The choice of whether to regulate firms or to allow them to compete is key. If demand is sufficiently inelastic, competition entails narrower allocative inefficiencies, but also smaller expected profits, and thus weaker incentives to invest in cost reduction. Hence, deregulation should be found where cost reduction is less socially relevant and consumers are more politically powerful, and it should produce lower expected costs only when investment is not sufficiently effective. These predictions hold true under several alternative assumptions and are consistent with data on the deregulation initiatives implemented in 43 US state electricity markets between 1981 and 1999 and on the operating costs of the plants that served these markets. Crucially, these empirical results help rationalize the slowdown of the deregulation wave and are robust to considering the other determinants of deregulation emphasized by the extant literature, i.e. costly long-term wholesale contracts and excessive capacity accumulation.

The prosecution of criminal suspects is an integral part of a country's justice system. While substantial scholarly attention has been devoted to the study of the police and judges and their relevance to the rule of law, surprisingly little is known about prosecutors. The aim of this paper is to contribute towards filling this knowledge gap. We first demonstrate the rising importance of prosecutors in criminal justice systems around the world. We identify the independence of prosecution agencies from the other two branches of government as a centrally important characteristic and then proceed to analyse the determinants of de facto prosecutorial independence from a political economy perspective. We find that press freedom, the immunity of parliamentarians and belonging to the common law tradition are positively associated with higher de facto independence.

In the 1970s, Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues found that neighborhood policing works better than metropolitan policing. Though Ostrom articulated design principles for self-governance, the early studies of neighborhood policing did not. In this paper, we articulate the design principles for self-governing policing, which we term Ostrom-Compliant Policing. We then apply this framework to an understudied case: policing on American Indian reservations. Policing in Indian country generally falls into one of three categories – federal policing (by the Bureau of Indian Affairs and Federal Bureau of Investigation), state policing (by municipal and state police departments), and tribal policing (by tribal police departments) – that vary in the degree of centralization. Our main contribution is to show that tribal policing as it is practiced in the United States, which claims to be self-governing, is not Ostrom-Compliant. Thus, our approach offers insight into why high crime remains an ongoing challenge in much of Indian country even when tribes have primary control over policing outcomes. This does not mean centralization is better, or that self-governance of policing does not work. Rather, our research suggests that a greater tribal autonomy over-policing and meta-political changes to federal rules governing criminal jurisdictions is necessary to implement Ostromian policing.

Economic historians tend to explain the rise of the cooperative form in agriculture from the advantage of cooperative over private factories in reducing transaction costs with suppliers. This study provides a first test of this thesis using data on 1,130 dairy factories in The Netherlands. Indeed, we find that cooperative factories performed significantly better than private factories. The persistence of private factories in certain regions can be explained by first-mover advantages.

Are institutions a deep cause of economic growth? This paper tries to answer this question in a novel manner by focusing on within-country variation, over long periods of time, using a new hand-collected data set on institutions and the power-ARCH econometric framework. Focusing on the case of Brazil since 1870, our results suggest (a) that both changes in formal political institutions and informal political instability affect economic growth negatively, (b) there are important differences in terms of their short- versus long-run behaviour, and (c) not all but just a few selected institutions affect economic growth in the long-run.

We examine the origin and methodology of a ‘New New Institutional Economics’ (NNIE) – an emerging research agenda distinguished by its attempt to account for the role of institutions in complex socio-economic change by formally modeling institutions as the background conditions to parameterized cost–benefit calculations. The NNIE expands the application of economic modeling tools to new areas of inquiry, models institutional outcomes with parsimony and mathematical rigor, and introduces political and economic power, thereby allowing for consideration of institutional change that is not Pareto improving. Using a four-part analytical framework, we find that the explanatory power of NNIE analysis derives not from its formal models, but from a more vague, nuanced, and narrative version of the formal models, which we call ‘Quasi-Models’. We find that the NNIE's formal models are too parsimonious to meaningfully illuminate the complex institutions they ostensibly represent.

