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Why separate the regulatory regimes applicable to food safety and product safety?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2018

Richard Hyde
Richard Hyde*
Affiliation:
Northumbria University
*
Richard Hyde, Lecturer, School of Law, Northumbria University, City Campus East, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 8ST, UK. Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

Why is food regulated separately from, and differently to, other consumer products? This paper attempts to examine the different regimes for the regulation of food and general product safety, and examines the economic, social and cultural reasons for the separation. Finally, the paper considers whether the separate nature of the regimes is necessary, or whether food should be regulated within a ‘product safety’ framework.

Type
Research Article
Information
Legal Studies , Volume 33 , Issue 4 , December 2013 , pp. 509 - 531
Copyright
Copyright © Society of Legal Scholars 2013

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Footnotes

*

Thanks are due to Peter Cartwright, Paul Roberts and the two anonymous reviewers for their very helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. Of course, the usual disclaimer applies.

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