It is now abundantly clear that social norms channel behaviour and impact economic development. This insight leads to the question: How do social norms evolve? This survey examines research that relies on geography to explain the development of social norms. It turns out that many social norms are either directly or indirectly determined by geography broadly conceived and can, hence, be considered largely time invariant. Given that successful economic development presupposes the congruence between formal institutions and social norms, this insight is highly relevant for all policy interventions designed to foster economic development. In a companion paper, the role of religion and family organization as potential mediators between geography and social norms assumes centre stage.

It is now abundantly clear that social norms channel behaviour and impact economic development. This insight leads to the question: How do social norms evolve? In a companion paper (Voigt (2023). Journal of Institutional Economics, 20), I survey studies showing that geographical conditions can have direct and long-lasting effects on social norms. This paper goes one step further: It surveys studies that show how different geographical conditions affect both religious beliefs as well as traditions of family organization and how these, in turn, affect social norms.

This paper highlights scholarly neglect of political legitimacy, the idea of a state's use of power in ways acceptable to its citizens. We argue that political legitimacy affects a state's ability to formulate and implement its policies, thus affecting governance. Our paper provides the first empirical evidence of the positive relationship between political legitimacy and governance. We combine novel cross-sectional data on political legitimacy and several governance indicators from 66 countries. Our results show that a one-standard-deviation increase in the legitimacy score increases the rule of law indicator by about one-third standard deviation. These results are robust across OLS, an instrumental variable method, and several other governance indicators. Moreover, our results reveal that in the presence of greater trust, political legitimacy has an enhanced impact on governance.

Is ‘individualism’ pure selfishness? The climate change literature often assumes so. However, individualism can be seen as capturing values aligned with self-determination and self-achievement but also universalism. Indeed, cultural psychology recognises individualism as reflecting both personal agency and one's embeddedness, not in narrowly defined in-groups, but in society broadly. Through this lens, individualism can be consistent with adopting pro-social behaviours, including climate-friendly behaviours. But the under-exploration of the concept means empirical evidence is limited. Using cross-country, cross-sectional data we find that individualistic values are associated with an increased willingness to take individual-level actions against climate change. Individualism is also not associated with less support for additional taxes levied to fight climate change, and those willing to take more individual level actions against climate change are also more supportive of additional climate change taxes. Overall, our results confirm that individualism can be associated with taking actions for the greater good.

Recent work has argued for a Hayekian behavioural economics, which combines Austrian economics with behavioural economics as developed by Kahneman, Thaler, Sunstein, and others. We suggest that this hybrid is misguided because it relies on individual cognitivism. This view of cognition is incompatible with the Hayekian view of cognition which treats rationality as an emergent phenomenon of social interaction in an institutional environment. This Hayekian view, which we call epistemic institutionalism, is compatible with an alternative prominent perspective in psychology, that of the extended mind, sometimes known as 4E cognition. We demonstrate how the Hayekian perspective on individualism, the price system, and the evolution of rules can be connected to the extended mind programme, through concepts such as the coupling of the individual and their environment, cognitive off-loading, and affordances. We suggest that this alternative combination of Austrian economics and psychology provides a more fruitful way forward, especially because it foregrounds the processes of learning, error-correction, and institutional orders, rather than choice, bias, and individual rationality. To explain why Austrian economists have been receptive to behavioural economics, we distinguish epistemic institutionalism from the (radical) subjectivist approach, which shares key assumptions of individual cognitivism.

This paper explores the role of artificial intelligence (AI) within economic institutions, focusing on bounded rationality as understood by Herbert Simon. Artificial Intelligence can do many things in the economy, such as increasing productivity, enhancing innovation, creating new sectors and jobs, and improving living standards. One of the ways that AI can disrupt the economy is by reducing the problem of bounded rationality. AI can help overcome this problem by processing large amounts of data, finding patterns and insights, and making predictions and recommendations. This insight raises the question: can AI overcome planning problems – could it be that central planning is now a viable option for economic organisation? This paper argues that AI does not make central planning viable at either the nation-state level or the firm level, simply because AI cannot resolve the knowledge problem as described by Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich Hayek.

This paper reveals a novel and perhaps surprising ingredient in the mix of influences that inspired and informed the work of Elinor and Vincent Ostrom on self-governance: cybernetics, understood as a theory of control via feedback mechanisms. Based on this crucial insight, the paper portrays self-governance as involving an architecture of multiple levels of so-called ‘second order’ feedback mechanisms. Such compounded systems of organization are the key to understanding any self-governance process and the paper argues that their intrinsic logic provides a critical link between the work of the Ostroms and the public choice and constitutional political economy perspectives on institutional order. The paper thereby offers both a fresh perspective on the Ostromian view of self-governance and also of also of governance theory in general.