‘The Problem of Social Cost’ (Coase, 1960) asserts a normative role for the common law judge, that of taking into account the economic consequences of his decisions in allocating property rights. This position is often accused of inconsistency: Coase sees the figure of the judge as willing and able to improve economic efficiency, but criticises the actors of public intervention, particularly regulators, for being fallible, vulnerable to political pressures, and lacking information. I shall show that Coase's giving this role to the judge stems precisely from his criticism of public intervention. This means that his figure of the judge escapes the tenets of the theoretical system that first rendered it necessary. Various reasons could explain this difference of treatment as between the judge and the other figures of public intervention in Coase's system, but Coase makes too strong an opposition between common law on one side and regulatory and statutory law on the other, and leaves unexplained the motivation of judges.

This paper uses the institutional economics of Douglass North to explain three features of the shale boom: why fracking technology emerged in the United States, the rapid increase in production of natural gas in the United States and the uneven response to these new economic opportunities in shale-rich economies. It argues that the institutional matrix of the United States, in particular private ownership of minerals, encouraged experimentation on the barren Texas oil and gas fields, where fracking technology emerged and the rapid transfer of mineral rights to gas companies. Institutional entrepreneurs, namely landmen and lawyers, facilitated contracting between owners of mineral rights and drillers. Private ownership of minerals and an ideology supportive of drilling provide insight into the adoption of regulations that encourage hydraulic fracturing.

This paper relates firm size and opportunism by showing that, given certain behavioural dispositions of humans, the size of a profit-maximizing firm can be determined by cognitive aspects underlying firm-internal cultural transmission processes. We argue that what firms do better than markets – besides economizing on transaction costs – is to establish a cooperative regime among its employees that keeps in check opportunism. A model depicts the outstanding role of the entrepreneur or business leader in firm-internal socialization processes and the evolution of corporate cultures. We show that high opportunism-related costs are a reason for keeping firms’ size small.

In robot torts, robots carry out activities that are partially controlled by a human operator. Several legal and economic scholars across the world have argued for the need to rethink legal remedies as we apply them to robot torts. Yet, to date, there exists no general formulation of liability in case of robot accidents, and the proposed solutions differ across jurisdictions. We proceed in our research with a set of two companion papers. In this paper, we present the novel problems posed by robot accidents, and assess the legal challenges and institutional prospects that policymakers face in the regulation of robot torts. In the companion paper, we build on the present analysis and use an economic model to propose a new liability regime which blends negligence-based rules and strict manufacturer liability rules to create optimal incentives for robot torts.

Nasir ad-Din Tusi's (born 1201 in Tus in northeastern Persia; died 1274 in Baghdad), has been far more influential for his various contributions to astronomy and mathematics, including founding the Maraghah observatory (in Iranian Azerbaijan) and his brilliant reformulations of the Ptolemaic planetary model, which served as an important inspiration for Nicolaus Copernicus (1473–1543) revolutionary work than for anything else. Nonetheless, he also stands as one major figure in the medieval Islamic philosophical ethics and a profound thinker on socio-economic matters, as is attested by his masterpiece Akhlāq-i Nāsirī (The Nasirean Ethics – titled after his first name), from which the following Fragment is taken. He may be deservingly credited as an important pioneer of the science of political economy.

The legal realist Robert Lee Hale offered a definition of freedom as a zero-sum game: each volitional freedom implies some degree of coercion over other people's freedom, and at the same time one's freedom is subject to some degree of control and coercion by others. The objective of our work is to develop this idea along with the theory of positional goods. This allows us to illustrate the externalities deriving from the ‘consumption’ of freedom and detail the role of the lawmaker in accordance with the Halean contribution.

This article demonstrates that the network structures of historical regimes influence the way information is spread, which in turn circumscribe the behaviors of the different groups that make up the system. It advances two central claims. The first is a methodological one showing that patterns of long-term historical change are best studied at the system level, rather than by a traditional equilibrium framework grounded in models of individual behavior. Then, an empirical claim is established by comparisons of China's hub-and-spoke hypernetwork with Europe's multi-hub hypernetwork to show that their different patterns of interconnectivity forged their respective capacities to weather intermittent socioeconomic transitions.

