal law has been proven inadequate in this context. Hence, it is submitted, the quest for an alternative and more stringent mechanism of legal control is one which should be undertaken with some urgency.

This paper considers the scope and limits of accessorial liability in the law of torts. It argues that the issue has been under-analysed, in part because such liability is encompassed under the label of ‘joint tortfeasorship’. Analysis of the question of accessorial liability needs to focus on two questions: what is the requisite involvement of the ‘accessory’ and what is the requisite mental state of the accessory when committing those acts? The paper seeks to define the precise limits of these two requirements and argues, after an analysis of the English and Australian authorities, that the current tests for accessorial liability, in rejecting liability for ‘mere’ assistance, are too narrowly stated.

This paper explores the development and operation of law and policy concerning the charging of overseas visitors for healthcare in England from the beginnings of the NHS to the present day. It highlights how this has been a highly contentious issue for decades, often linked with immigration policy, and is an area that still lacks comprehensive reliable empirical data to inform the debate. It explores and analyses the recent reforms to the NHS Overseas Charging Regulations introduced in 2015 and 2017. It demonstrates the problems in implementing the most recent regulations in an era of the ‘hostile environment’ and argues that the approach which has been taken can be seen as undermining the covenant of trust between patient and clinician and thus the fundamental principles of the NHS.

This paper explores the everyday lives of low-paid, low-skilled EU migrant workers living in and around Great Yarmouth in the East of England both pre- and post-Brexit. It considers the legal problems they face, especially around employment law, and how those problems may be resolved. It draws on the results of quantitative and qualitative research to examine the reach of law into the everyday lives of vulnerable EU migrants. We term our research ‘pragmatic law’ (PL) because our experience is that most legal issues, at least with the groups we are working with, do not enter any formal legal resolution pathway at a community level. They are addressed in the everyday, often by first-tier generalist (and sometimes volunteer) advisers with no formal legal training, who make no express reference to ‘the law’. This access to advice and problem resolution at a street level can be a lifeline to those living at the margins of the workforce.

This article explores civil society organisations’ (CSOs) participation in judicial review proceedings. This became contentious when the Ministry of Justice announced that it intended to reform the judicial review process, and suggested changes to the law on standing and third-party interventions. Ultimately, the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015 did not amend the law in these areas, but has arguably made it more difficult for CSOs to engage in public interest litigation. Attempts to restrict the access of CSOs to judicial review need to be seen in the context of the shifting relationship between CSOs and the state, and differing perspectives on their function. If CSOs are to continue to take part in judicial review cases they need to justify their presence in terms of their expertise and on the ground knowledge. It is argued that deliberative, dignitarian and more general theories about the nature of civil society may well establish a basis for CSOs’ continued presence in judicial review litigation.

This paper presents a history of New Zealand's accident compensation scheme as a struggle between two competing normative paradigms that justify the core reform of the replacement of civil actions for victims of personal injury with a comprehensive no-fault scheme. Under ‘community insurance’, the scheme represents the community taking moral and practical responsibility for members who are injured in accidents, while for ‘compulsory insurance’ the scheme is a specific form of compulsory accident insurance. Understanding the history of the scheme in this way helps explain both the persistence of the scheme and important changes made to it by different governments.

This paper evaluates the wide discretion afforded to planning decision-makers in England. It does so in respect of a key but often overlooked question in the transition to renewables: whether developers/owners of onshore wind projects should be required to provide a ‘bond’ to ensure decommissioning and site restoration (DSR) occurs. Bonds are financial instruments that evidence ability to fund DSR. They help avoid legacy issues (eg project abandonment) but carry a long-term cost burden for developers/owners. A study of 275 projects elicits three issues. First, a lack of government guidance on bonding, vague ‘threshold’ terms in law and policy and failure of planning decision-makers to consider how others had decided the question result in a lack of markers to inform discretion, with bonds being rare (present in only 15.6% of projects) and their stringency inconsistent. Secondly, this lack of markers legitimises risky, cost-saving practices prohibited in offshore wind, where government guidance informs bonding decisions. Thirdly, reasons for decisions are weak or absent, inhibiting achievement of the justifications for their provision in an administrative context (eg disciplining decision-making). Whilst discretion enhanced capacity to generate electricity from wind through enabling a reduction of market entry costs, assisting movement towards renewable energy targets, it resulted in abandonment risk being ignored. This mirrors strategies adopted elsewhere in England's energy sector, such as coal and oil and gas, where a ‘light touch’ approach to bonding has, traditionally, been deployed to avoid hindering project development.

Adapting the concept of ‘interpersonal justice’ used by Professor Robertson to provide a ‘meta-doctrinal’ defence of the law of negligence, this paper asks whether the personal injury system can be thought to have a democratic justification in common beliefs in such justice. It is widely acknowledged that the gross functional inadequacy of the personal injury system makes it implausible to claim that that system can be justified on grounds of compensation or deterrence. But that inadequacy makes it equally implausible to claim that common citizens would choose that system, which exists only because it is effectively compulsory. Constructing a market in first-person insurance would put the existence of the personal injury system to the test of actual choice.

In 1870, Christopher Columbus Langdell introduced the case method of teaching at Harvard, and dramatically altered the course of legal education in the United States. His method, involving student examination of judicial decisions coupled with Socratic style analysis, ultimately gained widespread acceptance. Today, most US law teachers use the case method. They continue, to varying degrees, to use Socratic questioning as part of that method. But, despite the method's widespread adoption, it has always had critics including both law students and law teachers.

The need for the statutory regulation of business tenancies was officially recognised towards the end of the nineteenth century. The mischief complained of was that some landlords held their tenants to ransom by demanding an inflated rent as a condition of a lease renewal. This was particularly harsh for the tenant who had built up business goodwill and carried out improvements to the premises. Despite the organisation of commercial tenants and the growth of political lobbying, it was not until Landlord and Tenant Act 1927 that controls emerged which provided compensation for loss of goodwill and improvements. The inadequacy of these provisions, however, entailed that tenant discontent and lobbying persisted until the enactment of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954. This paper charts the social and political change which brought about this significant retreat from market forces and the gradual recognition that security of tenure, as opposed to financial safeguards, was the necessary response. The controls established in 1954 have, remarkably, survived almost intact and, subject to some fine tuning, will continue to do so. This paper addresses the issue why the commercial code has, in marked distinction to its residential and agricultural counterparts, remained immune to shifts in political policy during a sustained period of deregulation in landlord and tenant law.

‘Legal reasoning’ and its character have been under discussion for some time: the character, that is, of the reasoning which judges, advocates, solicitors, and others engaged in matters of legal practice and decision must pursue if their conclusions are to claim validity. Do they – or should they – reason on lines dictated by the laws of formal logic, i.e. deductively in the strict sense of that term? Or must we say that judges, and lawyers in general, cannot reach or justify conclusions on deductive lines, and that in fact – and quite legitimately – they use, in establishing and justifying conclusions, a mode of reasoning which is not deductive but has a quite different determinate character of its own? If so, what is that determinate character? Does it provide criteria whereby we may appriase legal argumentation in particular instances as valid or invalid or, at least, as rational or failing in rationality?