The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and UN Human Rights Committee have reached contradictory decisions in cases concerning the right to manifest religion. This discrepancy calls into question the universality of the right and is problematic from the perspective of legal certainty. Consequently, this article explores the extent to which the diverging decisions of these two bodies are compatible with a good faith interpretation of the right to manifest religion. A good faith interpretation of the right is identified by utilising the travaux préparatoires and subsequent interpretations. It is argued that by failing to scrutinise the necessity of restrictions and the role of secularism, the ECtHR has undermined this good faith interpretation and, in so doing, is not fulfilling its role as ‘the conscience of Europe’.

This paper briefly reviews the US case law dealing with the issue of birth control fraud and speculates on the possibility of a similar action succeeding in the UK. It then focuses on newspaper reporting of one such case. A common media reading of this case, and one which can also be detected in some academic commentary of similar cases, is to contextualise it as part of an ongoing ‘battle of the sexes’, where historic poles of inequality have become reversed and women have gained unfair (legal) advantage in procreative matters. It is argued that such an understanding is flawed and misleading, serving to distract attention from the legal structuring of these kinds of disputes. The paper concludes that the operation of the law can here be better understood as seeking to support the nuclear family in a way which can impact negatively on both individual men and individual women. The birth control fraud cases invite us to rethink the way that parental obligations are imposed and to justify more rigorously the choices which we make in this regard.

The Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 (CDDA) instituted, inter alia, a mechanism whereby directors of failed companies can be disqualified from holding office in the future as the result of an application to the court by the Secretary of State, or in the case of compulsory liquidators, the official receive and a subsequent finding by the court that the director is unfit. The operation and effect of the CDDA has been the subject of speculation in the national press, other media and comment from insolvency practitioners since its inception. Most of this comment has focused on the role of the DTI and on its perceived failure to take steps to disqualify directors in sufficient numbers.

It is the purpose of this lecture to suggest that ignorance of the law is a serious social problem in this country and to consider ways in which this problem might be cured or, at least, alleviated. It is proper to start however with a disclaimer. The first half of this lecture will contain many examples of ignorance of the law and might give the impression that I am concerned to attack the ignorant. This is not so. Though some of the examples of ignorance may well be culpable, my predominant concern is with defective institutional arrangements which are the primary source of the ignorance.

This paper is concerned with one hundred and ten years of legal history. It is a success story. Yet it has, not an unhappy ending, for the end is in the future, but an unhappy present. Markers put down in 1883 and 1983 define the century. The change in question is the modernization of the literature of common law and hence of all the machinery of its interpretative development. Having been kept in shape first by the forms of action and then by a hardening of the doctrine of precedent, in the late nineteenth century the growing mass of case law urgently required to be more rationally ordered and explained. It began to find in the universities the means of achieving that improvement. Analysis, definition and classification, the familiar tools of the university, were brought to bear for the first time on the raw materials of the common law.

Are there now any circumstances in which a teenage may effectively withhold her consent to medical treatment? By effectively, I mean not only that she can refuse to consent to treatment but also that this refusal is respected and the treatment prevented.

Consent to medical advice and treatment, the givingofwhich means that a doctor does or does not commit a battery (criminal or civil) on her patient, necessarily involves both the giving of consent and the withholding of consent. Without one the other has no meaning.

The work of defence lawyers in civil litigation has been neglected by law and society studies. Research on personal injury cases, in particular, has usually focused on the alleged failure of legal systems to compensate plaintiffs as fully and as quickly as they believe proper. The defence lawyer is conventionally portrayed as a pettifogger in the classic sense, one who seeks points of detail on which to argue, delay and confuse issues until the plaintiff reduces their demands, dies, loses heart or otherwise goes away. Recent work has been widely taken as proposing that the most effective plaintiff response is to harry defendants in an aggressive and uncompromising fashion–so-called ‘hard bargaining’. This paper combines data from two studies of personal injury litigation carried out in the late 1980s and the mid 1990s to question this conclusion. Although the procedural environment has changed in England since the implementation of the Civil Justice Reforms in April 1999, it is argued that the general points on methodology and on the starting assumptions of socio-legal research remain valid.

The Charity Commissioners have indicated that they possess a law-making role. This paper evaluates the extent to which the Commissioners have exercised this role in relation to charities for the advancement of religion, and evaluates this role in the light of the Human Rights Act 1998. The analysis draws upon both case law and decisions of the Commissioners, in particular the decision of the Commissioners to refuse status as a religious charity to the Church of Scientology.

