This paper examines the processes whereby students may bring complaints against higher education institutions. It stresses that a right to redress of grievance is fundamental to the relationship between students and universities. It focuses on internal complaints procedures and discusses the findings from a survey of a representative sample of institutions of which nearly two thirds (25 in total) responded with statistical and other data on the grounds of complaint, the ethnicity and other characteristics of complainants, and the outcome of adjudications. It reveals areas of commonality and divergence in practice and raises concerns about the fairness and accessibility of the procedures. The paper also includes discussion of the process for the external adjudication of student complaints established under the Higher Education Act 2004 and the way that complaints progress to it. The paper discusses the case for reform of higher education institutions’ student complaints procedures, which are surprisingly unregulated, including the introduction of a more independent element such as ‘campus ombudsmen’.

The following scene as recounted by the English writer James Stern occurred in a German town one week after Germany's unconditional surrender in May 1945. A crowd is gathered around a series of photographs which though initially seeming to depict garbage instead reveal dead human bodies. Each photograph has a heading ‘WHO IS GUILTY?’. The spectators are silent, appearing hypnotised, and eventually retreat one by one. The placards are later replaced with clearer photographs and placards proclaiming ‘THIS TOWNISGUILTY! YOUARE GUILTY!’.

The introduction of s 33 of the Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, criminalising the disclosure of private sexual images, has been seen as a welcome step forward for curbing this abuse of privacy and the harmful effects it has on victims. However, while s 33 sidesteps any reference to ‘revenge pornography’, as the phenomenon has been termed in popular vernacular, little attention has been paid to the way in which narratives of revenge implicitly underpin and imbue the new offence, particularly its specific intent requirement. We argue this has serious implications for the treatment of s 33 offences in the courts and for sentencing. Drawing on cross-disciplinary conceptualisations of revenge, its recent criminal-legal history, and examples of media and parliamentary rhetoric, we claim that despite innumerable attempts to turn debate on disclosure of private sexual images towards consent, harm and privacy, there lurks within these discourses an assumption that the victim must have done something to deserve the treatment she received. Until the multiple harms of disclosure of private sexual images are recognised and explicit recommendations are made that scrutiny of victims’ behaviour should normally be inadmissible, we argue that the offence offers little in the way of redress.

The purpose of this article is to examine the interaction between the court and alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in the legal administration of civil justice. It addresses the following questions. What is the relationship between ADR and the concept of justice? How do we make sense of the anti-ADR views, in particular the serious threat to the rule of law? What role does, and should, the court play in alternative processes? It argues that integrating ADR into the court system broadens the notion of justice and its access, and that, under the rule of law, judges should play a more central role to ensure the use, quality and integrity of alternative processes. This paper extends our understanding of the relationship among justice, ADR and the court from an internal perspective. It also points out the need to expand the case management responsibilities of judges, and their delegates in the Online Court, on ADR.

Intended conduct is not the only means by which people, for good or ill, make their presence felt in the world. Nonetheless, much judicial and academic learning exists on the meaning of intention in law. In spite of so much learning, however, our understanding of how intention affects the wrongfulness of conduct remains impoverished. The impression given by case law and commentary is that the important issues raised by the role of intention in the criminal law can largely be exhausted by exploration of the distinction between direct and oblique intention: between desired goals and side-effects foreseen as certain in acting. Nothing could be further from the truth. In particular, there is far more richness and complexity in the concept of direct intention itself than has been hitherto realised. In this article, I will focus on two more or less neglected species of direct intention: the intention to try to do wrong, and the intention to expose another to the risk of wrongdoing. An understanding of the moral significance of these kmds of intention enhances our understanding of the nature and scope of criminal attempts and possible offences of endangerment in English law.

The Public Interest Disclosure Act 1998 provides protection for whistleblowers; it does not place statutory obligations on regulators to act in response to whistleblowing concerns. Using Freedom of Information requests as a research methodology, this paper seeks to examine how whistleblowing is approached by regulators and what happens when a whistleblowing disclosure is made. Forty-eight national regulators in a variety of fields and 408 county, district and unitary local authorities with responsibility for the regulation of food were contacted. The paper begins by considering the importance of whistleblowing disclosures and how they are protected in PIDA. The examination of the law reveals that several organisations with important regulatory functions are not prescribed, and this has the potential to create inconsistencies in the protection of whistleblowers. The bulk of the paper examines the results of the Freedom of Information requests. By examining the results of these requests, it was possible to show that there are a number of inconsistencies in the way in which regulatory agencies handle concerns. Several changes to practice are suggested in order to ensure that the whistleblowers receive appropriate treatment and that the concerns that they express can be properly addressed.

This paper considers certain proposals made by the European Commission on environmental liability, particularly in its White Paper on Environmental Liability. Civil liability has made a relatively minor contribution to environmental policy in recent decades, given its many well-known shortcomings when applied to environmental problems. Its usefulness, however, is being reassessed, given something of a consensus that traditional forms of regulation are reaching the limits of their effectiveness and that new approaches to environmental law are necessary. This paper will consider how the White Paper would move beyond the limitations of existing civil liability frameworks, in particular the fundamental incompatibility between the interests recognised in English tort law and the interests at stake in environmental protection. The Commission's recent retreat from the more ambitious elements of the White Paper may be a matter of concern.

