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Classification of obligations and the impact of constructivist epistemologies

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  02 January 2018

Geoffrey Samuel
Geoffrey Samuel*
Affiliation:
University of Kent
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Extract

In December 1996 Classification of Obligations formed the topic of one of a series of SPTL seminars under the general title of Pressing Problems in the Law. It may, perhaps, be asked quite why classification is a pressing problem, for it is by no means clear from the papers themselves that common lawyers have suddenly become more concerned about the internal structure of the ‘seamless web’. Nevertheless the seminar was a valuable opportunity to reflect upon a subject that is at least a useful vehicle for thinking about legal knowledge. Legal classification, in other words, raises questions of an epistemological nature. The purpose of this present paper is to pursue this epistemological point in an attempt to reveal how classification of symbolic knowledge (legal propositions or rules) hides much deeper issues about the role of non-symbolic knowledge (symmetries, images and isomorphs) in the formulation of legal solutions in the law of obligations.

Type
Research Article
Information
Legal Studies , Volume 17 , Issue 3 , November 1997 , pp. 448 - 482
Copyright
Copyright © Society of Legal Scholars 1997

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References

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68 Ibid pp 175–178.

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72 J.3.13pr.

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74 G.4.2–4.

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76 ‘Let us note that legal science is characterised from a methodological point of view by the fact of describing ‘atypical objects’, legal norms, which are nothing other than prescriptive propositions. What we wish only to say here is that the legal norm … constitutes, from the point of view of neo-positivist methodology, a rather particular kind of “object” which escapes the criteria of observability established for all empirical phenomena. The legal norm, at least according to the meta-scientific perspective of these positivists, is not in fact something of which one can have an immediate and direct perception… without the aid of concepts and theoretical categories’: V Villa La science du droit (Story-Scientia, 1990 trans O Nerhot and P Nerhot) p 84.

77 Samuel Foundations op cit pp 178–180.

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85 D.l.1.12; Jolowicz Roman Foundations op cit pp 80–81; Samuel Foundations op cit pp 53–54.

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91 G Bachelard La formation de l'esprit scientifique (Vrin 1938, reprint 1989) p 44.

92 D.9.3.1.

93 D.9.2.3 1.

94 D.13.6.2.

95 J.4.6pr.

96 Jolowicz op cit pp 80–81.

97 See eg Noveau Code de Procédure Civile arts 30–32.

98 See eg D. 11.1.6pr.

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100 D.22.6.2.

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109 In respect of the later nineteenth century see Samuel and Rinkes op cit pp 79–80.

110 Ibid pp 305–313. Today, animals, aircraft, trees, buildings, land, tools and so on all attract their own specific rules as far as civil liability is concerned.

111 Ibid pp 257–265.

112 Birks op cit p 4.

113 See eg Bryunt v Herbert (1877) 3 CPD 389.

114 Baker op cit pp 379–400. This process began, of course, well before the formal abolition of the forms of action.

115 Bryunt v Herbert (1877) 3 CPD 389 at 390.

116 The Roman law influence of non-contractual actions based on wrongs came largely through Blackstone: Winfield, P H The Province of the Law of Tort (Cambridge, 1931) pp 25–31 Google Scholar. However, what Blackstone provided were ‘a series of forms into which to put the content of the common law’: Lobban op cit p 39.

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118 Sincluir v Brougham [1914] AC 398 at 415.

119 Lindley LJ even went as far as implying that English law conformed more or less to the pattern to be found in Justinian's Institutes: Taylor v Manchester, Sheffield & Lincolnshire Rly [1895] 1 QB 134 at 138.

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134 Samuel and Rinkes op cit pp 277–293. Professor Birks (op cit) prefers to distinguish between compensatory and restitutionary damages; but had the historical distinction between debt and damages been consistently maintained (cf The Aldora [1975] QB 748, 751) the confusion about which Professor Birks complains (p 59) could be avoided: cf Samuel and Rinkes, pp 93–96.

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139 Tony Weir points out that over 90% of contractual actions are claims in debt: T Weir, Droit des contrats, in J A Jolowicz (ed) Droit anglais (Dalloz, 2nd edn, 1992) p 140.

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151 Le Moigne op cit pp 30–31.

152 See generally Rudden, B, A Source-book on French Law (Oxford, 3rd edn, 1991) pp 278–288 Google Scholar. The methodology predates the codes themselves: A Watson The Making of the Civil Law (Harvard, 1981) pp 39–52. However, one should note the reality: M Lasser ‘Judicial (Self-) Portraits: Judicial Discourse in the French Legal System’ (1995) 104 Yale Law Journal 1325. But cf Samuel and Rinkes op cit pp 20–26.

153 See eg Fisher v Bell [1961] 1 QB 394.

154 This point is now recognised by some senior judges who advocate the use of policy to fill the gap between two logically defensible solutions: see eg Steyn LJ in Watts v Aldington (1993) Times, 16 December, quoted by Auld LJ in Jameson v CEGB [1997] 3 WLR 151 at 161–162.

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171 Ibid.

172 Bechtel, W and Abrahamsen, A Connectionism and the Mind: An Introduction to Parallel Processing in Networks (Blackwell, 1991) pp 289–292 Google Scholar.

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178 Delacour op cit p 34.

179 Ibid pp 39, 104–122; Bechtel and Abrahamsen op cit p 235.

180 [1980] AC 827.

181 [1978] 1 WLR 856.

182 See generally Samuel Foundations op cit pp 204–207.

183 Treitel, G H The Law of Contract (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 9th edn, 1995) pp 70, 202Google Scholar.

