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The origins of governments: from anarchy to hierarchy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  06 May 2010

MATTHEW BAKER ,
ERWIN BULTE  and
JACOB WEISDORF
MATTHEW BAKER
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, City University of New York, New York, USA
ERWIN BULTE
Affiliation:
Development Economics Group, Wageningen University, and Department of Economics, Tilburg University, Netherlands
JACOB WEISDORF*
Affiliation:
Department of Economics, University of Copenhagen, Denmark
*
*Email: [email protected]
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Abstract:

We analyze development trajectories of early civilizations where population size and technology are endogenous, and derive conditions under which such societies optimally ‘switch’ from anarchy to hierarchy – when it is optimal to elect and support a ruler. The ruler provides an efficient level of law and order, but creams off part of society's surplus for his own consumption. Switching to hierarchy occurs if the state of technology exceeds a threshold value, but societies may also be ‘trapped’ at lower levels of technology, perpetuating conditions of anarchy. We present empirical evidence based on the Standard Cross Cultural Sample that support the model's main predictions.

Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Institutional Economics , Volume 6 , Issue 2 , June 2010 , pp. 215 - 242
Copyright
Copyright © The JOIE Foundation 2010

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