Economic sociology was a core concern of early political economists like Smith, Marx, Pareto, and Marshall. The new economic sociology has sought to revive the neglected subdiscipline using the construct of interpersonal networks. Richard Swedberg has assembled 42 substantial papers in this collection. This article, reviewing his selection, proceeds in three stages. First, it provides a general framework for the debate. Second, it discusses the papers specifically linked to networks. Third, it analyses the contributions that go beyond the concept of social processes as personal relationships.

The objective of this paper is to recall the forgotten opposition of Clément Juglar to the colonization of Algeria, the originality of this position, and his contributions to the genesis of analysing colonial institutions. Juglar was not a theoretician of colonialism, but a liberal economist who rejected the process of colonization on economic grounds. This paper provides evidence that conventional wisdom on French colonialism is indebted to his work. The issues of capital returns in the colonies, French colonialism as mercantilism and protectionism, and the role of colonial institutions in economic development were all addressed by Juglar. He identified property rights and colonial institutions as central issues in his explanation of the predictable failure of colonialism, and in doing so he can be regarded as a forerunner of neo-institutionalist analysis of colonialism.

Britain's Glorious Revolution of 1688 is one of the most widely studied cases of institutional change. Recent institutional analyses of the Glorious Revolution, however, have failed to address one of the central issues in political science: control of the state's comparative advantage in violence. This paper examines this issue through analysis of the standing army debates of the late 1690s. Participants in the debates disputed whether a standing army or a militia would be the most effective institutional arrangement to guard against threats from abroad and tyranny at home. Both sides of the debate analyzed the effects of a standing army in terms of the incentives that it created for soldiers, citizens, the monarch, and foreign governments.

This introduction to the special issue in honor of Professor Yoram Barzel provides an overview of his scholarship and a summary of the contributions to this special issue. Each contribution advances or elaborates upon major themes in Barzel's theoretical and applied work on property rights, transaction costs, and political economy. The contributions fall into three categories: an examination of the foundations and implications of the ‘Barzelian’ method for social scientific analysis; Barzel's economics of property rights and transaction costs to historical case studies; and advances to Barzel's theory of the state, which includes an analysis of the origins of democracy and the rule of law.

What was the turning point in the world's largest and deadliest outbreak of the Ebola virus disease? Public health interventions tend to focus on supply-side provision of public health goods. These goods are clinical resources such as medicine or equipment. However, no nation has enough resources to ‘treat’ its way out of a widespread epidemic. Behavioural changes, such as social distancing, are needed too. Behaviours are the demand-side of public health goods and if unaddressed, perpetuate disease transmission. Community-based institutions addressed demand-side barriers during the 2014 Ebola epidemic in Liberia and Sierra Leone. Sixty-seven interviews were conducted in several provinces in Liberia and Sierra Leone. The findings show that information asymmetry and collective action challenges lowered the demand for clinical resources. Community-based institutions intervened via health sensitization and emergency regulations. Therefore, health seeking and public cooperation improved. This research study demonstrates a need to integrate community-led action into public health emergency management.

In her ‘Markets, repugnance, and externalities’ (2022), Kimberly Krawiec notes that the so-called corruption theorists fail to provide evidence that the adoption of repugnant behaviours or commodification destroy social values. She adds that, the values repugnant behaviours are supposed to destroy may even be reinforced after a market has been created. The explanation she explores is that the creation of a market never goes without debates that allow the society to ponder the values it stands for. We suggest an alternative view on the lack of evidence Krawiec identifies. Our starting point is Krawiec's interpretation of repugnance in terms of externalities. We claim that an analysis of repugnance based on externalities requires a characterization of what an externality is, which is rarely done. We show that economists use two opposed definitions of externalities, an objective and a subjective one, and then show what it implies for an analysis of repugnance and justify why the corruption thesis is not always verified empirically.

The economic crisis experienced by many developed countries over the past decade saw the emergence of the phenomenon of so-called recovered firms (RFs), or employee buyouts of failed capitalist firms (CFs). While it is obvious that one of the objectives sought by these workers is to keep their jobs, the subsequent performance of these firms is unclear. Are RFs more likely to fail than other worker managed firms (WMFs) or than CFs? Do RF workers get higher incomes than their peers in other WMFs or in CFs? This analysis is based on a linked employer–employee panel data set from Uruguayan social security administrative records. The main findings are that RFs survive longer than other WMFs or than CFs. However, RF workers receive incomes lower than those of their peers at other WMFs or at CFs. This income differential is explained partly by a brain drain process and specific human capital losses.

It is now abundantly clear that social norms channel behaviour and impact economic development. This insight leads to the question: How do social norms evolve? This survey examines research that relies on geography to explain the development of social norms. It turns out that many social norms are either directly or indirectly determined by geography broadly conceived and can, hence, be considered largely time invariant. Given that successful economic development presupposes the congruence between formal institutions and social norms, this insight is highly relevant for all policy interventions designed to foster economic development. In a companion paper, the role of religion and family organization as potential mediators between geography and social norms assumes centre stage.

This paper undertakes a descriptive analysis of changes in economic institutions across countries from 2000 to 2016, using Economic Freedom of the World and the “State Economic Modernity” index. This latter index is a recent creation, similar conceptually to state capacity, measuring what can variously be thought of as state building, effectiveness, and economic power. These two indexes are used in concert with one another to classify countries into eight directions of institutional change. Despite recent pessimism, countries besides those at the top world income bracket have continued to liberalize, while wealthy countries have merely stagnated. At the high level aggregates, there is little movement in state economic modernity over this period, although there is considerably heterogeneity among individual countries. Of those measured, Rwanda is the single country to make the greatest movement toward the development benchmark of “Getting to Denmark.”

