The article argues that feminist theory needs a concept of objectivity as part of its working epistemology. “Objectivity” is not, as has been argued by some contemporary feminists, inevitably a “dichotomist male epistemological construct,” leading to psychological distance and the hierarchies of “knower” and “known” that have victimized many groups in liberal society. The article analyzes Catherine MacKinnon's critique of “objectivity” as one of the most explicit, sophisticated and compelling theories demonstrating current feminist mistrust of “objectivity.” It finds that even MacKinnon uses “objectivity” in a one-dimensional manner, equating epistemological objectivity with political objectification.

The question addressed by this essay is whether Thomas Hobbes is the true intellectual forebear of John Locke. A brief comparison of the teachings of these two authors with respect to natural justice and civil justice would seem to suggest that Locke is a determined adversary of Hobbes whose views on justice are reducible to the maxim that “might makes right.” But a reexamination of Locke's Second Treatise shows that Locke adopts this principle with hardly less thoroughness than Hobbes. Even so, an important difference remains, for Locke takes steps to disguise the grim reality of power, whereas Hobbes makes the enlightenment of people the sine qua non of his political science. Locke's departure from Hobbes is seen as an attempt to instill in the body politic a degree of justice that would not otherwise exist.

One of the most difficult features of the Declaration of Independence is the assertion within it that “we hold these truths to be self-evident.…” Careful examination of the text of the Declaration reveals, however, that the truths are not in fact said to be “self-evident” but are rather, as a matter of healthy political practice, to be treated as if self-evident. Appreciating the status of the so-called self-evident truths above all brings into focus the problem of politics as civic education in this regime, especially as seen by Jefferson. It also helps focus attention on the structure of the Declaration and clarifies some recent scholarly disputes over the meaning and sources of the Declaration.

Thomas Paine's social-contract theory, which asserts the protection of individual rights as the sole end of civil society and the consent of the majority of individuals as the sole source of government's authority, may seem to be better suited to the democratic Constitution of the United States than Edmund Burke's theory of prescription of government. Burke's theory is based on the rational moral goals of civil society, not on the supremacy of the people's or any other will. It asserts that the natural ends of society are prior to rights as Paine and other radical democrats conceived of them and that natural obligation is prior to and controls consent. Burke can therefore afford us a more realistic interpretation of popular consent and of the Constitution as the political form that makes us a people. He also offers a useful corrective to the currently popular view of the Supreme Court's function as being primarily to protect an ever-expanding array of constitutional rights. Burke was no democrat but he may help democrats to overcome the limitations of the liberal contractarian model of society.

Contrary to Arendt's claims, totalitarianism is not unique to the modern world. It is found occasionally in past ages and is exemplified in Shaka's rule over the Zulu. It is not clear whether the ideological “logic” of modern dictators differs from the seemingly paranoid behavior of Shaka or of certain ancient despots. Indeed, if Aristotle's account is accurate, certain extreme despots, by definition, treated citizens as slaves or household laborers. They thus projected the private realm into the public, effectively abolishing both; Arendt is wrong to say that modern dictators were the first to do so.

The interpretation of Edmund Burke as a laissez-faire economist has a long pedigree but is inaccurate. Rather, Burke is best seen as a moderate Whig who believed that governmental social and economic policy should be based on pragmatic and prudential considerations. However, utilitarian rule-making makes most sense when the rules can be formulated in terms of realizing some more abstract goal. This goal Burke obtained from his reading of the Scotch moral sense writers, who convinced him that man has an innate moral nature which can be improved through association with other men in society. Consideration of Burke's writings on a variety of specific economic and social issues, ranging from poor relief and economic reform to the slave trade, confirms this instrumental interpretation of Burke's economic thought.

This study questions a prevalent view of the First Amendment religion clauses which maintains they were intended to establish neutrality of the federal government between religion and nonreligion and thereby to establish not merely governmental religious pluralism but governmental secularism. Since the Bill of Rights is said to have been adopted to satisfy anti-Federalist objections to the original Constitution, what they said about religion in the ratification debates is comprehensively examined. They turn out to have been primarily concerned that the unamended Constitution was particularly dangerous to and tilted against religion. Hence they wanted not simply to prevent the new government from infringing on “religious liberty” (of individuals or states) but to redress the unamended Constitution's actual or potential tilt against religion. The First Congress debates are then examined from this rather different perspective to see what effect this concern may have had on the First Amendment religion clauses. It is argued that this concern produced a more complex constitutional position on religion and religious liberty than is commonly maintained. This position is not simply Madison/Jefferson separationism but a compromise which to some extent redressed the original Constitution's tilt against religion.

