The purpose of this article is to examine the interaction between the court and alternative dispute resolution (ADR) in the legal administration of civil justice. It addresses the following questions. What is the relationship between ADR and the concept of justice? How do we make sense of the anti-ADR views, in particular the serious threat to the rule of law? What role does, and should, the court play in alternative processes? It argues that integrating ADR into the court system broadens the notion of justice and its access, and that, under the rule of law, judges should play a more central role to ensure the use, quality and integrity of alternative processes. This paper extends our understanding of the relationship among justice, ADR and the court from an internal perspective. It also points out the need to expand the case management responsibilities of judges, and their delegates in the Online Court, on ADR.

In Bland the House of Lords held it lawful to withdraw tube-feeding from a patient in a ‘persistent vegetative state’ (pvs), even with intent to kill him. The British Medical Association (BMA) recently published guidance on the withholding and withdrawal of ‘medical treatment’, so defined as to include food and water delivered by tube. The guidance endorses the withholding/withdrawal of tube-delivered food and water not only from patients in pvs but also from other non-terminally ill patients, such as those with severe dementia or serious stroke. The underlying justification appears (as in Bland) to be that such lives lack worth. This article offers three major criticisms of the guidance. First, its argument that tube-feeding is medical treatment rather than basic care is weak. Secondly, its reasons for not treating or tube-feeding undermine the BMA's longstanding opposition to active euthanasia and active assisted suicide. Thirdly, it relies heavily on legal precedent at the expense of ethical reasoning.

The pressure to distinguish high quality from lower quality law journals is intensifying. To contribute to this debate, citation-based and peer review-based ranking of law journals are paralleled in the paper, using qualitative and quantitative analysis. It is found that all law journals that are considered as journals of the highest quality by legal experts are also ranked highly in Web of Science (WoS) and that 40% of the law journals categorised as ‘internationally leading’ by the peers are not listed in WoS. This paper explores what the editors of some of the internationally leading law journals that are not listed in the WoS think about applying to be listed in it. The paper offers data to support the contention that legal scholarship is characterised by regionalism in academic publishing and citation patterns. It is submitted that there is no perfect indicator of quality, and that no evaluation system will ever convince every legal scholar in the world of its value. WoS could be adopted as a rigorous and internationally recognised index for law journals only if it were aligned more closely with the Leiden Manifesto.

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and UN Human Rights Committee have reached contradictory decisions in cases concerning the right to manifest religion. This discrepancy calls into question the universality of the right and is problematic from the perspective of legal certainty. Consequently, this article explores the extent to which the diverging decisions of these two bodies are compatible with a good faith interpretation of the right to manifest religion. A good faith interpretation of the right is identified by utilising the travaux préparatoires and subsequent interpretations. It is argued that by failing to scrutinise the necessity of restrictions and the role of secularism, the ECtHR has undermined this good faith interpretation and, in so doing, is not fulfilling its role as ‘the conscience of Europe’.

The business case for corporate environmental responsibility is the claim that behaving responsibly makes financial sense. It is impossible to exaggerate the contemporary significance of this claim, not least in legitimising environmental concerns in the corporate sphere. However, the business case is not without significant empirical and normative limitations, as is illustrated by the corporate environmental problem of supermarket waste. This paper evaluates enlightened shareholder value under s 172 of the Companies Act 2006 in light of such business case limitations. It suggests that s 172, by procedurally mandating the business case for corporate environmental responsibility, is a retrograde step which envisions not enlightened, but rather environmentally unenlightened, shareholders.

In January 1995, during the furore over the murder conviction of Private Lee Clegg, the Home Office announced a review of the law of murder as the House of Lords had declared it to be. In March 1996 the Report of the Inter-Departmental Review of the Law on the Use of Lethal Force in Self-Defence or the Prevention of Crime was completed and, if not exactly ‘published’, then at least available to interested members of the public. The review was primarily concerned with the possibility of enacting a partial defence to murder, whereby a soldier or policemen who had used excessive force resulting in the death of a criminal suspect would be convicted only of manslaughter, but the Home Office also examined the possibility of giving statutory authority to the internal Army and police regulations upon the use of firearms, in order to clarify the concept of ‘reasonable force’. In the end, however, the Inter-Departmental Review (hereafter ‘the Review’) proposed no change to the law of murder nor of voluntary manslaughter, and neither did it propose any method of clarifying the concept of ‘reasonable force’.

