We posit that societal cultural values of creativity and security are associated with the likelihood that a person will engage in a business start-up. Creativity supports the opportunity identification and security the opportunity exploitation aspects of entrepreneurship. In contrast, both emphasis on performance and acceptance of risk-taking may not play the role that is typically assumed. To verify our hypotheses we construct a multilevel dataset, combining Global Entrepreneurship Monitor individual-level data with country-level data from the World Values Survey. We use a multilevel logit model to address the hierarchical structure of our data. We found that odds of start-up engagement are higher if people in a society value security, yet also appreciate thinking up new ideas and being creative. Our results support McCloskey's distinction between aristocratic and bourgeois values, and John and Storr's proposition that different cultural traits support different aspects of entrepreneurship.

This paper uses the concept of “Personnel is Policy” to extend the theory of regulatory capture to the political appointment of agency commissioners. The “Personnel is Policy” theory provides three important insights. First, it shows that whether or not an interest group benefits from a regulatory agency depends on the particular individuals appointed to run it. Second, the president plays an important role in regulatory capture by nominating individuals to be appointed to the commission. Third, regulatory capture does not follow a pre-determined path because the commissioners continually change. The theory is then used to explain the early years of a prominent regulatory agency created during the Progressive Era: the Federal Trade Commission. From the perspective of the big business “trust” interest group, their success at capturing the FTC to achieve their goals of controlling competition and blocking hostile antitrust actions was largely a result of who was appointed to the commission. The trusts were the most successful during the years of 1915–1916 and 1925–1929.

Louisiana consistently ranks as one of the most corrupt states in the nation. In fact, the Pelican State is the most corrupt state when looking at the most common indicator of corruption: corruption convictions per 100,000. What is less clear about Louisiana is how the state became corrupt. This paper seeks to provide the missing link. I argue that the high levels of corruption in the state can be explained by its origins in French civil law. This historical influence has perverse and persistent effects on the state, despite occurring over 200 years ago. Through these origins in civil law, corruption in Louisiana impacts its economic institutions. These institutions then lead to a variety of other bad outcomes in the state such as a high dependency on oil and low incomes. This argument implies that resource dependency is bad for development only when institutional quality is low. By linking legal origins to corruption, institutions, and economic outcomes, I seek to offer a clearer explanation for why Louisiana sets itself apart from other states in its politically corrupt environment.

This paper will propose a comparative analysis of the conceptualization of colonisation that could shed light on the contemporary economic analysis of the colonial legacy in Africa. More specifically, this article will propose a return to old debates on colonisation, with a special focus on French 19th century political economy. Three main institutionalist lessons can be drawn from a careful analysis of French colonial economics of the 19th century. First, by institutions, the authors referred not only to the modes of colonisation – liberalism or collectivism? – but also to the actors: What should be the respective role of states and of private actors (entrepreneurs, banks, settlers) in the colonisation of Africa? Second, the colonial debates involved a discussion of property, whether in the sense of land ownership (individual vs. collective) or under the prism of property rights. Third, the analysis of the colonisation of Africa by French economists reveals an understanding of institutions as cultural values, norms or even racial attributes.

Digital markets offer abundant free content but exhibit extreme concentration among content aggregation intermediaries. These characteristics are linked. Weak copyright environments select against stand-alone content-delivery structures and select for bundled aggregation structures in which free content for users promotes positively priced advertising and data-collection services for firms. Dominant intermediaries promote commoditization, and the reallocation of market rents from content producers to content aggregators, through litigation and free content distribution that weaken copyright protections. The potential net welfare effects raise concern. Network effects, compounded by weak inventory constraints, scale economies, and learning effects, promote winner-takes-all outcomes in the intermediary services market while weak copyright may generate output distortions in the content production market.

This paper is a contribution to the advancement of a naturalistic social ontology. Individuals participate in an institutionalized practice by following rules. In this perspective, I show that the nature, the stability, and the dynamics of any institution depend on how people reason about states of affairs that do not occur. That means that counterfactual reasoning is essential in the working of institutions. I present arguments for the importance of counterfactuals as well as a game-theoretic framework to account for them. Since the role of counterfactuals does not directly transpire in people's behavior, the whole discussion can be seen as a broad argument against behaviorism in philosophy and the social sciences.

Frank H. Knight's magnum opus Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit, published in 1921, is widely recognized for introducing and establishing the distinction between risk and uncertainty. It is also known for developing a novel theory of the firm and business profit based on entrepreneurial judgment. However, the work's relevance for institutionalism has only rarely been addressed or even acknowledged. This introduction to the special issue organized to celebrate the centenary of Knight's tome briefly summarizes the work's institutionalist implications and the articles that comprise the special issue.

