This paper discusses the accountability gap problem posed by artificial intelligence. After sketching out the accountability gap problem we turn to ancient Roman law and scrutinise how slave-run businesses dealt with the accountability gap through an indirect agency of slaves. Our analysis shows that Roman law developed a heterogeneous framework in which multiple legal remedies coexist to accommodate the various competing interests of owners and contracting third parties. Moreover, Roman law shows that addressing the various emerging interests had been a continuous and gradual process of allocating risks among different stakeholders. The paper concludes that these two findings are key for contemporary discussions on how to regulate artificial intelligence.

English opportunities regulation is confused about its relationship to the concepts of ownership and property. Recent reform proposals from the Company Law Review Steering Group would have changed English law's dominant regulatory lens: the way in which it thinks about the opportunities problem, from an approach focused on conflicts of interest to one focused on the ‘ownership’ of opportunities. This ownership approach is commonly referred to as the corporate opportunities doctrine. This article argues that the proposal failed as it did not consider the interpretative possibilities generated by changing the regulatory lens. However, the proposal inadvertently makes a contribution to the debate as it directs our attention to the function and meaning of ownership concepts in the opportunities context. Property in the opportunities setting is simply a label for qualified ownership as between the director and the company. However, the article argues that by understanding references to property in terms of traditional notions of property English law and commentary has obstructed the consideration and development of a long-standing English corporate opportunities doctrine.

In this short piece we focus on two of the main changes brought in by the recent Nationality and Borders Act 2022 with a focus on sexually diverse claimants: inadmissibility and the increased standard of proof. The recent changes have a negative impact on all asylum seekers but we highlight that they have a particularly adverse impact on sexually diverse claimants because their diverse backgrounds have not been appropriately considered. The problematic provisions on inadmissibility on the basis of mode of entry and removal to a ‘third safe country’ pose particular risks for sexual minorities. Additionally, the increased standard of proof exaggerates issues already faced by sexually diverse claimants in relation to objective evidence gathering and decision-makers using guidance riddled with stereotypical understandings about sexual minorities.

The principle of self-determination has gained significant judicial support over the last three decades, and the choice to procreate using assisted reproductive technology is a clear example of our right to choose a treatment that enhances our personal lives. The Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (as amended in 2008) stipulates that each party must give written, informed consent to ensure that our reproductive materials are used within strict parameters. However, the growing number of posthumous conception cases in several jurisdictions has raised concerns, particularly in situations where gametes are extracted from incapacitous patients without their consent, leading to posthumous parenthood. The landmark case of Y v A Healthcare NHS Trust [2018] EWCOP 18 caused significant concern when it authorised the retrieval, storage and use of sperm from a suspected brain stem dead man for procreative purposes under the Mental Capacity Act 2005. It has never been known to be in the ‘best interests’ of a patient who lacks capacity to procreate in English law, and the consequences of this decision could be highly significant, raising questions about the exploitation of incapacitous patients and the misuse of genetic material. The decision has since been confirmed as the correct approach by the Court of Protection in Re X (Catastrophic Injury: Collection and Storage of Sperm) [2022] EWCOP 48, and a public consultation has now been opened by the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority. This paper examines the rigorous consent regime of the 1990 Act and the ethical complexities of retrieving gametes from incapacitous patients for procreative purposes. It will be determined that the 1990 Act's preference for a rigorous consent regime for public policy reasons is appropriate, and any alternative forms of consent could open a slippery slope to the unethical use of vulnerable individuals for their reproductive materials.

A lively debate progresses about change to the professions, including law, especially change in the form of managerialism. ‘Managerialism’ covers the methods and beliefs of managers within organisations, used to actively influence, evaluate, and ‘market’ professional work. But what about when that managerialism is change itself? How do we understand managerialism-as-change? This paper reports on an interview study with change managers, or ‘transformation leaders’ in the legal profession. Transformation leaders offer rich insights into the dynamics of professional change because they are incontrovertibly change agents. They are also themselves a form of managerial change as a new cadre of managers within the professions; managers with ‘hybrid’ identities whose legitimacy in professional settings is not assured. The findings presented include: the change leaders’ identities; the types of change being introduced; the constraints on and affordances for change in legal practices; and how change leaders secure, and sometimes struggle to secure, the authority needed to implement change. The concluding discussion highlights the study's contributions to our understanding of professional change and managerialism in the legal context – both what changes are being pursued and how they are materialising through certain ‘managerial’ goals, strategies, and the interactions of those with mixed identities and status.

Under the Consumer Rights Act 2015 consumer contracts and consumer notices are required to be expressed in plain and intelligible language. This is a difficult concept to capture. Determining whether a contract is expressed in plain and intelligible language involves resource-intensive work by regulators and difficult adjudications by courts. This paper explores whether reading scores present a viable alternative. Can a simple computer program tell a consumer, a business, a regulator or the court that a particular contract is not expressed in plain and intelligible language? The paper begins by exploring the concept and role of plain and intelligible language in the Consumer Rights Act, before considering the ways that reading scores have developed and been used in legal contexts. We then report on the findings of an experimental examination of insurance contracts using a basket of reading scores, using our findings to draw conclusions about the utility of reading scores in determining whether a contract is expressed in plain and intelligible language. We find that reading scores can play a role in such determinations, but that further work is needed to provide appropriate tools for business, regulators and courts to use in assessing plain and intelligible language.

Members of the senior judiciary have expressed concern about the ‘over-judicialisation’ of welfare in the context of homelessness decision-making and adjudication. This paper examines how those fears have been manifested and makes a link with the concept of proportionate dispute resolution (PDR). It argues that the statutory scheme incorporates elements of PDR and judges should therefore refrain from introducing additional layers. The courts’ denial of the application of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights to the homelessness context is disputed, and the paper makes the case for continuing rigorous judicial oversight of front-line decision-making, recommending that attention is focused on assessing procedural safeguards rather than disputing the ambit of Article 6.

