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Political and Distributive Justice in the Political Science of Aristotle

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  05 August 2009

William Mathie
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Extract

The modern science of politics has agreed with Thomas Hobbes that government must be based on the rejection of Aristotle's belief that claims to rule might be judged and accepted on their substantive merit as a matter of justice. The present essay examines the premodern approach as found in Aristotle's treatment of the question of regimes in the Politics. It is argued that the interpretation of Aristotle's discussion that understands him to distinguish right and deviant regimes as these are in the interest of ruled or rulers respectively and to seek a resolution of the conflict between claims to rule as a kind or instance of distributive justice is belied by a close reading of his Politics and Nicomachean Ethics and collapses distinctions crucial to Aristotelian political science.

Type
Research Article
Information
The Review of Politics , Volume 49 , Issue 1 , Winter 1987 , pp. 59 - 84
Copyright
Copyright © University of Notre Dame 1987

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References

Notes

1 Politics 1253a8–18. So far as possible subsequent references to the Politics and Nicomachean Ethics will be made in parentheses in the text. EN will indicate the latter where the text itself does not make this clear. Translations are my own though I have consulted Ross, (London: Oxford World's Classics, 1954)Google Scholar, Rackham, (London: Heinemann, 1934)Google Scholar, and Ostwald, (Indianapolis: Library of Liberal Arts, 1962)Google Scholar in translating the Ethics and Barker, (London: Oxford, 1958)Google Scholar, Rackham, (London: Heinemann, 1944)Google Scholar, Newman, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1887–1902)Google Scholar, Robinson, (Oxford: Clarendon, 1962)Google Scholar and Lord, (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1984)Google Scholar in translating the Politics. I have also gained much from the use of a translation of Politics, bk. 3, by Laurence Berns published by the Collegian of St. John's College, Annapolis, Md.

2 For a discussion of the transformed character of political science resulting from this denial see Mansfield, Harvey C. Jr., “Hobbes and the Science of Indirect Government,” American Political Science Review 45 (03 1971): 97–110CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Mathie, William, “Justice and the Question of Regimes in Ancient and Modern Political Philosophy,” Canadian Journal of Political Science 9 (09 1976): 449–63.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3 In the same paragraph from which these words are taken, Barker adds that in the right regimes “the holding of office [is] for the common interest of all the members” but suggests that the interest of the ruled and the common interest can be equated since the ruled constitute “nearly the whole of the members” (The Politics of Aristotle, p. 113 note V).Google Scholar See also The Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle (New York: Dover, 1959), p. 309.Google Scholar Similarly, Rackham, says “the constitutions [are] classified by the number of the sovereign body, and by its selfish or unselfish aim”Google Scholar (Politics, p. 205).Google Scholar

4 342E, 343B, 346E–347E.

5 Thus Hobbes argues that we should prefer monarchy since here the ruler need not share with others the benefit accruing to the possessors of public authority through the successful prosecution of the public good, as the several members of an assembly must. Leviathan (Oxford: Blackwell, 1960) 2. 19, pp. 122–23.Google Scholar

6 Susemihl argues plausibly that in the last case Aristotle has in mind the contrast between ancient and modern forms of democracy. Susemihl, F. and Hicks, R. D., The Politics of Aristotle: Books I-V (London: Macmillan, 1894), pp. 383–84.Google Scholar

7 Newman is especially helpful in identifying what are in effect objections to the interpretation of this passage as supporting a satisfactory distinction between the right and deviant regimes as generally understood but does not address the implications of what he shows. See his edition of the Politics, v. 1, pp. 244–45Google Scholar (especially note 4) and v. 3, p. 190, note 8.

8 Politics 1252a15–17, 1269a14–25.

9 Newman who points out the lack of such recompense in the latter case conjectures that honor or monetary reward must here substitute, but one may wonder whether the honoring by inferiors could so serve; gain is ruled out by the very purpose of the argument. Newman, , Politics, v. 3, p. 190, no. 8.Google Scholar

10 See, e.g., 1284b30–34.

11 Such an advantage will occur in the case of master and slave if both are such “by nature” inasmuch as the deterioration of the slave reduces the advantage for the ruler, and in the case of the ship's pilot so far as he must share in the fate of the ship he navigates.

12 This would seem to suggest that the deviant no less than the right regimes are comprehended by Aristotle's statement in the first book of the Politics that “the city is by nature” (1252b31–1253a2), insofar as the deviant or despotic regimes provide for living together and life itself.

13 Politics 1277b17–31; EN 1102a9, 1130a1–3.

14 The treatment is not “completed” here either insofar as that treatment itself indicates the importance of the subsequent analysis of the prospects for more or less decent variants and mixed regimes.