This brief note is a commentary on Hendriks and Guala's (2014) unification of the institutional theories of Lewis, North, and Searle. It argues that the equilibrium theory of Lewis is fundamental and that the kind of equilibrium best suited in this role remains the orthodox notion of Nash.

This comment relates to Richard Posner (2010), the lead article for this issue. Posner applies ‘the principles of organization economics’ to the study of diverse types of organizations. His study comparing the FBI to other types of police organization is important and compatible with the study of urban policing in American metropolitan areas. Many policy prescriptions are based on an inadequate understanding of the diversity of urban public good production functions and a lumping together of every type of police service. A brief review of research related to the concept of polycentricity as related to urban services in metropolitan areas is provided as a way of further illustrating Posner's concern that finer distinctions need to be made in the way scholars analyze organizational economics.

We investigate the relationship between economic development and the growth of the state by testing Wagner's Law. We begin with a general test, and find it does not hold in all cases: it breaks down at higher levels of development and in more recent time periods. This suggests that Wagner's law has specific scope conditions, beyond which states do not continue to grow as economies grow. We use a series of models to explore the temporal scope of Wagner's law and the point at which state growth may hit a ceiling. We conclude limits on the growth of the state are set by limits on the capacity of states to increase taxation. States can avoid this problem temporarily by running budget deficits, but eventually accumulated debt forces them to cut expenditures. Spending is tied to tax revenue like a rubber band, it can stretch only so far before being pulled back.

In his Scroogenomics, Joel Waldfogel argues that gifting creates enormous deadweight loss, as individuals give one another gifts that they do not want or cannot use. He views efficiency as static, calculating the gains from trade (or gifting) at the moment of transaction. A puzzle arises, however, when one realizes that gifting has been a nearly ubiquitous institution throughout history. If gifting wastes valuable resources, why does it persist? We argue that gift giving is dynamically efficient despite the possibility of generating short-term deadweight loss. A well-functioning market economy requires expanded social networks and trustworthiness among anonymous and quasi-anonymous exchange partners. Gifting allows individuals to signal trustworthiness by offering ‘burnt sacrifices’. Gifting practices that include a willingness to sacrifice via reciprocity norms, public visibility and ritual will tend to promote generalized trust. We consider these four elements – sacrifice, reciprocity, publicness, and ritual – to be critical institutional design principles for fostering dynamic efficiency. Our essay contributes to the literature on institutional economics by prompting scholars to think about the long-term (dynamic) efficiencies generated by cultural practices that appear inexplicably inefficient.

Political parties, formal, durable and mass organizations that inform voters on public policy issues, nominate candidates for office and fight elections for the right to govern, are ubiquitous in modern representative democracies but were absent from the direct participatory democracy of ancient Athens. The paper investigates how the political institutions of Athens may explain their absence. The arguments explored include voter homogeneity; the conditions at the start of the democracy, characterized by single constituency configuration of the demos, simple majority voting and lack of organized groups; the irrelevance of holding public office for determining public policy; appointment to public posts through sortition; and voting on single-dimension issues. The paper then discusses how in the absence of parties voters became informed and how political leaders were held accountable by the courts.

This paper analyzes the determinants of network structure, as measured by hierarchy and monopolization, by examining various black market networks. We examine structures of networks on the Internet Dark Net (Virtual) and compare it to network structures of traditional black markets (Ground), using agent-based modeling. The purpose of modeling these two different types of illicit markets is to understand the network structure that emerges from the interactions of the agents in each environment. Traditional black markets are relatively hierarchical, with high degree and high betweenness. We compare the density and average length of the shortest path of the simulated Ground black market networks with our simulated Virtual network. We find that hierarchy and monopolization tendencies in networks are products of different transaction costs and information asymmetries. The Internet is an effective way to lower multiple aspects of network structure. We observe that the network structure surrounding the interactions in the Virtual black market is less hierarchical and slightly more monopolistic than the network structure of the Ground market.

We analyze development trajectories of early civilizations where population size and technology are endogenous, and derive conditions under which such societies optimally ‘switch’ from anarchy to hierarchy – when it is optimal to elect and support a ruler. The ruler provides an efficient level of law and order, but creams off part of society's surplus for his own consumption. Switching to hierarchy occurs if the state of technology exceeds a threshold value, but societies may also be ‘trapped’ at lower levels of technology, perpetuating conditions of anarchy. We present empirical evidence based on the Standard Cross Cultural Sample that support the model's main predictions.