184 See eg Stovin v Wise [1996] AC 923.

185 See eg Alcock v Chief Constable of South Yorkshire [1992] 1 AC 310.

186 See eg Animals Act 1971.

187 Samuel Foundations op cit pp 231–234.

188 Grant v Australian Knitting Mills Ltd [1936] AC 85.

189 Durand op cit p 53.

190 Caparo Industries v Dickman [1990] 2 AC 605. For the inductive and deductive method see Lord Diplock in Home Office v Dorset Yacht Co [1970] AC 1004 at 1058–1059.

191 FA & AB Ltd v Lupton [1972] AC 634 at 658–659.

192 Granger op cit p 111.

193 See eg Lord Denning MR in Spartan Steel & Alloys Ltd v Martin & Co [1973] 1 QB 27 at 35. Lord Denning MR appeared to contradict his view on parasitic damages in Jackson v Horizon Holidays Ltd [1975] 1 WLR 1468.

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196 Lévy-Leblond, J-M ‘Symétrie et espace-temps’ in various authors La symétrie aujourd'hui (Éitions du Seuil, 1989) p 64 Google Scholar.

197 See eg Lord Simonds in Read v J Lyons & Co [1947] AC 156 at 182.

198 The rule theorist will, of course, want to link reasoning by analogy with reasoning from rules and principles: see eg MacCormick, N Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (Oxford, 1978) p 186 Google Scholar.

199 [1947] AC 156.

200 See eg Lord Macmillan at 171, 175.

201 Samuel Foundations op cit pp 147–154, 199–202.

202 [1996] 3 WLR 626.

203 At 628–629.

204 At 629.

205 On which see eg Beswick v Beswick [1966] Ch 538; cf [1968] AC 58; Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 548.

206 See also Ex p Island Records [1978] Ch 122.

207 For a recent example where property notions (possession and ownership) are dependent upon the obligations notion of trespass see Waverley BC v Fletcher [1996] QB 334.

208 Atiyah op cit pp 764–778.

209 See Lawson, F H Remedies of English Law (London: Butterworth, 2nd edn, 1980) pp 147–160 Google Scholar.

210 It is particularly important with respect to real security: Lawson, F H and Rudden, B The Law of Property (Oxford, 2nd edn, 1982) pp 188–204 Google Scholar. See also Bridge, M Personal Property Law (London: Blackstone, 2nd edn, 1996) pp 8–9 CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

211 [1972] 1 WLR 1009.

212 Treitel, G H Remedies for Breach of Contract (Oxford, 1988) p 245 Google Scholar.

213 Bachelard op cit.

214 See eg Samuel and Rinkes pp 322–325.

215 See eg Weir Casebook op cit pp 646–648.

216 See Samuel and Rinkes pp 24–26.

217 See generally A Watson ‘The Importance of “Nutshells”’ op cit.

218 See eg Goulet, J ‘Quelques variations sur le modéle thermodynamique et le droit artificiel’ in Bourcier, D and Mackay, P (eds) Lire le droit: Langue, texte, cognition (LGDJ, 1992) p 38 Google Scholar. See also Bourcier, D La décision artificielle: le droit, la machine et l'humain (Presses Universitaires de France, 1995) pp 205–208 Google Scholar.

219 FA & AB Ltd v Lupton [1972] AC 634 at 658–659.

220 Atias Épistémologie du droit op cit pp 21–28.

221 Weinrib Seminar Paper op cit p 1.

222 Cf Blanché op cit p 29.

223 Professor Birks (op cit), to his credit, is trying to steer a middle course; but in doing so it is arguable that his theoretical underpinning is extremely weak (for example his use of notions such as ‘logic’ and ‘democratic bargain’ raise more questions than they answer). In fairness, however, his important essay cannot properly be discussed in a short note; what is needed is a separate and detailed response.

224 Again Birk's paper (op cit) does not really address in any serious way the epistemological functions of taxonomy and rule application. For example to conclude that the case of Spring v Guardian Assurance PlC [1995] 2 AC 296 presents ‘a conundrum of disorderly categories’ which ‘disfigures the law’ (p 6) because it recognises in a single set of facts the torts of defamation (‘an infringement of an interest in reputation’) and negligence (‘a wrong named by reference to a kind of fault’) is to suggest that legal categorisation should be alternative and mutually exclusive. This in turn makes assumptions about the nature of fact in relation to rule systems. Now ‘facts are never evident’ and they ‘never directly thrust themselves upon one, and it can be said that they exist neither a priori nor separately’ since they ‘have sense only in relation to a system of thought, through a pre-existing theory’ ( Astolfi, J-P and Develay, M La didactique des sciences (Presses Universitaires de France, 4th edn, 1996) p 25 Google Scholar. What Professor Birks seems to be advocating is a return to the axiomatic period of science which characterized the mos geometricus. Artificial Intelligence research has shown, for law, that such an epistemological model is misconceived to say the least since it is, inter aha, to make false assumptions about the nature of fact (see eg Dreyfus op cit). On concurrence generally, if Professor Birks wishes to create an axiomatic model where concurrence is excluded, then much thought will have to be invested into the question of alternative versus cumulative categories which might be bad news for, say, labour and consumer lawyers. Nevertheless, Birks is at least attempting to connect practice with theory and such efforts are to be welcomed.

225 Blanché op cit p 33.

226 Watson ‘Nutshells’ op cit at p 21.

227 Villey op cit p 540.

228 P Legrand ‘How to Compare Now’ (1996) 16 Legal Studies 232, 238.