15 Cf. Politics 1280a17–22a; EN 1131a16–24.

16 Cf. Politics 1280a11–15, 19–20; EN 1131a13, 27.

17 Cf. Politics 1280a26–31; EN 1131b29–31.

18 Barker, , Political Thought, pp. 313, 345Google Scholar; Rackham, , Politics, p. 231 notedGoogle Scholar; Newman, , Politics v. 1, p. 267Google Scholar; Mulgan, R. G., Aristotle's Political Theory (Oxford: Clarendon, 1977), pp. 80–81Google Scholar; Jaffa, Harry V., “Aristotle” in History of Political Philosophy, ed. Strauss, Leo and Cropsey, Joseph, 2nd ed. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1972), p. 111.Google Scholar

19 Injustice in this sense is πεϱὶ τιμὶν ἤ χϱήματα ἤ σωτϱίαν, Aristotle seems to mean by χϱήματα those same things which are the concern of the virtue of liberality and we may properly apply his remark in the treatment of that virtue that by χϱήματα he means “all those things whose value is measured by money” (1119b28).

20 On the translation of μεϱιστὰ as “fall to be divided” I follow SirRoss, David, The Nichomachean Ethics (London: Oxford, 1954), p. 111.Google Scholar Aristotle's omission of “security” from the present enumeration would seem to suggest that security must be allotted in equal shares to members of the regime as a matter of rectificatory rather than distributive justice.

21 H. H. Joachim remarks that “the μεϱιστὰ άγαΘά … are such that the more A gets, the less there is for B … as contrasted, for example, with goods like knowledge, noble action, etc., which are such that the more A secures the more there is for everyone else” (The Nichomachean Ethics: A Commentary [London: Oxford, 1951], p. 133).Google Scholar

22 Of course office entails honor and this fact belongs to Aristotle's critical discussion of the claims to rule of the few or one but this need not mean that office and honor are identical. This is discussed below at p. 71.

23 Henry Jackson notes that justice in the particular sense, both as distributive and rectificatory, “leaves things as they were”; rectificatory justice presupposes and restores the just relations in existence prior to a voluntary or involuntary loss or gain (The Fifth Book of the Nichomachean Ethics of Aristotle [London: Cambridge, 1879], p. 88).Google Scholar

24 Barry, Brian, “Reflections on ‘Justice as Fairness,’” in Justice and Equality, ed. Bedau, Hugo (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1971), p. 110.Google Scholar

25 The “neutrality” or “formality” of distributive justice vis-à-vis the under-standing of merit of each regime on Aristotle's account ought not to be confused with J. S. Mill's remark that “the notion of justice varies in different persons, and always conforms in its variations to their notion of utility.” For Mill, expediency, or false notions of expediency, rather constitute a limit to the sphere of equality and notions of equality vary ultimately only insofar as this sphere is more or less extensive. Utilitarianism, Liberty and Representative Government (New York: Everyman, 1951), pp. 56–57, 78–79.Google Scholar

26 It should be noted that the teaching on the things just by nature and things just by convention, within which this statement about the one best regime is made, deals with what is just by nature as a part of political justice (1134b18). If, further, we follow Aquinas in supposing that we can infer instances of things just by nature from the examples Aristotle furnishes of things just by convention, we must be struck by the fact that none of those examples involves distributive justice as such. See StAquinas, Thomas, Commentary on the Ethics of Aristotle, trans. Litzinger, C. I. (Chicago: Regnery, 1963), I, par. 1024.Google Scholar

27 Justice as the fair or equal or “partial justice” is so extended, for example, by Delba Winthrop when she says: “The presumption that law secures the happiness of the political community and its parts is ultimately a presumption that the law was made by some one or many who thought about what is good for the whole and its parts and distributed whatever goods the political community can supply in accordance with this determination. Our respect for the law leads us to suppose that some legislator has employed the principle of partial justice … our suspicion that he may not have done so properly—that we live in an imperfectly just regime—leads us to presume to apply the principle ourselves. Partial justice should give us a standard for law, although to think about it is potentially subversive of law” (“Aristotle and Theories of Justice,” American Political Science Review 72 [12 1978]: 1203).Google Scholar

28 Reflection upon Aristotle's account and enumeration of the moral virtues in books three to five of the Nichomachean Ethics suggests that justice as the specific virtue which consists in taking no more than one's equal share has a very modest status within the Aristotelian scheme. Thus his account seems to constitute an ascent from courage and temperance — the virtues of the parts of the soul lacking reasoned speech (1117b23–24) to magnanimity and then a descent to justice as a particular virtue. This is suggested both by the comprehensiveness of magnanimity (1123b26–1124a5) and by the fact that liberality, magnificence, magnanimity, and due ambition with regard to lesser honors are presented in this order, for we are told that due ambition stands in relation to magnanimity as liberality is in relation to magnificence (1125b1–4). One should also consider that he who has the virtue of truthfulness, the ninth virtue in Aristotle's enumeration, is assumed also to be just in the particular sense (1127a33). To the extent that these three remarks accurately suggest the status of justice as fairness, we may suppose the provision of habituation in this virtue to be among the least imposing of the tasks facing the legislator.