The work of carers is too often unvalued and unrecognised. This paper seeks to demonstrate some of the ways in which law and traditional medical ethics overlook the interests of carers and the importance of their work. It argues that this is, in part, due to the individualistic ethic that has come to dominate legal and ethical discourse about medicine. It recommends an approach based on an ethic of care that seeks to promote and protect just relationships of care, rather than an individualised model of rights.

The right to the exclusive services of sports performers is a valuable asset, in team sports, to the clubs which employ them and, in individual sports, to the agents, managers and/or promoters who act for them. This is most visible in professional football's market for players’ services where leading performers are currently ‘sold’ for many millions of pounds. The notion of players as assets is often reflected in clubs’ accounts and enhances clubs’ overall value. Of those clubs which are owned by publicly quoted companies the securing (or loss) of a star player can crucially affect the share price of the controlling company. In a more general sense a player's value to his club is reflected in his capacity to attract larger attendances, an increased volume of pre-season ticket sales and enhanced merchandising and marketing opportunities.

The government has made a commitment to ensure that sustainable development is placed at the heart of decision-making. The UK's strategy has primarily involved the development of voluntary measures to achieve sustainable development in policy-making. These measures are monitored by a Sustainable Development Commission and, most importantly, a parliamentary Environmental Audit Committee. However, a number of public bodies also have a statutory duty in respect of sustainable development. These duties do not create enforceable legal obligations, but may have significant value as a clear statement of policy on the achievement of sustainable development – providing political leadership at the highest level. It is essential to this aim that the government provides a clear message regarding the objective of sustainable development. However, close investigation of these duties reveals not only a partial legal framework, but a number of inconsistencies in the government's approach to the achievement of sustainable development.

The substance of this article revolves around Kenny's rhetorical question. It is a widely held view among lawyers and legal philosophers that the idea of criminal justice involves the presupposition of the freedom of the will, but there are good grounds for accepting some version of determinism as a working hypothesis to explain criminal behaviour. Judges themselves on occasion do this. Unless it can be shown, therefore, that determinism is either compatible with free will, or is itself an incoherent doctrine, the whole rationale of the criminal law as a form of social control stands exposed to criticism.

I am going to attack a particular type of undergraduate Criminal Law course. I do not have in mind any particular course currently taught. I do not assume that it is the textbooks which provide the model from which courses proceed. The sort ofcourse upon which I want to make an attack has many features, amongst which the following are to be found:

This paper offers a timely investigation into access to justice in rural areas through place-based research. The paper reports an empirical study designed to gain the local knowledge and personal experience of one particular group of rural dwellers in the hope that it might help encourage a wider discussion on access to rural justice. The research has been conducted within the wider socio-political context of austerity that provides a challenge to public-sector service delivery in general, alongside the particular legal impact of budget cuts on the provision of justice, with closures of large amounts of courts, the decline in legal aid provision and reductions in police numbers. Such are important issues for England and Wales as a whole, meaning that this research is contemporary and represents one of the first academic studies to specifically deal with the impact of austerity on access to justice. The value of this research is further heightened with its focus on the specific rural impact of such cuts as rural areas are those likely to face the biggest effect on provision while concomitantly being the least studied area of legal provision, with notably little scholarship in the past two decades into justice in rural England and Wales. Considering the damage these cuts may cause to rural justice is a current issue of utmost importance to the principle of access to justice. The paper offers the foundations upon which a new wave of academic attention to justice in rural areas should be developed, reflecting the need to give due credence to the rural in contemporary socio-legal scholarship.

The United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice state that there should be ‘a close relationship between the notion of responsibility for delinquent or criminal behaviour and other social rights and responsibilities’. If healthcare autonomy, or the ‘right to be responsible for making decisions about our own medical welfare’, is accepted as one of these social rights then, in England, the age gap between criminal responsibility and healthcare right is considerable. It has been suggested that this age difference might be explained in terms of the attribution of responsibility; in essence that there is a difference in the timing and nature of the responsibility being ascribed. The aim of this paper is to examine the concept of responsibility, particularly as it relates to adolescent decisions concerning death; the refusal of life-saving treatment, on the one hand, and the commission of homicidal acts, on the other. It would appear that there is considerable overlap in the types of responsibility alluded to in both situations, most particularly in the notions of capacity responsibility and prospective responsibility. If this is so, then having a wide gap between the two ages of responsibility would seem to lack a secure jurisprudential basis.

