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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 August 2009
Liberalism needs a theory of fundamental rights. Since rights belong to persons, a theory of rights should be linked to a conception of the person. The courts have never undertaken to develop such a conception. The implications of adopting competing positivist, deontological or empiricist conceptions of the person are explored. Because of the weaknesses of each, an eclectic “politics of rights” approach is advocated. On this approach, the validity of a claim of right is enhanced by its formal neutrality and congruity with legal precedent, but also depends on careful assessment of what recognition of the right would mean for actual persons in the concrete political situation.
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