In dealing with rules of a procedural type lawyers often make a distinction which is referred to as that between ‘mandatory’, and ‘directory’ rules. (The terms ‘imperative’, ‘absolute’, ‘obligatory’, ‘compulsory’, and ‘peremptory’, have sometimes been used instead of ‘mandatory’.) The distinction has to do with the effect of breach of a rule on the process to which it relates. Very broadly, mandatory rules are those procedural rules the breach of which necessarily invalidates the process to which they relate, while directory rules are procedural rules the breach of which does not necessarily have this effect. This distinction has existed in the common law for about three hundred years, yet, so far as I can discover, no serious attempt has ever been made to explore its logical basis. That is surprising, for on its face the distinction is a puzzling one.

History, as much as logic, has shaped the English real property law of today. The richness of that history is one of its strengths, but is also a potential source of weakness, as where the boundaries between similar, but distinct rights are neither theoretically nor logically distinguished. Whilst this may often not be of practical concern, none the less a lack of logic may lead to inconsistency or uncertainty in the law (or indeed both). Particularly is this so where social pressures require protection for new situations, as for example where a flat owner requires the certainty that his right to park his car is a proprietary right.

That provides one justification for seeking a strong and consistent theoretical framework. Another is that as we integrate more closely with our European partners, we may be compelled to accept into our thinking concepts which are at present alien to us.

The High Court created by Australia's 1901 Constitution first sat on 6 October 1903. A century on, it is an apt time to consider how the record of the Court can contribute a different perspective to the debate over a possible Supreme Court for the United Kingdom. Of course, it cannot be assumed that common views are held of this record. Indeed, the role of the High Court and its place in the Australian political system remains hotly contested.

Why is food regulated separately from, and differently to, other consumer products? This paper attempts to examine the different regimes for the regulation of food and general product safety, and examines the economic, social and cultural reasons for the separation. Finally, the paper considers whether the separate nature of the regimes is necessary, or whether food should be regulated within a ‘product safety’ framework.

John owns a workshop which he wants to redevelop. Securing the necessary financing and obtaining planning permission will take a few months and in the meantime he is happy to let Mike use the workshop for E30 a week. They draw up a simple form of agreement whereby John lets the property to Mark at the agreed rent ‘until John is in a position to proceed with the redevelopment’. John and Mark are content with the arrangement: Mark has the security of knowing he can occupy the premises for several months; John is getting some income from the property.

One of the most controversial aspects of the assessment of damages for breach of contract is the extent to which there can be recovery for ‘intangible’ losses such as disappointment and inconvenience. In Watts v Morrow, Bingham LJ assumed that public policy generally proscribed contractual liability for such losses, unless the object of the contract was to provide pleasure and/or peace of mind, or the breach caused foreseeable physical inconvenience to the victim. Unfortunately, Watts, and its associated case-law, offered scant guidance on the underlying rationale for either the general rule or its two exceptions. Consequently, more recent judicial pronouncements on this issue, particularly from the House of Lords, are to be welcomed insofar as they demonstrate a greater preparedness to eschew the use of arbitrary policy constraints in favour of focusing upon a claimant’s expected benefits as contained within the contract. In so doing, disappointment and inconvenience appear to be subject to the same rules of recovery. This paper will seek to justify and encourage this trend, arguing that a logical application of the principles contained within Hadley v Baxendale and Robinson v Harman dispenses with any need to use ‘policy’ as a means of limiting the recovery of damages for disappointment and inconvenience, more properly takes account of a claimant’s known preferences, and ensures that all forms of inconvenience and disappointment are subject to the same rules; in short, that damages properly reflect the full range of the claimant’s expectation deficit.

Court decisions concerning the life and death of patients become more and more frequent in the context of medical practice. One of the most controversial decisions in this area in recent years has been the decision of the Court of Appeal in Re A (Conjoined Twins: Medical Treatment), authorising the separation of conjoined twins. This paper will argue that the decision was flawed both on legal and moral grounds and that its potential implications for future cases are more far-reaching than the judgment itself suggests.

I shall not attempt to give more than the briefest summary of the founding of the Society, for the story has already been ably told by someone with first-hand knowledge, namely, A. D. Bowers, Emeritus Member, Extraordinary, of the Society, whose account appears in the June 1959 issue of the Journal. It is not clear whether the originator of the idea of the Society's foundation was Edward Jenks, then Principal and Director of Legal Studies to The Law Society and later first holder of the Chair of English Law at the London School of Economics, or Henry Goudy, Regius Professor of the University of Oxford. What is clear, however, is that Jenks was the one who really got things moving. Indeed in the early days the Society was apparently sometimes referred to as ‘Jenks’ Trade Union’, to Jenks’ disgust.

Reservations of title clauses have enjoyed mixed fortunes in recent times at the hands of the courts in Britain. On the one hand, the House of Lords has upheld the validity and effectiveness of an ‘all-liabilities’ reservation of title clause. On the other hand, claims on the part of a supplier to resale proceeds have been rejected in a string offirst instance decisions. Reservation of title has however been viewed more favourably as a phenomenon in New Zealand. In the leading New Zealand case Len Vidgen Ski and Leisure Ltd u Timam Marine Supplies Ltd. a tracing claim succeeded. Moreover in Coleman u Harvey the New Zealand Court of Appeal gave vent to the view that the title of the supplier is not necessarily lost when mixing of goods, which are the subject matter of a reservation of title clause, has occurred. There are now a series of more recent New Zealand decisions, some of them unreported, dealing with many aspects of reservation of title.