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Charismatic Leadership and Cultural Democracy

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2009

E. B. Portis
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Extract

If democracy in the sense of popular rule is to have a significant degree of realization in the modern world, it will have to mean popular control of cultural meaning and cultural change rather than public policy. While the impact of cultural values on public policy is problematic, there is more at stake in political struggle than specific policies. In fact, the most important personal consequences of politics are thoroughly symbolic, and the symbolic rewards of “cultural democracy” are likely to be more meaningful than the tangible rewards of distributive policies. Although popular control of these meaningful symbolic rewards is possible, such control could occur only through the mediation of charismatic leaders.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Politics , Volume 49 , Issue 2 , Spring 1987 , pp. 231 - 250
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 1987

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References

Notes

1 Schumpeter, Joseph A., Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1950), pp. 261–63Google Scholar: see also Schiffer, Irvine, Charisma: A Psychoanalytical Look at Mass Society (New York: The Free Press, 1973), p. 10.Google Scholar

2 The concept of “charismatic leadership” has been, to use James MacGregor Burns's term, cheapened by overuse. Although few have doubted the existence of the phenomenon, many have argued that the term is too broad, failing to allow for one crucial distinction or another. Cf. Burns, , Leadership (New York: Harper and Row, 1978) p. 244Google Scholar; Friedrich, Carl J., “Political Leadership and the Problem of Charismatic Power,” Journal of Politics 23 (1961): 16, 22CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Downton, James V., Rebel Leadership: Commitment and Charisma in the Revolutionary Process (New York: The Free Press, 1973), p. 236Google Scholar. I suspect that it is too late to give the term a restrictive meaning, and doubt the utility of doing so. There are surely many variations of inspirational leadership, and I will attempt to distinguish the form most compatible with “cultural democracy” in another section of this essay. My use of the term follows that of Tucker, Robert C., “The Theory of Charismatic Leadership,” in Philosophers and Kings: Studies in Leadership, ed. Rustow, Dankwart A. (New York: George Braziller, 1970), p. 71Google Scholar, and, I believe, Max Weber. See Economy and Society, trans. Roth, Guenther and Wittich, Claus (New York: Bedminster Press, 1968), p. 1116Google Scholar; From Max Weber, trans. Gerth, H. H. and Mills, C. Wright (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 79Google Scholar. For a recent review of the relevant literature, as well as an interesting and intelligent attempt to give the concept a somewhat more restrictive meaning than is adopted in the last section of this essay, see Willner, Ann Ruth, The Spellbinders: Charismatic Political Leadership (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3 Indeed, in a passage which undercuts his own arguments to a serious extent, Schumpeter asserts that “electorates … must be on an intellectual and moral level high enough to be proof against the offerings of the crook and the crank …” (Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, p. 294).Google Scholar

4 From Max Weber, p. 113.Google Scholar

5 Cf. Mommsen, Wolfgang J., The Age of Bureaucracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1974)Google Scholar; Giddens, Anthony, Politics and Sociology in the Thought of Max Weber (London: The Macmillan Company, 1972)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Portis, E. B., “Max Weber and the Unity of Normative and Empirical Theory,” Political Studies 31 (1983): 32–40.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

6 On this last point see Michels, Robert, Political Parties (New York: The Free Press, 1962), pp. 107–14, 124, 172–77, 205–11Google Scholar. I do not doubt that the public is capable of rough, limited, and invariably retrospective judgments on the performance of political leaders. What seems implausible is that such an ability can be the basis of meaningful popular control of political officials. It is noteworthy that V. O. Key never made this latter claim in his influential defense of the rationality of the electorate. The Responsible Electorate (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966), pp. 1–8Google Scholar. But compare Pomper, Gerald M., Elections in America: Control and Influence in Democratic Politics (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1968), pp. 244–86.Google Scholar

7 See Dahl, Robert A., Who Governs?: Democracy and Power in an American City (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961), pp. 271–325.Google Scholar

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9 Pateman, , Participation and Democratic Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970), pp. 44, 98, 102.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

10 In an eloquent recent defense of participatory democracy, Benjamin R. Barber consistently assumes that the objections to his proposals to encourage citizen participation would concern the risk of ill-considered policy or instability. He neglects the possibility that they would have little effect at all. Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), pp. 307–308Google Scholar. At one point he notes the fewer opportunities for direct citizen involvement at the federal level, while ignoring the extent to which the public ignores such opportunities at the state level (ibid., p. 282).