In his comprehensive analysis of the relationship between institutions and economic growth, Ha-Joon Chang, in his article ‘Institutions and Economic Development: Theory, Policy and History’, reviews the empirical evidence on this relationship emphasizing the contrast between the conclusions that one can derive from the time-series evidence and the claims often made in favor of ‘liberalized institutions’ based on the results of cross-section studies. Does the time-series evidence contradict the results of cross-section studies regarding the relationship between institutions and growth? In this comment, I argue that in stressing the contrast between these two kinds of evidence, Chang falls short of a full criticism, consistent with his theoretical analysis, of cross-section studies while at the same time failing to infer what the time-series evidence really shows.

Social norms pervade society and when they conflict with legal norms, the former undermine the latter making them ineffective. In this study, we propose that the extortion racket in Sicily has turned into a social norm and this is why recent top-down interventions have failed in stalling this socially undesirable activity. One exception is represented by Addiopizzo, a grass root movement that uses non-legal means to fight the racket phenomenon in Sicily. During the last 15 years, Addiopizzo was able to produce an effective reduction in the payment of protection money in the Sicilian city of Palermo by triggering, we suggest, among other things, a process of change in social norms. Acknowledging the importance of a change in social norms to achieve social change allows us to link the theory of institutions as ‘rules’ with the theory of institutions as ‘equilibria’.

Coase's (1960) contractual single-exchange framework is challenged by Arruñada (2017) as a framework that cannot be used to understand the complex nature of property law and related institutions. Arruñada proposes the sequential exchange model as an alternative framework. Differences between the two approaches are considered and some applications in land and natural resources are used to evaluate his critique. These cases support Arruñada's critique of the simple contracting approach to property, showing that for many natural resources private contracting has not been the solution and that a mix of property institutions govern. Contrary to Arruñada, however, I argue that the limits of the single-exchange framework arise not because of sequential exchange, but because assets (parcels of land) are complex and physically connected.

Standard health economics concentrates on the provision of care by medical professionals. Yet ‘care’ receives scant analysis; it is portrayed as a spillover effect or externality in the form of interdependent utility functions. In this context care can only be conceived as either acts of altruism or as social capital. Both conceptions are subject to considerable problems stemming from mainstream health economics’ reliance on a reductionist social model built around instrumental rationality and consequentialism. Subsequently, this implies a disregard for moral rules and duties and the compassionate aspects of behaviour. Care as an externality is a second-order concern relative to self-interested utility maximization, and is therefore crowded out by the parameters of the standard model. We outline an alternative relational approach to conceptualising care based on the social embeddedness of the individual that emphasises the ethical properties of care. The deontological dimension of care suggests that standard health economics is likely to undervalue the importance of care and caring in medicine.

This paper explores the potential for gains from trade between Austrian and behavioral economics, with a focus on how the two schools of thoughts can constructively critique each other. Among other things, the Austrian critique of behavioral economics would urge it to jettison its restrictive and axiomatic definition of rationality, and to treat humans as active agents rather than passive recipients of environmental and cognitive influences. Meanwhile, the behavioral critique of Austrian economics would push it to take more seriously the fundamental question of how individuals arrive at choices and to analyze how such choices can interact with ‘micro-institutional’ choice environments.

This essay outlines the contributions of Ronald Harry Coase (1910–2013) to institutional economics, noting his insistence on the importance of studying real world institutions and his personal contribution as an institution builder.

We employ matching methods to explore the relationships between foreign aid flows and corruption in recipient countries. Data are drawn from recipients of foreign aid for the 1996–2013 period. We find no compelling evidence of an effect running from corruption to aid flows. Furthermore, point estimates imply that corruption reforms lead countries to receive less aid. Alternatively, we generally find that, over a 10-year horizon, a sustained increase in aid leads to more corruption in a recipient. It is the sustained nature of an aid increase that seems to be important for this effect. (We generally do not report significant results for large changes in aid that are not sustained over time.)