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Institutions, rules and equilibria: a commentary

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  30 December 2014

KEN BINMORE
KEN BINMORE*
Affiliation:
Philosophy Department, Bristol University, Bristol, BS8 1TN, UK
*
*Email: [email protected]
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Abstract:

This brief note is a commentary on Hendriks and Guala's (2014) unification of the institutional theories of Lewis, North, and Searle. It argues that the equilibrium theory of Lewis is fundamental and that the kind of equilibrium best suited in this role remains the orthodox notion of Nash.

Type
Article Commentary
Information
Journal of Institutional Economics , Volume 11 , Issue 3 , September 2015 , pp. 493 - 496
Copyright
Copyright © Millennium Economics Ltd 2014 

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