11 Pateman, , Participation and Democratic Theory, pp. 44, 106.Google Scholar

12 Mansbridge, , Beyond Adversary Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 279.Google Scholar

13 Pateman, , Participation and Democratic Theory, pp. 82–84, 97, 101.Google Scholar

14 Mansbridge, , Beyond Adversary Democracy, p. 293.Google Scholar

15 Ibid., p. 297.

16 Goodwyn, , The Populist Moment (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978)Google Scholar. This is an abridged version of his The Democratic Promise (Oxford University Press, 1976).Google Scholar

17 The Populist Moment, pp. 295–96.Google Scholar

18 See ibid., pp. 109–11.

19 Ibid., pp. 230–32.

20 See ibid., p. 143.

21 “They never found the means to bring the educational power of their movement culture to remotely enough American voters, but if one thing may be said about the Populists, it is that they tried” (ibid., p. 294).

22 Ibid., pp. 268–69.

23 Ibid., p. 270.

24 Ibid., pp. 271–72.

25 See Edelman, Murray, The Symbolic Uses of Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1964), p. 149.Google Scholar

26 See Gusfield, Joseph R., Symbolic Crusade (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1963), p. 182Google Scholar; Elder, Charles D. and Cobb, Roger W., The Political Uses of Symbols (New York: Longman, 1983), p. 115.Google Scholar

27 Symbolic Crusade, pp. 174, 180.Google Scholar

28 Gusfield explicitly distinguishes rational symbolic politics, which deals with status, from aimless and irrational “expressive” politics (ibid., pp. 19, 23, 177). If my argument is valid, this distinction is significantly less clear cut.

29 See Erikson, Erik H.. Childhood and Society (New York: W.W. Norton, 1963), p. 194.Google Scholar

30 Mead, , Mind, Self, and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934), pp. 67, 73, 139.Google Scholar

31 Ibid., p. 47; see also Piaget, Jean, Six Psychological Studies (New York: Random House, 1967), p. 40.Google Scholar

32 Mead, , Mind, Self, and Society, p. 139.Google Scholar

33 Cf. Connolly, William E., Appearance and Reality in Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 154–55Google Scholar; Elder, and Cobb, , The Political Uses of Symbols, pp. 43–44Google Scholar; Hollis, Martin, Models of Man: Philosophical Thoughts on Social Action (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp. 105–106Google Scholar; Berger, Peter, “Identity as a Problem in the Sociology of Knowledge,” European Journal of Sociology 7 (1966): 108.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

34 Although logically one could not choose one's self-concept, I do not want to suggest that choice can play no role in what one becomes. However, for choice to have a significant influence probably requires that one's present identity be in some way “open,” perhaps that one see oneself as a neophyte of some sort. See the discussion in Portis, Edward Bryan, Max Weber and Political Commitment: Science, Politics and Personality (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1986), pp. 37–38.Google Scholar

35 James, , Psychology: The Briefer Course (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1910), p. 205.Google Scholar

36 Turner, Ralph H., “The Self-Conception in Social Interaction,” in The Self in Social Interaction, ed. Gorden, Chad and Gergen, Kenneth J. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1968), p. 47.Google Scholar

37 For a more extensive discussion of the argument presented in the preceding paragraphs, see Portis, E. B., “Citizenship and Personal Identity,” Polity 18 (1986): 461–67CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For evidence of the important role performed by the self-concept in processing and structuring social information, see Rogers, T. B., “A Model of the Self as an Aspect of the Human Information Processing System,” p. 200Google Scholar, and Kuiper, Nicholas A. and Derry, Paul A., “The Self as a Cognitive Prototype: An Application to Person Perception and Depression,” p. 217Google Scholar, both in Personality, Cognition, and Social Interaction, ed. Cantor, Nancy and Kihlstrom, John F. (Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 1981).Google Scholar

