In all legal systems, possession and property are inextricably linked. Game theory captures this relationship in the Hawk–Dove game: players competing for an asset are better off when the possessor plays Hawk and the intruder plays Dove (the bourgeois strategy) so that property can emerge as a spontaneous convention. This theory has been supported by large experimental evidence with animals. This paper presents a lab experiment where possession is manipulated to study the emergence of the property convention with human subjects. We show that the highest coordination emerges when possession is achieved meritoriously and that possession induces only bourgeois coordination (never antibourgeois).

We analyse the role of culture in economic freedom reform and dispersion in an unbalanced panel of up to 80 countries, and in dyadic models with up to 3,003 unique country pairs. We find that a sense of individualism strengthens the effectiveness of democracy in promoting economic freedom within countries over 1950–2015, and that institutional distance between countries increases in their cultural distance, suggesting an important role of culture in determining long-run institutional equilibria. Our results are robust to a large variety of socio-economic controls, measures of institutions and measures of bilateral geographic, economic and demographic distances.

In this paper, we present results from of a large-scale replication of Hodgson and Rothman's (1999, The Economic Journal, 109(453): 165–186) seminal analysis of the institutional and geographical concentration of authors publishing in top economic journals. We analyze bibliometric data of more than 49,000 articles published in a set of 30 highly influential economic journals between 1990 and 2018. Based on a random sample of 3,253 authors, we further analyze the PhD-granting institutions of the authors under study to better scrutinize the claim of an ‘institutional oligopoly’. The findings confirm the long-term persistence of strong oligopolistic structures in terms of both, author affiliations as well as PhD-granting institutions.

The role of citizens' collective action for the emergence and consolidation of democracy is generally analysed within bottom-up theories. However, top-down theories show that elites might impede or promote both democracy and collective action through a set of strategies which are often unobserved and vary over time. Democratic persistence and change require then to be assessed in a dynamic framework which considers both citizens and elites' strategies. For such reason, on a large sample of countries in the period 1971–2014, we jointly estimate the probability of collective action and democracy using a Structural Dynamic Model. This allows us to account for the dynamic nature of the two political phenomena under investigation by controlling for their persistence, for initial conditions and time-varying unobserved heterogeneity. We find that collective action matters for the emergence of democracy but not for its consolidation which seems to be related to more structural economic factors.

The paper interrogates the argument put forward by Acemoglu and Robinson or North et al. that capitalism and democracy are supportive to each other. It analyzes the development of political and economic institutions in Germany before and after World War I. It is shown that the lack of democracy in Imperial Germany furthered a liberal economic order and gives reasons why the transition to full-scale parliamentarianism would have impaired the quality of economic institutions. This also explains why such a transition was not completed. The Weimar Republic established a modern democracy but was unable to secure the quality of economic institutions achieved before. Not only in Germany did the politicization of the economy impair the economic order. This empirical outcome helps to explain why Eucken and other liberals identified democracy as part of the economic problem during the interwar period. It also gives reasons to rethink the complex relationship between capitalism and democracy.

An established tenet of the literature is that the use of flexible labor leads to less innovation. Yet, less attention has been paid to the possibility that it is the decision to innovate that generates the incentive to hire on a permanent basis. The goal of this paper is to show the existence of interlocking complementarities between the firm's technological and hiring strategies. To do so, we develop a simple model where the workers’ decision to invest in human capital is affected by the type of employment contract (temporary versus permanent) and by the type of technological investments (routine versus innovative). When the firm is unable to coordinate its actions across these different domains, two equilibria simultaneously exist: in the ‘high-road’ equilibrium, firms invest more in innovative projects and hire on a permanent basis; in the ‘low-road’ equilibrium, they invest more in routine projects and hire on a temporary basis.

Does limited social knowledge inhibit government intervention or, conversely, demand it? This article confronts these two positions, as they are respectively advocated by Hayek and Popper, and sets out to substantiate the belief that Popper's view is the more coherent one.