29 It is not certain that all of the moral virtues can be realized in this way. See, e.g., 1130b26–29.

30 The reversed understanding of the relation of priority between justice as lawful and justice as equity is wonderfully expressed by Hobbes's very different advice to those who are required to interpret the civil laws. See Leviathan 2.26, pp. 180–84.Google Scholar Aquinas, too, believes that recourse to the natural law is required of the dispenser of equity though he does not, of course, equate the natural law with the acknowledgement of natural equality. Commentary on Ethics, pars. 1081, 1086.

31 Gauthier and Jolif see that Aristotle makes a significant change in the substitution of the άνισος for the пλεονέκτης but suggest a different explanation for the change. L'Ethique a Nicomaque (Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1959), 2:336–37.Google Scholar

32 Republic 331A–336B. Consider also Socrates' refutation of Thrasymachus who associates injustice as пλεονεξία with science of wisdom (349b2–10).

33 Aristotle does not hesitate to require of the great-souled, or magnanimous, man that his claims correspond to his actual worth (349b–350c).

34 This is, Newman says, “a comparative conclusion only … for we shall find in the sequel that Aristotle does not concede even to a superiority in virtue, unless it is combined with an adequate provision of external goods, a right to predominance in the State” (Politics, v. 1, p. 249).Google Scholar

35 Richard Robinson refers to the present discussion as “a pure example of aporetic procedure with negative results that even resembles the slyness or ‘irony’ of the Socratic method” (Aristotle's Politics: Books III and IV, p. 35).Google Scholar Newman, too, characterizes Aristotle's aim here as “in the main a negative and critical one” but adds that Aristotle intends here “to overthrow the exclusive claims of the Few Best just as [in the preceding discussion of oligarchy and democracy] he overthrows the exclusive claims of the rich and the έλέυθεϱοι” (Politics, III, pp. 213–24).Google Scholar The aporetic character of the present section may be recognized while yet acknowledging the contribution of the discussion to the progress of Aristotle's dialectical inquiry. Further, as we have noted, the claims of oligarchy and democracy are here considered anew.

36 Cf. Rousseau, , Du Contract Social 1.3.Google Scholar

37 Cf. Locke, , Second Treatise, section 96.Google Scholar

38 The principle is explicitly stated at 1261b9–10.

39 See Jaffa, , “Politics,” p. 113Google Scholar, on this point and generally pp. 105–116 for a lucid analysis of the question of regimes understood as a matter of distributive justice.

40 Ibid., p. 113.

41 In attempting to explain the “peculiarly Greek” conception of justice which distributes offices according to the worth of the recipients, Barker points out that “these offices were chiefly of the nature of honours … awarded far more for consideration of worth and public spirit than of capacity” (Political Thought of Plato and Aristotle, pp. 340–41).Google Scholar

42 In a passage previously cited, Brian Barry accuses John Rawls of proposing a justifiable incentive system rather than a theory of justice. Barry concedes that justice may need to be sacrificed to the public interest at times, but holds we should not confuse this case with the operation of justice. The distribution of flutes is to be distinguished from distributive justice in this way though Aristotle comprehends the former case within his account of political justice.

43 A city would not be possible that was entirely made up of slaves or those without property.

44 Jaffa, , “Aristotle,” pp. 111–13.Google Scholar

45 See Politics 1323a39–b37.

46 Such circumstances are described at 1326alff.

47 пλὴν ανευ μὲν των пϱων αδύνατον ειναι пόλιν, ανευ δὲ τοότων οικεισΘαι καλως (1283 a21).

48 See above, p. 66.

49 “The reason why such constitutions must necessarily be пαϱεκβάσεις is not on the present account “that they contravene τὸ αпλῶς δίκαιον,” Newman, , Politics, v. 3, pp. 232–33.Google Scholar The perspective here is no longer that of the simply just but rather political justice.

50 Strauss, Leo, Natural Right and History (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1953), p. 160.Google Scholar

51 Newman, , Politics, v. 1, p. 250Google Scholar, note 1; Baker, , Political Thought, p. 346.Google Scholar

52 Ibid., p. 340, note 1.

53 Thus what the guardians are to do in “the city in speech” determines what they are to have— they will better perform their work without than with private possessions. Further the movement from better to worse regimes entails the collapse and reversal of this relation; it is the characteristic defect of oligarchy that what a man has determines what he shall do (551C). On this connection in the Republic, see Vlastos, Gregory, “Justice and Happiness in the Republic” in Plato: A Collection of Critical Essays II: Ethics, Politics and Philosophy of Art and Religion, ed, Vlastos, (New York: Doubleday, 1971), pp. 72–77.Google Scholar

54 See, e.g., Republic, 592b.

55 Republic, 520a–b.