Law has traditionally viewed emotions as the enemies of rationality and reason, irrational and potentially dangerous forces which must be suppressed or disregarded. This separation and enmity has been mirrored within undergraduate legal education in England and Wales, with its rigid focus on seemingly impartial and objective analysis and notions such as the ubiquitous ‘thinking like a lawyer’. This paper will argue that attempts to disregard or suppress emotions within the law school are both misguided and destined to fail. It will explore the integral part emotions play within effective legal learning, the development of legal skills, and the well-being of both law students and legal academics. It will also consider how developments in legal scholarship and the evolving climate of higher education generally offer some potential, but also pitfalls, for the future acknowledgment and incorporation of emotions within undergraduate legal education in England and Wales. Bodies of literature relating to not only legal education, but also education generally, psychology and philosophy will be drawn on to demonstrate that emotions have a potentially transformative power within legal education, requiring them to be acknowledged and utilised within a more holistic, integrated form of law degree.

Failure of medical advice by a medical practitioner can vitiate a patient’s consent to treatment giving rise to battery and it can also constitute a breach of the medical practitioner’s duty to inform bringing in negligence. This failure to inform pertains to the two torts of battery and negligence. What then is the distinction between medical trespass and medical negligence? The English cases from Chatterton v Gerson in 1981 to the recent leading case of Sidaway v Bethlem Royal Hospital Governors and Others have drawn a distinction. The distinction between the two torts is useful for the purposes of classification and application of tortious liability and is also necessary for the purpose of establishing the different functions of the two torts. Unfortunately, the distinction drawn is inappropriate. The article will first examine the distinction drawn by the cases between the two torts in this area of failure of medical advice; then it will discuss the difficulties in the distinction employed; and, finally, it will suggest a more appropriate relationship between medical trespass and negligence.

The general theme of this conference - legal change and legal scholarship across Europe - reflects a growing interest of British academic lawyers in the increasing European dimension of law. Indeed, the new dynamics of the unification movement is one of the most salient features of the legal development of the recent past. It has many aspects, including EC legislation and the drafting of restatements and of general principles of law, which I will shed some light upon in the first part of my paper. I will then venture an explanation for the renascence and the new appeal of the unification movement (section II) before turning to a more specific discussion of the hamonisation of private law in Europe (section III), the significance of general principles of law for its unification (section IV), and the restatements of contract law and their role in the process of integration (section V). For the sake of clarity, I should like to premise that harmonisation and unification, although technically having different meanings, will be used interchangeably here.

Over the years, there has been an explosion in the mainstream scholarship of various academic disciplines on the issue of the appropriate corporate objective, which has been framed by a debate between the shareholder wealth maximisation and stakeholder-orientated theories. Behind the two paradigms is a complex set of controversies on which there exists wide disagreement. What is certain is that the prevailing theories have obvious normative and/or practical limitations and neither is to be extolled as an affirmative theory, for different reasons. The purpose of this paper is to cut through the consequent knot of partial and inaccurate dialectic in order to develop a positive normative principle of the corporate objective. This will be referred to as the Equitable Maximisation and Viability principle. The objective of the corporation as a separate legal entity should be to: (i) respect, protect, and fulfil the demonstrable, legitimate interests and expectations of the constituent groups that contribute to the corporation; and (ii) to facilitate the corporation's viability so that its future is guaranteed with sufficiently high probability. This theory is justifiable on the basis of the values of equality and efficiency.

The paper assesses the extension of the public sector equality duty to cover religion and belief. The duty on public authorities is to have due regard to the need to eliminate discrimination, harassment and victimisation on grounds of religion and belief; and advance equality of opportunity and foster good relations between people of different religions (and none). The paper considers a number of concerns about how this duty may be applied in the context of religion and belief, and, in particular, that it could give rise to resentment between communities rather than fostering good relations. It is suggested that the potential difficulties of such a duty, when applied to religion and belief, may be lessened if it is based overtly on a concept of equality which aims to address disadvantage, rather than on a concept based on dignity or recognition.

This paper analyses the EU proposal for a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) and a recent US proposal for the establishment of a border carbon adjustment (BCA) as examples of ‘defensive’ policies, broadly informed by an economic level playing field and an environmental level playing field rationale. From an environmental law perspective, the CBAM's narrow focus on price-based policies, distortions of competition and trade intensity is unsatisfactory; however, the EU CBAM is more feasible in practical terms and overall more likely to be WTO law compatible than the US proposal for a BCA. An environmental level playing field perspective is associated with several practical problems: these relate to the determination of environmental equivalence, the identification of appropriate remedies, and the demarcation of the scope of application of the relevant regulatory arrangements. Further, measures informed by an economic level playing field rationale can be easier to justify under WTO law. Taking stock of these findings, the paper concludes that practical obstacles and structural legal constraints push towards a narrower focus on an economic level playing field, as a matter of regulatory design.