The integration of national financial markets over the past 30 years has resulted in a globalised market for corporate control which has increased both the opportunities for companies to fund acquisitions and the possibility of being acquired. Takeovers and mergers have, as a result, become a matter of some concern for governments, as they try to encourage the development of financial markets but also deal with the consequences of a globalised market for corporate control, where even companies regarded as national champions are within the reach of a foreign takeover. In the course of the last decade General Principle No 7 of the UK Takeover Code, that shareholders should decide the outcome of a takeover bid, has been adopted in many jurisdictions around the world and has formed the heart of the EU Directive on Takeovers. The Principle is however a controversial one, as its adoption is often viewed in civil law jurisdictions as an attack on a core part of a social market system. This has been particularly evident in the debate on the EU Directive on Takeovers. A number of common law heritage countries have also based their takeover regime around General Principle No 7 and many of these common law heritage counties have similarities with social market systems, in that they have less significant stock exchanges than the UK, the make up of their shareholding base is more concentrated and employment protections are more extensive. A central jurisdiction in that overlap is Australia, with exactly this combination. The purpose of this paper is to examine the historical effect of introducing UK takeover principles into the Australian system, by creating an empirical data set of takeovers of Australian listed companies covering the period before and after those UK-based principles were introduced. In doing so the paper found that factors such as concentrated ownership, capital controls and protective labour law have significant effects on the market for corporate control. There was no transforming effect evident in adopting an anti-managerial pro-shareholder takeover regime. As such, the fear that the adoption of a standardised EU-wide takeover Directive, along the lines of the UK Panel on Takeovers and Mergers' shareholder-oriented General Principle 7, would have a negative transforming effect on social market systems appears, on the Australian evidence, to be overblown, while other key features of such systems, particularly concentrated ownership and protective labour laws, remain in place.

Academic lawyers have commented extensively on the judicial interpretation of the Human Rights Act 1998, but the reaction of politicians to it has received less attention. This paper examines the trends in parliamentary attitudes to human rights by analysing Commons and Lords debates on the Human Rights Bill itself, the Terrorism Bill 1999–2000, the Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Bill 2001 and the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Bill 2002. It also considers MPs' response to the Thompson and Venables and Anderson judgments, as well as Conservative attempts to amend the Human Rights Act. Against this background, it argues that the British polity can be characterised as a ‘contestatory democracy’, in which the system of fundamental rights protection is incomplete since it neglects Parliament's vital role in defining the Convention rights.

Although sex education lessons have been provided in our schools for many years, concerns about the sexual health and practices of the nation's youth remain centre stage. In recent years, a number of initiatives have been introduced, with varying degrees of success, to increase young people's awareness of sexual matters and to reduce the high number of unplanned teenage pregnancies. One particularly controversial idea is that parents should be divested of the right to withdraw their children from sex education classes. In this paper, I consider the implications of this proposal, paying special attention to the response of those conservative religious organisations most likely to oppose it. My central thesis is that, while the state should be careful not to ride rough-shod over the wishes of parents in what is an extremely emotive area, the interests of the child are paramount and all young people in maintained secondary schools should have access to comprehensive sex education programmes.

Boxing, in particular professional boxing, has been bedevilied in recent years by a number of highly publicised tragedies in the ring. Despite these tragedies, the Law Commission in its recent Consultation Paper declined the opportunity to review the legality of professional boxing. The Law Commission concluded that

‘boxing, if it is to remain lawful, can only do so by the application of public policy considerations that are particular to that sport. Since that is a matter of pure policy, divorced from the more general considerations addressed in this Paper, we do not think it would be useful for us to add to the already formidable public debate on the issues.

This paper aims to unravel two connected errors in the current critical position on companies. Since the financial crisis, there have been a growing number of voices in the academic community raised against the shareholder value driven corporate sector. The often conservative and highly doctrinal voices of English company lawyers have become in parts more radicalised and have found common research ground with varied academic disciplines and with company lawyers in other jurisdictions more accustomed to critical approaches. New ideas have been forged; old ideas have been rediscovered and re-examined. In the emerging networks, the neoliberal domination of the study of companies is being substantially challenged. As exciting as this is, I am concerned that critical scholars have cohered around a core claim about company law which is erroneous. Furthermore, they have largely assumed that the current economy can sustain a social agenda as well as creating profit. This, I argue, hugely underestimates entrenched problems in the economy. In unravelling these issues my aim is to reorientate challenges to shareholder primacy and to the claims of capital more generally.