38 Connolly, , Appearance and Reality in Politics, pp. 163–64Google Scholar; cf. Gerth, Hans and Mills, C. Wright, Character and Social Structure (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1953), pp. 298–99.Google Scholar

39 See Gusfield, , Symbolic Crusade, pp. 4–5.Google Scholar

40 Schiffer, , Charisma, p. 120.Google Scholar

41 Cf. Mansbridge, , Beyond Adversary Democracy, pp. 241, 244Google Scholar; Lane, Robert E., “Government and Self-Esteem,” Political Theory 10 (1982): 20.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

42 See Bellah, Robert N. et al. , Habits of the Heart: Individualism and Commitment in American Life (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 75.Google Scholar

43 Cf. Downs, Anthony, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), pp. 220–34.Google Scholar

44 Cf. Conover, Pamela Johnston, “The Influence of Group Identifications on Political Perception and Evaluation,” Journal of Politics 46 (1984): 782–83CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Roth, Marian and Boynton, G. R., “Communal Ideology and Political Support,” Journal of Politics 31 (1969): 172, 175–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

45 See Portis, , “Citizenship and Personal Identity,” pp. 469–70Google Scholar. Mansbridge does note some of the dangers of her recommendation. Beyond Adversary Democracy, p. 298Google Scholar. She purposely chose small groups committed to a version of communal democracy in order to assess its viability. The much greater public concern for national political affairs and the higher moral expectations they have of national political figures, as opposed to all but the very lowest levels of government, would seem to call into question the extent her observations can be generalized.

46 Gaventa, , Power and Powerlessness: Quiescence and Rebellion in an Appalachian Valley (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1980), p. 194.Google Scholar

47 Erikson, Erik H., Young Man Luther: A Study in Psychoanalysis and History (New York: W. W Norton & Co., 1962), p. 110.Google Scholar

48 Downton, , Rebel Leadership, p. 79.Google Scholar

49 Burns, , Leadership, p. 244.Google Scholar

50 See especially Weber, , From Max Weber, pp. 79–80.Google Scholar

51 Despite his tendency to overgeneralize and his often impressionistic evidence, Eric Hoffer's study remains in my opinion one of the most insightful of such analyses. The True Believer: Thoughts on the Nature of Mass Movements (New York: Harper and Row, 1951)Google Scholar. In general, see Cantril, Hadley, The Psychology of Social Movements (New York: Wiley, 1941).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

52 Cf. Tucker, , “The Theory of Charismatic Leadership,” pp. 80–81, 87Google Scholar; Schiffer, , Charisma, p. 37.Google Scholar

53 Lasswell, , Power and Personality (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 1948), p. 39Google Scholar; cf. Erikson, , Young Man Luther, pp. 148–50Google Scholar; Downton, , Rebel Leadership, pp. 41–42Google Scholar; Selznik, Philip, Leadership in Administration: A Sociological Interpretation (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), pp. 142–43.Google Scholar

54 Cf. Grazia, Sebastian De, The Political Community: A Study of Anomie (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948), pp. 85, 92Google Scholar; Schiffer, , Charisma, p. 159Google Scholar; Crutchfield, Richard S., “Conformity and Character,” The American Psychologist 10 (1955): 195–96.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

55 See Grazia, De, The Political Community, p.73.Google Scholar

56 Mansbridge, , Beyond Adversary Democracy, pp. 29–30.Google Scholar

57 Differences in abilities would certainly be central if an individual identifies primarily with a functional role and the status attached to it, as opposed to a communal group of some sort. When such individuals attach themselves to a charismatic leader, one would expect that the leader would tend to take on the father figure role. Perhaps the support received by such leaders as Mussolini and Hitler from the lower middle class is partly explained by this tendency. In general see Lipset, Seymour Martin, Political Man: The Social Basis of Politics (New York: Doubleday, 1960), pp. 127–79.Google Scholar