This empirical study extends the public choice literature on the allocation of death during war by examining the political economy of foreign fighter deaths in the Russo-Ukrainian War since the 24 February 2022 invasion. The study explores the roles played by various demographic factors, military institutions, and international trade relations in determining the number of foreign fighters from a variety of countries who have died in support of either Ukraine or Russia during the Russo-Ukrainian War. Unlike other related studies, this study also investigates the importance of, and finds evidence in support of, both economic freedom and a robust democracy in shaping the choices made by individuals around the globe to venture to, and die fighting on, the battlefields of Ukraine.

Conflicts over resources with poorly defined property rights have fuelled both deforestation and violence in the Brazilian Amazon. However, what happens when the State enhances its ability to monitor and enforce existing environmental laws? We study the case of the list of Municípios Prioritários, a policy that allocates additional resources to verify compliance with environmental laws in municipalities with high deforestation rates. Employing a difference-in-differences approach, our findings suggest that an improvement in the ability of the State to monitor and enforce environmental laws can reduce conflicts over the appropriation of value from resources with poorly defined property rights. Consistent with existing studies, we also find that the policy led to a reduction in deforestation rates in the Brazilian Amazon. Finally, we discuss the limitations of the current approach to curb violence in a region where the activity of mafias has considerably grown since the turn of the twenty-first century.

This paper contributes to research on the institutional determinants of tax capacity using annual data from 39 sub-Saharan African countries from 1985 to 2018 to construct a measure of tax capacity for each country based on the trend component of the ratio of actual to potential tax revenue. Potential revenue is estimated by a parsimonious tax performance specification, including only variables found to be robust determinants of the tax/GDP ratio. The results show that, on average, tax capacity is high (given potential) and has improved over time (especially for low-income countries). The final stage of analysis selects, from a wide variety of economic and institutional variables, the most important determinants of cross-country variation in tax capacity. Equal distribution of resources is the most important institutional factor associated with greater capacity, consistent with perceptions of equity supporting the fiscal bargain; corruption is associated with lower capacity, consistent with undermining trust in government. Private consumption and resource rents are associated with greater capacity. Other institutional factors are indirectly associated with greater capacity, such as accountability and elements of democracy associated with equity in the allocation and use of public resources.

The paper examines the legacy of pre-colonial centralization on tax compliance norms of citizens in contemporary Uganda. Using a regression discontinuity analysis on neighboring ethnic homelands with different levels of pre-colonial centralization, we find that pre-colonial centralization is correlated with stronger norm for tax compliance. The result is explained by the legacy of location-specific capacity of centralized states in upholding authority and a strong social cohesion exhibited through higher interpersonal trust but not through trust in public institutions.

We argue that the effectiveness of Rwandan governments, both at implementing the 1994 genocide and inducing the current growth miracle, illustrates that the state has high capacity. Yet this capacity is not captured by conventional Weberian concepts, with their focus on taxation and formal bureaucracy. Rather, the capacity of Rwanda's state relies on its ability to leverage dense social networks which connect it to society. The origins of these networks lie in the construction of the historical state which expanded by merging with local lineages and kinship groups. Using data on the historical expansion of the Rwandan state as a proxy for the strength of state–society social networks we show they are uncorrelated with measures of Weberian state capacity. In a fieldwork exercise, we show that rule compliance today is positively correlated with our proxy, but uncorrelated with Weberian state capacity.

This article combines cross-national statistical analysis and in-depth historical case studies of Argentina and Chile to explore the relationship between two crucial dimensions of state capacity. We show that information capacity contributes to the development of fiscal capacity. When states have accurate information about their subject populations, territories, and economies, they are more effective at mobilizing revenues. In developing this argument this article makes three broader contributions. First, while existing scholarship either treats distinct dimensions of state capacity as separate entities, or simply assumes that they complement each other, our findings urge scholars to treat state development as sequential and to further investigate how multiple dimensions of state capacity are interrelated. Second, the paper suggests a broader underlying set of mechanisms – economies of scope – which connect these dimensions, and explores them in the specific context of how information capacity facilitates fiscal capacity. Third, we join the scholarship on the importance of societal compliance in the creation of the fiscal state, but with a focus on elite cooperation with the state's information collection efforts, which we show to be crucial to tax state development.

In this article, we reconceptualize, using an extended discrete and dynamic Ostrom's classification, the specific intellectual property (IP) regimes that support geographical indications (GIs) as ‘knowledge commons’, e.g. a set of shared collective knowledge resources constituting a complex ecosystem created and shared by a group of people that has remained subject to social dilemma. Geographical names are usually considered part of the public domain. However, under certain circumstances, geographical names have also been appropriated through trademark registration. Our analysis suggests that IP laws that support GIs first emerged in Europe and spread worldwide as a response to the threat of undue usurpation or private confiscation through trademark registration. We thus emphasize the nature of the tradeoffs faced when shifting GIs from the public domain to shared common property regimes, as defined by the EU legislation pertaining to GIs. In the context of trade globalization, we also compare the pros and cons of regulating GIs ex-ante rather than engaging in ex-post trademark litigation in the courts.