The study of ethics has recently become influenced by a form of moral conservatism—a critique of “modernity” with a bias towards Aristotle. It stresses the integrity of communities and their customs, a pluralistic and particularistic respect for the diversity of human groups, the poverty of utopianism and Marxism, and the inevitability of moral and political conflict. Each stress raises major issues: the priority of social goods over human rights; hermeneutical problems of understanding between communities; difficulties for societies' shaping a common future in accordance with their moral understanding; the balance between consensus and conflict in political life. These problems are addressed in an extended form of moral conservatism which defines a number of correspondences with progressive conceptions of humanity. Referring to central facts of moral psychology and possible institutions of public communication, the discussion identifies universal human purposes whose practical implications are consistent with a postmodern society in which the course of development is settled by public deliberation.

Liberalism needs a theory of fundamental rights. Since rights belong to persons, a theory of rights should be linked to a conception of the person. The courts have never undertaken to develop such a conception. The implications of adopting competing positivist, deontological or empiricist conceptions of the person are explored. Because of the weaknesses of each, an eclectic “politics of rights” approach is advocated. On this approach, the validity of a claim of right is enhanced by its formal neutrality and congruity with legal precedent, but also depends on careful assessment of what recognition of the right would mean for actual persons in the concrete political situation.

This article explores a hitherto unexamined aspect of John Locke's political thought, his advocacy of general naturalization. It is based upon an unpublished manuscript of Locke's which appears in the Appendix. Although naturalization was supported by a number of Locke's contemporaries, the arguments for naturalization which rely on the tradition of classical republicanism must be distinguished from those such as Locke's which rely on the new political economy. The classical republicans ground naturalization in the need for increasing the number of citizens available for a civic militia; this need, in turn, is intertwined with a vision of imperialistic conquest on the Roman model. Locke's arguments are based on a theory of an expanding commercial society and the productive power of labor. They reflect a new concept of individualistic voluntaristic citizenship which provides an alternative to the common law notions of natural allegiance of Locke's day.

The modern science of politics has agreed with Thomas Hobbes that government must be based on the rejection of Aristotle's belief that claims to rule might be judged and accepted on their substantive merit as a matter of justice. The present essay examines the premodern approach as found in Aristotle's treatment of the question of regimes in the Politics. It is argued that the interpretation of Aristotle's discussion that understands him to distinguish right and deviant regimes as these are in the interest of ruled or rulers respectively and to seek a resolution of the conflict between claims to rule as a kind or instance of distributive justice is belied by a close reading of his Politics and Nicomachean Ethics and collapses distinctions crucial to Aristotelian political science.

After World War II bitter controversy broke out in the United States between Catholics, on the one hand, and Protestants and liberals on the other. Although important issues were involved, these controversies have attracted almost no scholarly attention. Donald Crosby's book on Catholics and McCar-thyism is the only full-scale monograph dealing with any aspect of the controversies of which I am aware. My intention here is to draw attention to two additional aspects of the controversy which touch on matters that are still of interest and in need of much more study by historians. These are: (1) ambiguities in the concept of pluralism; and (2) a tendency that emerged in the critique of Catholic authoritarianism to treat democracy as a civil religion. But before taking up these issues we must look briefly at the development of “the Catholic issue” between the A1 Smith campaign of 1928 and the end of World War II.

If democracy in the sense of popular rule is to have a significant degree of realization in the modern world, it will have to mean popular control of cultural meaning and cultural change rather than public policy. While the impact of cultural values on public policy is problematic, there is more at stake in political struggle than specific policies. In fact, the most important personal consequences of politics are thoroughly symbolic, and the symbolic rewards of “cultural democracy” are likely to be more meaningful than the tangible rewards of distributive policies. Although popular control of these meaningful symbolic rewards is possible, such control could occur only through the mediation of charismatic leaders.