58 See Seeman, Melvin, “Alienation, Membership, and Political Knowledge: A Comparative Study,” Public Opinion Quarterly 30 (1966): 355–66.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

59 See Kuiper, and Derry, , “The Self as Cognitive Prototype” p. 216Google Scholar; Rogers, , “A Model of the Self,” pp. 195–96Google Scholar; Abse, D. Wilfred and Ulman, Richard B., “Charismatic Political Leadership and Collective Repression,” in Psychopathology and Political Leadership, ed. Robins, Robert S. (New Orleans: Tulane University, 1977), p. 39.Google Scholar

60 Actually, the negative impact of the electronic media is an open question. As far as I know, we lack any convincing studies on whether the public in general is more or less acknowledgeable about public affairs after the development of mass media. Given both the thesis and the publication date of Walter Lippmann's classic, Public Opinion (New York: Macmillan, 1922)Google Scholar, there certainly is reason to doubt whether the age of the electronic media has been characterized by the decline of a sophisticated electorate.

61 See Redl, Fritz, “Group Emotion and Leadership,” Psychiatry 5 (1942): 582CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Schiffer, , Charisma, pp. 66–67Google Scholar; Fiske, Susan T. and Linville, Patricia W., “What Does the Schema Concept Buy Us?” Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 6 (1980): 551.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

62 Prewitt, Kenneth, Eulau, Heinz, and Zisk, Betty H., “Political Socialization and Political Roles,” Public Opinion Quarterly 30 (1966): 576–77CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Aberbach, Joel D., Putnam, Robert D., and Rockman, Bert A., Bureaucrats and Politicians in Western Democracies (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1981), pp. 73–75.Google Scholar

63 Cf. George, Alexander L., “The ‘Operational Code’: A Neglected Approach to the Study of Political Leaders and Decision-Making,” International Studies Quarterly 13 (1969): 190–222CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Conover, , “The Influence of Group Identifications,” 762–63Google Scholar; Elder, and Cobb, , The Political Uses of Symbols, pp. 54, 84.Google Scholar

64 See Aberbach, et al. , Bureaucrats and Politicians, pp. 90–91, 112Google Scholar; Edinger, Lewis J., “Political Science and Political Biography (II): Reflections on the Study of Leadership” Journal of Politics 26 (1964): 663–64.Google Scholar

65 See especially Free, Lloyd A. and Cantril, Hadley, The Political Beliefs of Americans: A Study of Public Opinion (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1968), pp. 46–49.Google Scholar

66 The more questions refer to specific policies, the less likely even a majority of the respondents will agree with President Reagan's position. See especially the summary of poll results in the National Journal (08 31, 1985), 1962; (11 16, 1985), 2620.Google Scholar

67 It is not surprising that presidents are not appreciably helped in their efforts to influence Congress by high approval ratings with the electorate. Congressmen are likely to be aware that the public is not very concerned with the president's specific policies. See Bond, Jon R. and Fleisher, Richard, “Presidential Popularity and Congressional Voting: A Reexamination of Public Opinion as a Source of Influence in Congress,” The Western Political Quarterly 37 (1984): 291–306CrossRefGoogle Scholar. Certainly some policy issues are more likely to arouse public interest than others just because they deal with culturally salient symbols. I expect that conflict over such policies would be more likely to be “socialized.” See Schattschneider, E. E., The Semi-Sovereign People (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1960), pp. 1–43Google Scholar. Also relevant in this regard is Lowery, David and Sigelman, Lee, “Understanding the Tax Revolt: Eight Explanations,” American Political Science Review 75 (1981): 963–74.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

68 See Leiserson, Avery, Parties and Politics (New York: Knopf, 1958), pp. 8, 258Google Scholar; Selznik, , Leadership in Administration, p. 37.Google Scholar