This paper examines the effect of frontier academic research on technological development and the way institutional quality influences this impact. Using a dataset that covers 18 OECD countries over the 2003–2017 period, we find that frontier academic research exerts an important influence on total factor productivity. First, frontier academic research induces technological change by directly enhancing production processes and management methods. Second, frontier academic research stimulates industrial innovations, which in turn improves productivity. Regarding the moderating effect of institutional variables on these relationships, we find that positive moderation only exists for some, not all, of the institutional variables. In that case, a higher level of these variables is found to strengthen the way countries reap benefits from frontier academic research and industrial innovation. However, the moderation of institutions is much less clear with the process that turns frontier academic research into industrial innovations.

Several scholars anticipated Ludwig von Mises's calculation argument against socialism. The present paper summarises the contributions by the members of the German Historical School of Economics who preceded Mises and provides several examples of anticipation that have not been discussed in the literature. Furthermore, the paper explains why it is not a coincidence that members of the Historical School claimed as early as the nineteenth century that socialism was unfeasible due to calculation and knowledge problems. In their attempts to understand historically specific features of capitalism, they developed an approach to capital that involved the institutions of private property, money, the market, the enterprise, and monetary calculation. Starting from this institutional approach to capital and capitalism, it was only a small step to the question of what it means for socialist systems that those institutions are lacking.

This paper reviews work that tests (1) how formal and informal institutions, and especially their interaction, affect participation in the shadow economy in transition countries; and (2) how participating in these shadow economies affects individuals' well-being. The key findings are that a clash of individuals' perceptions of formal institutions with their informal institutions increases involvement in the shadow economy. Conversely, a trustworthy relationship with the government and other individuals makes people more inclined to comply. The importance of their social and institutional context also appears in how individuals' involvement in the shadow economy relates to their well-being. These findings complement insights from the rich literature on tax morale, on the exchange between public institutions and citizens and between culture and institutions more generally. The findings also contribute to the institutional economic literature by empirically showing that: (1) focusing on formal institutions alone, that is strengthening the rule of law, is a necessary but insufficient response to the shadow economy; (2) taking informal institutions, such as individuals' trust and tax morale, into account is of equal importance; and (3) most importantly, formal and informal institutions go hand in hand, and their interaction should be an essential part of the new institutional perspective.

James M. Buchanan's politics-as-exchange retrospectively conceptualized formal institutions emerging from bilateral agreements to establish reciprocal rights and prospectively guided constitutional entrepreneurs to broker Pareto-superior reforms that had unanimous consent. Buchanan believed this conceptualization of politics-as-exchange was necessitated by his ontological–methodological individualism and would initiate a new era of consensual politics, but it is argued it led to illiberal conclusions that reflected dissonance between his Kantian individualism and Humean subjectivism. It meant, for example, that slavery was characterized as a bilateral agreement between very unequal parties and it is argued it logically implied abolition required the consent of slaveowners. But Buchanan's ontology was compatible with the introduction into his framework of a right of exit that would have differentiated between exchanges with and without the sword to produce a consistent liberal constitutionalism.

The ancient Greek city-states were slave societies, but the institutions of slavery differed across them. The slaves of democratic Athens were foreigners bought as chattels labouring in agriculture, craftsmanship, banking, mining, and domestic services and were often given some limited freedoms and extra pay. On the contrary, the helots, the slaves of oligarchic Sparta, were indigenous of the lands they cultivated for their masters and were treated harshly. The study offers an economic explanation of the different slavery systems. Modelling the slaveholder as a profit maximiser, it attributes the different systems to differences in the probabilities of the slaves running away or revolting, the dependence of output on effort-intensive or care-intensive production technology, which depends on the fertility of the soil and affects whether the slave is treated kindly instead of harshly, and the cost of guarding slaves under different regimes.

This paper explores Elinor Ostrom's account of practical reason through the conceptual lens provided by a typology of dimensions of rational conduct advanced by Amartya Sen. On Sen's view, self-interested behaviour has three independent, and separable, features: self-centred welfare, self-welfare goal and self-goal choice. We suggest that Ostrom is committed to a version of rational choice theory that retains the assumptions of self-welfare goal and self-goal choice but, by acknowledging that people's welfare is affected by factors beyond their material consumption, departs from the assumption of self-welfare goal. We argue that this departure is not necessarily driven by an acknowledgement, along Senian lines, that people may have reasons for action other than the single-minded pursuit of their own goals, but rather by Ostrom's belief that the decision problem people face is so complex that maximising behaviour is rendered impossible. We illustrate this argument by analysing how Elinor Ostrom's position differs not only from Sen's but also from that of her husband and long-time collaborator Vincent Ostrom, who in his analysis of the covenantal aspects of rule-making seems to depart from the assumptions of instrumental rationality and preference-satisfaction.