A growing body of evidence documents a vast array of economic and social ill-effects of public perceived corruption. These findings and the scant evidence of recent success in the fight against corruption beg the question: how to abate it? We document the existence of a negative, statistically significant and quantitatively large impact of economic freedom (our proxy for institutions of capitalism, markets and competition) on public corruption. This negative response of corruption to economic freedom holds after allowing for non-linearities interacting economic freedom and political rights, endowments, legal families, ethnicity and for robust determinants of corruption uncovered by Daniel Treisman [‘What Have We Learned About the Causes of Corruption From Ten Years of Cross-National Empirical Research?’, Annual Review of Political Science, 10: 211–244], such as income, democracy, freedom of the press and fuel exports. Thus, this paper helps to explain why high-income prosperous countries exhibit low levels of public perceived corruption, and why honesty is a normal good.

This paper proposes a composite measure of ethnic fragmentation, the Social Diversity Index (SDI) to capture inherent multidimensionality not captured in the prevalent Ethno-Linguistic Fractionalization Index (ELF). The SDI more accurately demonstrates the direct effects of hidden diversity values and the extent and corresponding costs of ethnic diversity on economic growth. A comparative empirical analysis of the results from 132 countries employing the SDI and the ELF Index, suggests that the SDI is more robustly correlated with growth, and does a moderately better job of explaining the effect of exogenous static ethnic diversity. However, the empirical effects of ethnic diversity on growth tend to diminish with the inclusion of additional macroeconomic variables.

Should scholars, like columnists, exaggerate and aggregate opposing views into men of straw? I analyse an example of scholarly criticism that characterizes the treatment of development in institutional economics as a simplistic and extremist paradigm. I argue that scholarly standards demand a complete and honest portrayal of contrary opinions and that straw men should be banished from scholarly discourse.

Because verdicts are typically the more costly resolution of legal disputes, most governments are interested in high settlement rates. In this paper, we use a unique dataset of 860 case records from a German trial court to explore which institutional factors have a significant impact on the decision to settle in civil law litigation. We find that procedural aspects and individual characteristics of the involved judge have a significant impact on in-court settlement probability. We also find that judge-specific aspects such as the judge's gender may have an impact on settlement probabilities in certain subfields of law. Based on our empirical results, we derive some conclusions for legal policies that aim at increasing settlement rates.

In Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (RUP), Knight (1921) develops a theory of the firm that stresses the important role of entrepreneurial judgment for a firm's success. For Knight, entrepreneurial judgment is first and foremost the selection of ‘proxy entrepreneurs’ who are capable of making good judgments under uncertainty. In this sense, entrepreneurial judgment is essentially ‘judgment of judgment’. An overlooked implication of Knight's position is the fact that it leads to an endorsement of distributed entrepreneurship and responsibility. We deem this a very modern idea that challenges a completely hierarchical understanding of the firm. Knight himself does not thoroughly examine the institutional implications of the analytical framework he sets up in RUP. In this paper, we summarize the ‘philosophical vision’ of Knight's framework and illustrate his rationale behind the distribution of entrepreneurship. We conclude the paper with a discussion of potential institutional implications by referring to the danger of monocultures, the additional value created by cognitively diverse teams, and the effectiveness of venture capitalists.

This essay explores six sentences from Oliver Williamson – five providing context and the sixth the central topic. Decades ago, Williamson asserted that: (a) ‘substantially the same factors’ (1973: 316) create governance issues not only within organizations but also in interactions between organizations; and (b) relational contracting might be useful in addressing these issues in both domains (1979, Figure II). More recently – in an informal conversation in 2002 – he suggested a perspective on relational contracting that appears valuable in both of these domains: relational contracts as ‘deals that start when you sign them’. The bulk of this essay explores past, present, and potential research on this perspective.