Posner's economics of organization yields an unconventional view that private organizations operating in the market, the publicly held US business corporation, despite the profit motive, ends up being inefficient, paying excessive compensation to CEOs, while some public organizations, the US federal judicial system (and the judicial system of Continental Europe and Japan), despite the insulation of judges from most of incentives and the near complete autonomy afforded to them, works reasonably well. Unfortunately, Posner does not state clearly the criteria by which he judges one ‘excessive’ and the others ‘works reasonably well’, nor does he explain well why professional norms of judges that play a crucial role in public organizations are not a factor in business organizations.

This paper argues that the degree to which a given industry's labor contracts are complete or incomplete is the major factor determining whether its workforce will be unionized. For instance, assembly line industries feature complete labor contracts because of the nature of the production technology: Either a worker keeps up with the line, or he does not. In such a situation, there is no chance for a reciprocal gift exchange under which firms offer high wages in exchange for high effort levels. The result is low wages that make workers prone to unionization. By contrast, jobs that feature incomplete contracts (lawyers, computer programmers, economists) already have reciprocity and gift exchange in place. Such benefits guarantee to workers that their better interests will be looked after by a management that wishes to maintain a positive and productive labor–management interaction.

Law and economics scholars argue that the common law evolves toward efficiency. Invisible-hand theories suggest that the law is primarily driven by a selection process whereby inefficient laws are litigated more frequently than efficient laws, and hence are more likely to be overturned. However, the preferences of judges also necessarily affect legal change. This paper models the interaction of these two forces to evaluate the efficiency claim, and then applies the conclusions to the evolution of accident law in the United States beginning in the 19th century. Specifically, it attributes the persistence of negligence to its efficiency properties, despite its having been initially selected by judges for a different reason. The paper relates legal evolution to biological evolution by employing the concepts of natural and artificial selection, and the more recent concept of exaptation.

Fiscal capacity is regularly linked to warfare and democratization. However, the majority of income taxes – a cornerstone of government finance – were introduced by non-democratic states in peacetime. This paper is concerned with how autocratic politics shape the adoption and expansion of income taxes. Political institutions help overcome a commitment problem related to investments in taxation. To avoid being deposed by his or her elite supporters, a ruler needs to guarantee that new taxes will not be used opportunistically (e.g. expropriating the elite). If the elite supporters can effectively monitor the government, any transgressions will be detected and punishable. Institutions such as legislatures solve this commitment problem when they allow oversight and monitoring over the executive branch. The empirical implications are straightforward: in places with strong institutional oversight, which allows the elite to monitor the executive, we should observe higher fiscal capacity. I find support for this by analyzing newly available historical datasets over tax revenues, tax introduction dates, and political institutions.

A critical response to Bart Wilson's (2022) theory of property, focusing on his assertion of a final cause in the evolution of property. It argues that while Darwin's great achievement was to remove final causes from earthly evolution and thus move the question of how biological life is organized from theology to science, Wilson's apparent restoration of a final cause to the evolution of property would move the question of how social life is organized from science back to theology, a clear step backward.

While regulation is increasingly relied upon to address economic and social issues in developed economies, research has yet to examine the impact of the growing use of regulation on the courts. This paper explores the relationship between regulation and criminal judicial enforcement. Data regarding regulatory cases and defendants filed in U.S. district courts and regulation at the U.S. federal level are analyzed. The results suggest that increased reliance on regulation leads to growth in regulatory court cases and defendants filed. These findings imply that the courts continue to play an important role when regulation is employed to address problems and that the courts might experience increasing responsibilities as the use of regulation grows. Additionally, the results suggest that the relationship between regulation and the courts should be considered in the design and implementation of regulation in practice.

Oliver E. Williamson, who died on May 21, 2020 at the age of 87, was one of the most influential social scientists of modern times. In 2009, he was co-recipient of the Nobel Prize in Economics. As of mid-October 2021, he had been cited an astonishing 317,838 times according to Google Scholar. His measured influence outdistances that of even his fellow Nobel Laureates Elinor Ostrom (230,667), Douglass C. North (187,577) and Ronald H. Coase (123,686). This special issue of the Journal of Institutional Economics brings together a distinguished roster of scholars to remember Williamson, to elucidate some of his key ideas and influences, and to extend the reach of his ideas to new arenas.

In this essay, we honour the memory of Oliver Williamson by reflecting on Chiles and McMackin's 1996 Academy of Management Review article ‘Integrating variable risk preferences, trust, and transaction cost economics’. The article, which built on Williamson's work in transaction cost economics (TCE), went on to attract attention not only from the authors’ home discipline of management and organisation studies, but also from other business disciplines, the professions and the social sciences. After revisiting the article's origins and core arguments, we turn to selectively (re)view TCE's development since 1996 through the lens of this article, focusing on trust, risk and subjective costs. We cover conceptual and empirical developments in each of these areas and reflect on how our review contributes to previous debates concerning trade-offs implicit in relaxing TCE's behavioural assumptions. We conclude by reflecting on key points of learning from our review and possible implications for future research.

In this paper we seek to integrate human needs and self-actualisation into the design of organisational governance. We problematise the assumptions that guide established justifications for governance, thus providing an opportunity for this type of theoretical approach. Drawing on Maslow's human psychology, we consider the potentially regressive features of the prescriptions of transaction cost theory (TCT), particularly the new institutionalist approach, and suggest inclusiveness as a mode of coordination that firms may wish to pursue to enhance self-actualisation. The main value added of this contribution is to highlight the need to discern among modes of governance design, using criteria of welfare maximisation by enabling opportunities for self-actualisation within the firm, different from the TCT focus on internal efficiency.