Why is food regulated separately from, and differently to, other consumer products? This paper attempts to examine the different regimes for the regulation of food and general product safety, and examines the economic, social and cultural reasons for the separation. Finally, the paper considers whether the separate nature of the regimes is necessary, or whether food should be regulated within a ‘product safety’ framework.

Framed within the broader context of law's engagement with modernism, this paper offers an argument in defence of copyright protection of John Cage's 4′33″ as a ‘musical work’ under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. This argument approaches the issues involved analytically and contextually. In doing so, it draws on both legal and non-legal sources. Throughout the paper, the underlying question remains as to whether Cage's 4′33″ really is – or is not – a challenge to law (and to music).

This paper argues that the Pallant v Morgan equity should not be recognised as an independent doctrine because it does not rest on any tenable jurisprudential basis. It shows that a characterisation based on ‘common intention’ should be rejected because it is inconsistent with established legal principles and commercial practice. The alternative explanation based on breach of fiduciary duty, as suggested by Etherton LJ in Crossco No. 4 Unlimited v Jolan Unlimited [2011] 2 All ER 754 fares no better, as there is no reason why the Pallant v Morgan equity cases should be considered separately from other instances of breach of fiduciary duty in law. Further, this account must however be read in light of the Court of Appeal's decision in Sinclair Investments (UK) Ltd v Versailles Trade Finance Ltd [2011] 3 WLR 1153 which ruled that proprietary relief is only allowed in circumstances where the breach amounts to abuse of the principal's asset. This requirement is particularly difficult to satisfy in the paradigm case of the Pallant v Morgan equity, save in the case of agency. But where there is a relationship of agency, a constructive trust will also arise in accordance with an established agency principle, resulting in duplication in results.

Focusing on a single, uncontested will is unusual within legal studies. And the extensive literature about EM Forster has overlooked the significance of his will. This article endeavours to address these silences and develop a conversation between the two. It first explores the place of inheritance in Forster's life and novels; and in doing so highlights his interest in inheritance as both a concept and a practice. Turning then to his will, it argues that it reveals a reflective personal and political engagement with concerns about kinship, sexuality and intimate citizenship which are central to current debates within socio-legal and sociological scholarship. This reading consequently argues that his will is a text that can be read alongside his other work; that it represents a ‘posthumous publication’. While a close, critical reading of the will of one very particular individual, the article identifies the challenges posed to testators in negotiating the public and private nature of wills and highlights both the rich potential and the difficulties that these texts present for socio-legal, literary and biographical scholarship.

This article explores two questions. First, in adjudicating claims under the Human Rights Act 1998 (HRA), should the court defer to the executive or legislature on the ground that the latter two institutions possess superior expertise or information-gathering powers, when such expertise or powers fail to generate persuasive first-order reasons for the court? This article argues that rationality requires courts to defer on these second-order grounds of institutional capacity in situations of judicial uncertainty. Secondly, this article examines an underexplored question in the current literature: when is it justified for courts to consider the government as possessing second-order grounds of institutional capacity that warrant deference? It is argued that rational, impartial and open adjudication in the post-HRA era requires the government to prove its claims of superior institutional capacity, and courts to openly scrutinise such claims by considering a number of factors, including, crucially, the government institution's track record of expertise and credibility.

The public health challenges of moving dangerous substances across jurisdictions have led to a renewed international focus on the importance of the health perspective in the Basel Convention on Transboundary Movement of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal. This paper systematically reviews the health dimensions of the Basel Convention and the ways in which the Convention can be strengthened. It analyses the limits of the health objective of the Convention in promoting public health and the environment and the potential for optimising it. The paper argues that an examination of the Convention's substantive, procedural, and institutional and implementation mechanisms highlights its failure to fully achieve its potential for health protection. Parties to the Convention have initiated measures to address this issue, but the design and functioning of the Convention itself constrain the full achievement of health goals, which in turn undermines the protection of human health and the environment. To optimise the health promotion, the author argues for an adaptive governance framework by bolstering the governance mechanisms of the Convention and the Secretariat, strengthening health cooperation between international health agencies and improving domestic implementation of the Convention by its Member States.

Legal academics and practitioners have engaged in intense elaboration and defence of differing perspectives about the appropriate standard of corporate conduct, and unresolved debates surrounding this contemporary legal issue have proved intractable. The classical scholarship has become ghettoised in self-supporting ecosystems of inflexible exchange. Of necessity, a new conceptual approach has been proposed to address in an affirmative fashion the inevitable penumbra of uncertainty and institutional indeterminacy of corporate law, specifically in regard to stipulating an appropriate standard of corporate behaviour for the myriad of organisational activity. This is the Equitable Maximisation and Viability principle (EMV). This paper focuses on providing for some meaningful enforceable standards that ensure the principle is not precatory. Before this can be undertaken, it considers in a systematic and comprehensive manner corollary questions as to whether substantive private enforcement procedures can, and should, be used to monitor and challenge directors’ decision making. These insights allow the paper to open up the enforcement issue. The principal part of the paper identifies and examines various alternative ways of enforcing the principle and then argues for the use of one credible mechanism.