Religion is again a lively topic not only in practical-political life but also in social and political thought. The latter development is by far more surprising and intriguing than the practical-political relevance. For some time, political theory had ostensibly settled accounts with, or resolved the status of, religious belief: basically churches and religious movements were classified as one type of interest groups (or “input variables”) within a comprehensive liberal-democratic model — a model secular in character but not intolerant, within limits, of religious convictions. On the part of organized (especially Protestant) churches, the settlement was widely accepted as a means for securing both internal church autonomy and some influence in the political arena; the “social gospel” movement in particular saw faith chiefly as a leverage for advancing welfare and progress within secular society. To be sure, the optimism of the liberal settlement was severely challenged, and partly disrupted, by catastrophic events in our century as well as by radical theological criticism — a criticism highlighted in Richard Niebuhr's well-known phrase: “A God without wrath brought men without sin into a kingdom without judgment through the ministrations of a Christ without a cross.” Yet, when carried to an extreme, theological criticism had the paradoxical effect of reinforcing the secular-liberal paradigm. Once religion was radically segregated from politics or the “city of God” from the “earthly city,” the latter was left entirely to its own devices; purged of all religious and millenarian considerations social and political theory could return to business as usual.

The relationship between Kant and Rawls is apparently an obvious one; Rawls himself acknowledges the Kantian foundations of his approach to questions of justice and political right, and identifies the precise points at which his theory departs from that of Kant. This essay attempts to show that when one examines those points of departure carefully, they turn out to point not merely away from Kant, but directly and inexorably toward the account of political right given by Rousseau in The Social Contract. The essay argues that it is impossible to fully understand Rawls' theoretical project until one sees the (unstable) position it occupies between the Kantian and Rousseauian accounts of political right. Moreover, it argues that the theoretical project undertaken by Rawls, that of revising the Kantian conception of autonomy in an attempt to show how it could be coherently “expressed” politically, was actually undertaken and “completed” by Rousseau — though with ironic, and unsettling, results.

This article argues that there has been a movement in Catholic political thought from a position of doctrinal neutrality concerning forms of government — provided that they promote the common good — to an endorsement of democracy as the morally superior form of government. It traces the various theoretical and practical elements in the Catholic tradition that have favored or opposed liberal democracy, giving particular attention to the ambiguity of medieval theories, the centralizing and authoritarian tendencies in the early modern period, and the intense hostility of the nineteenth-century popes to French and Italian liberalism. After analyzing the emergence of neo-Thomistic theories of democracy in the twentieth century and their influence on Christian Democratic parties in Europe and Latin America, the article concludes that John XXIII's encyclical Pacem in Terris (1963) and the discussion of democracy by the Second Vatican Council in Gaudium et Spes (1965) marked the abandonment of earlier opposition to liberal democracy and a decisive commitment to democracy and human rights.

Tocqueville saw democracy as a form of government and society that was basically valid yet liable to produce unpleasant, even disastrous, surprises. Today we may look on one of the major manifestations of democracy, the welfare state, in like fashion. Although it marks an enhancement of economic justice, it has had some disturbing consequences. These include the rise of an immense federal bureaucracy and (if we understand the welfare state as comprising the phenomenon of “consumer capitalism”) a trivialization of liberty and public life. What, then, must we do? I suggest in this article that Christianity provides a clue — the value of which is not confined to Christians. Christianity indicates a radically new way of looking at political and social matters; spirit is prior to order, and suffering is prior to action. These principles suggest a way of countering the evil consequences of the welfare state and thus, not merely saving the welfare state, but giving it a new spiritual and prophetic value.

This article asks why new protest movements have recently emerged in Western Europe by focusing on the British postwar race and anti-nuclear movements. Contrary to “subjective” propositions which have attributed their emergence to inter-generational value change, this article instead proposes a “structural” explanation. It is argued that the failure of the major British political parties to articulate citizen concerns on a number of salient issues has generated extra-party initiatives whose willingness to “voice” citizen anxieties primarily explains their popular support. Once in existence, these groups further politicize the conflict over public policy through various unconventional activities.

Many poor and oppressed people wish to leave their countries of origin in the third world to come to affluent Western societies. This essay argues that there is little justification for keeping them out. The essay draws on three contemporary approaches to political theory — the Rawlsian, the Nozickean, and the utilitarian — to construct arguments for open borders. The fact that all three theories converge upon the same results on this issue, despite their significant disagreements on others, strengthens the case for open borders and reveals its roots in our deep commitment to respect all human beings as free and equal moral persons. The final part of the essay considers communitarian objections to this conclusion, especially those of Michael Walzer.