For more than a decade regionalism has been on the rise in the global economy. Based on the concept of allocative efficiency, standard trade theory regards regionalism as a form of protectionism. The paper confronts this view with an institutionalist explanation and draws on recent research on the role of specific investments into international market access, uncertainty and asymmetric information in policy coordination. A distinction between regionalism and regionalist policies is proposed. Endogenous regionalism reflects the economic forces of path-dependent comparative advantage and manifests the embeddedness of trade relations in social networks. Regionalism translates into regionalist policies via political entrepreneurship in policy networks that aims at stabilizing expectations about future market access and balancing negotiation power in a multilateral setting. Regionalism is thus presented as the standard case in global economic integration between the two extremes of unilateral liberalization and complete multilateralism.

This paper examines in depth one of the potential causes of the low performance of foreign aid; in particular, the role incentive structures within international donor agencies could play in leading to ‘a push’ to disburse money. This pressure to disburse money is termed as the ‘Money-Moving Syndrome’ (MMS). The theoretical analysis in this paper relies on the principal–agent theory to explore how donor agencies' institutional incentive systems may affect the characteristics of an optimal and efficient incentive contract and thus give rise to the MMS. The basic framework of the principal–agent theory was innovatively adapted to fit the organizational settings of donor agencies. The model concludes that the extent to which a performance measure based on the amount of aid allocated within a specific period of time would lead to the MMS and affect aid effectiveness depends on the level of ‘institutional imperatives’, the degree of aid agency's accountability for effectiveness, the level of corruption in recipient countries and the degree of difficulty to evaluate development activities.

Coase originally formulated his conjecture about intertemporal price competition in an example of land monopoly, but it has been applied almost exclusively to non-spatial markets. This paper revisits the Coase conjecture and compares four institutional arrangements based on the combination of land tenure options and local governance forms: private/rental, public/rental, private/owner, and public/owner. The two-period model developed in this paper shows that homeownership may result in more land development than leasehold. Numeric examples suggest (1) public/owner is efficient for uniform distribution of consumer; (2) rentals can be desirable for ‘poor’ communities; (3) private/owner is more efficient for ‘rich’ communities; (4) restrictive zoning reduces social surplus. These results can help explain why public institutions are dominant in the urban area and why most private communities are small, located in the suburbs, and for middle-upper class.

The prosecution of criminal suspects is an integral part of a country's justice system. While substantial scholarly attention has been devoted to the study of the police and judges and their relevance to the rule of law, surprisingly little is known about prosecutors. The aim of this paper is to contribute towards filling this knowledge gap. We first demonstrate the rising importance of prosecutors in criminal justice systems around the world. We identify the independence of prosecution agencies from the other two branches of government as a centrally important characteristic and then proceed to analyse the determinants of de facto prosecutorial independence from a political economy perspective. We find that press freedom, the immunity of parliamentarians and belonging to the common law tradition are positively associated with higher de facto independence.

In the 1970s, Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues found that neighborhood policing works better than metropolitan policing. Though Ostrom articulated design principles for self-governance, the early studies of neighborhood policing did not. In this paper, we articulate the design principles for self-governing policing, which we term Ostrom-Compliant Policing. We then apply this framework to an understudied case: policing on American Indian reservations. Policing in Indian country generally falls into one of three categories – federal policing (by the Bureau of Indian Affairs and Federal Bureau of Investigation), state policing (by municipal and state police departments), and tribal policing (by tribal police departments) – that vary in the degree of centralization. Our main contribution is to show that tribal policing as it is practiced in the United States, which claims to be self-governing, is not Ostrom-Compliant. Thus, our approach offers insight into why high crime remains an ongoing challenge in much of Indian country even when tribes have primary control over policing outcomes. This does not mean centralization is better, or that self-governance of policing does not work. Rather, our research suggests that a greater tribal autonomy over-policing and meta-political changes to federal rules governing criminal jurisdictions is necessary to implement Ostromian policing.

The choice of whether to regulate firms or to allow them to compete is key. If demand is sufficiently inelastic, competition entails narrower allocative inefficiencies, but also smaller expected profits, and thus weaker incentives to invest in cost reduction. Hence, deregulation should be found where cost reduction is less socially relevant and consumers are more politically powerful, and it should produce lower expected costs only when investment is not sufficiently effective. These predictions hold true under several alternative assumptions and are consistent with data on the deregulation initiatives implemented in 43 US state electricity markets between 1981 and 1999 and on the operating costs of the plants that served these markets. Crucially, these empirical results help rationalize the slowdown of the deregulation wave and are robust to considering the other determinants of deregulation emphasized by the extant literature, i.e. costly long-term wholesale contracts and excessive capacity accumulation.