In the literature on firms and organizations, in economics, sociology, and business studies, there has been an increasing awareness that firms need others, outside the firm, in order to function, and particularly in order to innovate. This has led to the proliferation of studies on subjects such as outsourcing, inter-firm alliances, and networks of firms. Still, though, most of these studies focus on dyads of firms (i.e., strategic interaction of firms). Even in network studies, networks were seen mostly as aggregates of dyads. In contrast, in network analysis in sociology there has been, for some time, attention to roles and effects of third parties and of triads. In particular, the work of Ronald Burt (e.g. Burt, 1992) noted the importance, especially in the context of the acquisition of new information, of being a third party in ‘bridging structural holes’ between unconnected nodes or networks, and the opportunities for advantage as a tertius gaudens (laughing third) in playing agents off against each other. While in network analysis this attention to triads is relatively new, it has, in fact, a long history, going back, in particular, to the work of the sociologist Georg Simmel. A recent publication that acknowledges this is Krackhardt (1999).

Economic history has recently emphasised the impact of economic shrinking on long-term economic growth, but economic theories do not provide explanations for how and why some countries avoid economic shrinking. In this case study of institutional change in post-independence Indonesia, we examine how the country managed to reduce the frequency of shrinking during the authoritarian regime and beyond. We argue that the state's autonomy, measured by macroeconomic policymaking, and accountability, measured by food security, were two key social capabilities that enabled Indonesia to reduce the frequency of economic shrinking. During this period, the ‘doorstep conditions’ for the transition into a democracy and stable economic growth emerged. More specifically, Indonesia managed to diversify its revenue base and make public resources more available for the broader common good. Loosening the connection between macroeconomic policymaking and elites opened up greater opportunities for the emergence of private enterprises. However, to date, the country is still far from a full-fledged open access society.

We experimentally investigate whether and how individuals change formal institutions governing an organization. The focus is on formal rules prescribing individual cooperation to achieve a collective goal. Our analysis accounts for the role of social norms and individuals’ social values. We observe that prosocial individuals –who value cooperation and have a conflict between this value and existing rules allowing for low cooperation– attempt to change this rule. In line with our theoretical discussion, we also find that prosocial individuals first try to change the institutional environment by changing social norms. If this fails, these individuals change formal rules directly.

This special issue, devoted to the analysis of colonial institutions in the economic performance of countries both pre- and post-colonialism Africa, aims to be a contribution, in the vein of North (2005), to the field of colonial studies in comparative institutional perspective. The papers in this issue combine the history of economic thought, econometrics, economic history, cliometrics and the analysis of colonial institutions. These approaches shed a new light on the question of path-dependence and historical dynamics. They suggest that as former African colonial countries move away from the colonial period, the shadow of colonial institutions is less marked and is now rivalled in importance by the extent of democracy, which now plays a crucial role in their economic development.

Ha-Joon Chang (2011), in his article ‘Institutions and Economic Development: Theory, Policy and History’, argues that economists place too much faith in ‘liberalized’ institutions. Institutions matter for growth, he contends, but not the way institutional economists think they do. In this article, we offer a defense of the hypothesis that ‘institutions matter’ for economic growth and present several objections to Chang's arguments.

Economics as a social science is about exchange and the institutions within which exchange relationships are formed and transactions are executed. Yoram Barzel's contribution to economics and political economy reflect this focus on exchange and institutions. In this paper, I will sketch a theory of real-existing socialist economies from a property rights/public choice perspective. Then I present the puzzles in political economy that such a system confronted in attempting to create a prosperous, regenerating and competitive economic system. I then conclude with a short discussion of the future for a progressive research program in political economy that takes institutional change seriously.

The different role played by case law and the historical and conceptual differences between the doctrines of precedent in common law and civil law traditions are important determinants of judicial creativity. In this article, we consider a hybrid version of stare decisis, called by the French name of jurisprudence constante, adopted by mixed jurisdictions. Unlike stare decisis, which allows a single precedent to establish case law, the doctrine of jurisprudence constante links the recognition of a judge-made rule to the existence of a consecutive line of decisions affirming the same legal principle. We develop a model to consider the effects of this doctrine on the social costs arising from judicial error and uncertainty in case law. We further consider the effects of these alternative doctrines of precedent on judicial creativity and ideological bias in judge-made law.