Rankings of law schools and law journals are part of a trend towards more emphasis in academia on transparency and accountability with regard to the quality of research and education. Globalisation increases the need to compare law schools and law journals across borders, but this raises complicated questions due to differences in language, education systems, publishing style and so on. In this contribution, it is argued that ranking of law schools and law reviews runs the risk of driving us away from quality based on substance towards proceduralisation and quality assessment based on proxies favoured by managers of law schools, funding bodies and government agencies, instead of by the forum of legal scholars.

This paper examines the interplay between discourses of exclusion and inclusion in the relationship between land law and human rights. It explores the common law conception of property in land and its relationship with the conceptual structure of property before suggesting that the particular form the conception takes in the English common law is problematic as a discourse of exclusion in the light of inclusive human rights considerations. However, further submerged exclusions in law are also explored, suggesting a problematic ideological continuity between land law and human rights law, notwithstanding identifiable surface tensions between them as contrasting discourses. Once the continuity of hidden exclusions is identified, the paper explores the theoretical unity between the deep structure of property as ‘propriety’ and human rights as ‘what is due’, and suggests their mutual potential for embracing more inclusive concerns. Finally, two modest proposals for future theoretical reform are offered: the need for a more anthropologically adequate and inclusive construct of the human being as legal actor, and the need for a more differentiated, context-sensitive formulation of the common law1 property conception, one capable of reconciling conceptually necessary elements of excludability with inclusive human rights impulses.

Arguments for reform of the dynamic of medical negligence litigation in Ireland frequently centre on temporal and financial concerns. However, as the field of law and psychology has continued to grow, a body of international literature has emerged which recognises that litigation can have a destructive emotional impact on its participants, particularly in the context of medical negligence disputes.

This paper contributes to the discourse on law-caused harms through a critical exploration of the emotional burdens of medical negligence litigation from the perspective of both the plaintiff and medical practitioner, with reference to the findings of an empirical study (interviews with barristers, patient support groups, and medical professional bodies) and the literature. Whilst the temporal and financial efficiency of medical negligence litigation is important, if litigation can cause emotional harm, this should be considered a serious, undesirable effect of the traditional adversarial process, and may have broader implications for reform in this area.

The Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 (CDDA) instituted, inter alia, a mechanism whereby directors of failed companies can be disqualified from holding office in the future as the result of an application to the court by the Secretary of State, or in the case of compulsory liquidators, the official receive and a subsequent finding by the court that the director is unfit. The operation and effect of the CDDA has been the subject of speculation in the national press, other media and comment from insolvency practitioners since its inception. Most of this comment has focused on the role of the DTI and on its perceived failure to take steps to disqualify directors in sufficient numbers.

This paper briefly reviews the US case law dealing with the issue of birth control fraud and speculates on the possibility of a similar action succeeding in the UK. It then focuses on newspaper reporting of one such case. A common media reading of this case, and one which can also be detected in some academic commentary of similar cases, is to contextualise it as part of an ongoing ‘battle of the sexes’, where historic poles of inequality have become reversed and women have gained unfair (legal) advantage in procreative matters. It is argued that such an understanding is flawed and misleading, serving to distract attention from the legal structuring of these kinds of disputes. The paper concludes that the operation of the law can here be better understood as seeking to support the nuclear family in a way which can impact negatively on both individual men and individual women. The birth control fraud cases invite us to rethink the way that parental obligations are imposed and to justify more rigorously the choices which we make in this regard.

This paper analyses the EU proposal for a carbon border adjustment mechanism (CBAM) and a recent US proposal for the establishment of a border carbon adjustment (BCA) as examples of ‘defensive’ policies, broadly informed by an economic level playing field and an environmental level playing field rationale. From an environmental law perspective, the CBAM's narrow focus on price-based policies, distortions of competition and trade intensity is unsatisfactory; however, the EU CBAM is more feasible in practical terms and overall more likely to be WTO law compatible than the US proposal for a BCA. An environmental level playing field perspective is associated with several practical problems: these relate to the determination of environmental equivalence, the identification of appropriate remedies, and the demarcation of the scope of application of the relevant regulatory arrangements. Further, measures informed by an economic level playing field rationale can be easier to justify under WTO law. Taking stock of these findings, the paper concludes that practical obstacles and structural legal constraints push towards a narrower focus on an economic level playing field, as a matter of regulatory design.

Are there now any circumstances in which a teenage may effectively withhold her consent to medical treatment? By effectively, I mean not only that she can refuse to consent to treatment but also that this refusal is respected and the treatment prevented.

Consent to medical advice and treatment, the givingofwhich means that a doctor does or does not commit a battery (criminal or civil) on her patient, necessarily involves both the giving of consent and the withholding of consent. Without one the other has no meaning.