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Political instability, institutional change and economic growth in Brazil since 1870

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 June 2020

Nauro Campos ,
Menelaos Karanasos ,
Panagiotis Koutroumpis  and
Zihui Zhang
Nauro Campos
Affiliation:
University College London, London, UK ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland IZA-Bonn, Bonn, Germany
Menelaos Karanasos*
Affiliation:
Brunel University London, London, UK
Panagiotis Koutroumpis
Affiliation:
Queen Mary University London, London, UK
Zihui Zhang
Affiliation:
Brunel University London, London, UK
*
*Corresponding author. Email: [email protected]
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Abstract

Are institutions a deep cause of economic growth? This paper tries to answer this question in a novel manner by focusing on within-country variation, over long periods of time, using a new hand-collected data set on institutions and the power-ARCH econometric framework. Focusing on the case of Brazil since 1870, our results suggest (a) that both changes in formal political institutions and informal political instability affect economic growth negatively, (b) there are important differences in terms of their short- versus long-run behaviour, and (c) not all but just a few selected institutions affect economic growth in the long-run.

Keywords

Economic growthinstitutionspolitical instabilitypower-ARCHvolatility

JEL classification

C14: Semiparametric and Nonparametric Methods: General E23: Production O40: General D72: Political Processes: Rent-Seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
Type
Research Article
Information
Journal of Institutional Economics , Volume 16 , Issue 6 , December 2020 , pp. 883 - 910
Copyright
Copyright © Millennium Economics Ltd 2020

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