‘English law, having committed itself to a rather technical and schematic doctrine of contract, in application takes a practical approach, often at the cost of forcing the facts to fit uneasily into the marked slots of offer, acceptance and consideration. Although the context of these remarks was the necessity to analyse the complex of relations between the parties involved in a carriage of goods by sea- cargo owners, carriers, stevedores, and so on- into classical offer and acceptance, with identifiable consideration, this was not, as such, the root of Lord Wilberforce's difficulty. Rather, the source of the problem was the notoriously inconvenient doctrine of privity of contract which, in The Eurymedon, prevented the negligent stevedores from being able to rely straightforwardly upon the time limit provisions in the contract of carriage.

In a previous paper in this journal I responded to Professor John Keown’s criticisms of the British Medical Association guidance on withholding and withdrawing life-prolonging treatment, arguing that the sanctity of life principle he endorses is indefensible as a juridical and moral guide. Professor Keown replied recently, also in this journal, alleging that I wrongly caricatured the sanctity of life position he supports, which continues to illuminate the proper decision-making path in relation to the withdrawal or withholding of life-sustaining medical treatment. In this present paper it is submitted that Keown’s riposte is misconceived and disguises the true nature of the sanctity of life stance, which both rests upon unconvincing premisses and tends towards unacceptable repercussions, thus leading to its inevitable and rightful rejection.

Whether or not the events of 1992 will have significant effects on the criminal law, there is good reason for looking hard at those respects in which English criminal laws differ in scope from those of our European neighbours and partners. One obvious example concerns crimes of omission, especially those founded on public duties. German law has long had offences of failing to render assistance to a person in peril and similar offences are to be found in other countries such as Denmark, Finland, Italy, Russia and Spain. These laws stand in contrast to the English position, which remains essentially the same as Sir James Fitzjames Stephen described it in 1883:

There is, it seems, a revival of interest in anarchist theories of law. But then there is always a revival of interest in anarchist theories of law. In the 1960s Wortley began his text, Jurisprudence, with a study of anarchism, and the early 1980s saw a succession of papers and articles on anarchist critiques of law. Despite this, discussion of anarchist legal theory has rarely moved beyond the introductory stage. Basic tenets have been outlined but detailed analysis eschewed. Part of the reason for this may lie in basic difficulties of definition. The concern has been with ‘anarchist theories of law’, but what is anarchism?

Most writers, whether they be anarchist theorists or academic commentators, begin with the proposition that the word anarchism is derived from the Greek anarchos and means either ‘no government’ or ‘no ruler’. Such etymology cannot take the place of definition but, beyond the bare fact that anarchism involves the rejection of rulers, no further definition seems possible.

Down the centuries, it has been considered that in general a doctor is only under a duty to exercise reasonable care in treating a patient. While the latter is entitled to a high standard of treatment, results are not guaranteed. In the United States, courts have imposed more onerous obligations, but in England there has been no real challenge to this position until now. The doctor's liability in contract has always had the potential of going beyond mere negligence, but the general concentration on tort actions and understandable uncertainties as to the scope of contractual liability meant that this potential was never explored.

This article examines the development, operation and reform of the tribunal system responsible for determining appeals against the refusal of refugee status by the Home Office. Consideration of this particular appellate system is situated within a broader discussion of the criteria and values against which tribunal adjudication systems may be evaluated, By examining asylum appeals, light is shed on the theory and practice of administrative justice with regard to: the problematic nature of ensuring accuracy in tribunal decision-making; the tensions under which appeal procedures operate; the importance of onward appeal rights; and the role of tribunals in policy implementation. The article argues that recent reform of the asylum appeal process, including the introduction of a single tier of appeal, the Asylum and Immigration Tribunal, by the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004 and restrictions on legal aid, has been motivated by political considerations and may increase the dificulties in operating an effective appeal process.

The Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 purports to move away from the identification doctrine, towards a genuinely organisational model of corporate liability. There is a risk, however, that insistence upon the involvement of senior management in corporate manslaughter will reduce the Act to doing no more than aggregating individual misconduct. Such an approach would fail both to encompass the culpability of the organisation as more than just a collection of individuals, and to offer an effective tool for the prosecution of large organisations. I argue that the senior management requirement should not be interpreted as focusing on individuals, but on the authoritative systems of work that organisations impose upon their employees. Inherent in large organisations is a corporate structure, determining the meaning and value of what employees perceive and the boundaries and direction of their work. These structures emerge from the involvement of senior managers, whose rank and role within organisations enables them to contribute to the development of corporate structure. Through insistence on the involvement of these corporate architects and surveyors, the 2007 Act may be seen to emphasise the role of the organisation in corporate manslaughter, identifying truly corporate culpability.