During 2020, weddings were profoundly affected by the Covid-19 pandemic. During periods of lockdown few weddings could take place, and even afterwards restrictions on how they could be celebrated remained. To investigate the impact of such restrictions, we carried out a survey of those whose plans to marry in England and Wales had been affected by Covid-19. The 1,449 responses we received illustrated that the ease and speed with which couples had been able to marry, and sometimes whether they had been able to marry at all, had depended not merely on the national restrictions in place but on their chosen route into marriage. This highlights the complexity and antiquity of marriage law and reinforces the need for reform. The restrictions on weddings taking place also revealed the extent to which couples valued getting married as opposed to having a wedding. Understanding both the social and the legal dimension of weddings is important in informing recommendations as to how the law should be changed in the future, not merely to deal with similar crises but also to ensure that the general law is fit for purpose in the twenty-first century.

Money is central to the constitution, whether the focus be effective power, legitimate authority, or both. To map the distribution of power within government it is best to begin by examining the control of money, because little of the business of government can be done without incurring expenditure of some sort. Control of money gives control of policy, either directly - because, in many fields, ‘expenditure is policy; policy is expenditure’ -or indirectly, on the principle that he who pays the piper calls the tune.

This paper examines the legal support available to incarcerated children when they leave custody. It argues that the current support provided to custody-leavers – which includes both ‘resettlement’ (provided by youth justice agencies) and duties owed to some custody-leavers under Pt III of the Children Act 1989 – may achieve criminal justice aims (such as preventing re-offending) but does not adequately protect the status and rights that all custody-leavers have qua child. When the child leaves custody her primary status is child, not offender, and therefore it is argued here that she should be entitled to the same legal rights as analogous groups of children; namely, care-leavers. It is suggested that the reason why care-leavers and custody-leavers are comparable groups to whom parity in legal rights should be accorded is because the four types of responsibility that underpin the state's obligations to care-leavers (reparatory, assumed, generational and equity-based) apply equally to custody-leavers.

Proportionality has been testing the judiciary for decades. However, a single replicable model of proportionality has not been consistently applied by the courts. This paper explores the differential application of proportionality in English law. It is argued that these differential approaches create doctrinal confusion and give rise to numerous shortcomings. These shortcomings include: (i) the a priori weighting of fundamental rights; (ii) undue deference to state institutions; and (iii) variable judicial scrutiny dependent upon the source of the rights in question. It will be argued here that the courts ought to adopt a common standard of proportionality review in all proceedings concerning fundamental rights. The viability of this approach will then be tested against existing case law.

Many human and financial resources are being spent on the asylum determination and appeal processes in order to distinguish those asylum applicants who require protection from those who do not. However, the majority of failed asylum seekers do not leave the country. The lack of an effective removal policy defeats the purpose of having an asylum system at all. In other words, removals of failed asylum seekers are essential to preserve the integrity and credibility of the asylum system. Since forced removals are a crucial component of our asylum system, this paper seeks to examine how they can be made more eflcient and humane. In particular, it examines the recent measures adopted through the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004 and proposed measures currently debated at the EU level.

Coexisting and eye-watering levels of food abundance, waste, overconsumption and hunger are symptomatic of a broken food system punctuated by vested interests in systematic overproduction. Against that backdrop, this paper evaluates England's ‘new’ approach to food waste in light of concerns that policy-makers have framed food waste as a consumer behaviour problem, rather than a structural challenge. The Resources and Waste Strategy's acknowledgement of normalised overproduction is thus remarkable, but unexpected. However, frame critical analysis reveals how an apparent departure from preoccupations with economic growth, combined with promises of government action, obscure an ongoing reluctance to intervene against powerful interests and the causes (not symptoms) of food waste. Legislative proposals, rather than reducing surplus, shift the burden of redistributing food away from the state and retailers, on to charities and farmers. With England, perhaps wrongly, seen as a world-leader on food waste, this has implications for other jurisdictions, as well as forthcoming consultations.

Disputes relating to cryptoassets have proliferated in recent years, along with the rise of the cryptoasset market. Some of these can be resolved using traditional principles of contract, tort or trust law, but proprietary issues raise particular conundrums. While cryptoassets have generally been accepted to be property, that is merely the starting point. To properly resolve proprietary disputes, it is necessary to provide a reasoned and robust explanation for why particular rules of title originally developed in the context of tangible property should apply. In turn, two foundational questions must be answered. First, what is the subject-matter of the property right in cryptoassets? And secondly, what is the proprietary effect of a blockchain transaction? These issues have received relatively little attention in the literature, which has focused on whether cryptoassets are property at all, and existing contributions (including the Law Commission's recent Consultation Paper on Digital Assets) which do engage these issues are far from reaching consensus. This paper critically examines those views and puts forward its own reasoned approach for the application of traditional rules of title to cryptoassets.