Nearly two decades ago Aristide Zolberg suggested that the most visible feature of independent Africa might well be instability and not stability, cleavage and conflict rather than unity and consensus. This observation holds equally true today. The elusive formula assuring the establishment of a viable and integrative political order has eluded many African states. Their failure politically to institutionalise themselves and to forge ahead in the direction of national integration and socio-economic development has been documented in the voluminous literature that has sprung up since Zolberg's original analysis. Ravaged now by natural disasters, international conflict or civil war, and military coups, early expectations of a relatively smooth transition from colonialism to meaningful independence have been dashed. While striking exceptions do exist, neither the richer nor the more developed nations are necessarily assured of stability and unity, given the continental context of scarcity and conflict.

There are three basic contradictions in the Nigerian political system. They may be stated briefly at the outset. First, the machinery of government is basically regionalised, but the party machinery—the organisation of the masses—retains a strong trans-regional and anti-regional tendency. Secondly, the main opposition party has relied upon the support of a class-conscious regional power group in its drive against the system of regional power. Depending upon a regional section of the political class to effect a shift in the class content of power, it was really asking that section to commit suicide. This contradiction produced a crisis in the Western Region which might easily be repeated elsewhere. Thirdly, the constitutional allocation of power is inconsistent with the real distribution of power in society. The constitution gives dominant power to the numerical majority—i.e., under existing conditions, to the north—but the real distribution of power is determined by technological development, in which respect the south is superior.

This article argues that access to clientelistic networks is central to the ability of youth to engage in violent activities in Nigeria's oil-rich Delta. Even though the literature has demonstrated that the contradictions of oil wealth and economic neglect provide the backdrop for conflict in the region, the actual channels through which it becomes possible to activate incentives for violence have not been properly addressed. It also points out that a fixation on the narrative of resistance has undermined our ability to engage with other critical variables such as social codes of masculinity, survival and ‘becoming’ which play very central roles in animating violent networks in the region. Drawing evidence from interview data, the article uses the lived experiences of ‘ex-militants’ to highlight these points as well as to raise questions about the applications of neopatrimonial theory to governance projects in African states.

In criminal investigations by police officers in northern Ghana, the lines are fluid: civilians arrest suspects on their own, assuming the tasks of the police. Police officers are heavily influenced by civilians, often forming paid alliances with them. Yet such entanglements paradoxically enable state policing and integrate the police into society in a context of low resources and low legitimacy. Other practices limit and frame such transgressions. Using the concept of boundary work, this article analyses how actors maintain and negotiate the seemingly blurred distinction between state and society in West Africa.

Amílcar Cabral was perhaps the foremost political thinker to emerge out of the many independence movements of post-World War II Africa. His insightful theory of class struggle in the continent, his informative analysis of the history of Guinea-Bissau, his original concept of ‘class suicide’, and his notion of the relationship between national liberation and culture,1 helped convince many scholars of the viability of a class and ideological approach to the study of African politics.2

Zimbabwe today is the site of a surprisingly vigorous debate over the one-party state. Some students of Africa might find the issue stale and the conclusion foregone, but Zimbabweans do not look at their political future that way. The first task of this article is to present the arguments of the Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) in favour of one-party rule and the rebuttals this has provoked. Documenting this debate is worthwhile given various popular misconceptions about Zimbabwean political life; in addition, doing so sheds light on the character of political thinking in Africa. The arguments are also important enough and of sufficient interest to be assessed philosophically, and this is my second task. Since Z.A.N.U.(P.F.) officially embraces a Marxist ideology, I shall, in particular, scrutinise its case for one-party rule from within its own political-theoretical framework. I contend that Marxist theory does not dictate such a system of government, and that viewed from this perspective the arguments for it are flawed and the party's faith in it is problematic.

The immediate origins of the democratic elections held in Malawi in 1994, which brought to an end over 30 years of political dominance by President Kamuzu Banda and the Malawi Congress Party (MCP), lie in the unprecedented events which shook the entire nation in 1992. Although that turbulent year was characterised by industrial action, serious urban riots, student demonstrations, the emergence of new domestic political groupings, and the Government's agreement to hold a national referendum on the future of the one-party system in the country, in retrospect perhaps what was most remarkable about these developments was that they were sparked off by the Catholic Church, and that their momentum was sustained at crucial stages by other Christian denominations in Malawi.1

What determines people's willingness to consider punishment for human rights abusers? This article investigates this question in the context of Zimbabwe in the aftermath of the country's violent presidential election campaign of June 2008. Based on a national probability sample survey, the paper shows that exposure to violence was reportedly widespread and that attitudes to transitional justice are mixed. In considering how to handle abuses, Zimbabweans weigh the pros and cons carefully and, recognising that peace and justice are difficult to obtain simultaneously, generally prefer the former. The article analyses the various factors that together predict a citizen's proclivity to claim transitional justice in its most demanding retributive form. Reflecting power relations, the results indicate that political partisanship is almost as important as individuals’ personal experience of actual and threatened acts of violence.

In Uganda, as in many other African countries, increasing numbers of 15–24 year olds are migrating to urban areas to look for work and educational opportunities. We explore the shifting sense of identity amongst youth migrants in Uganda as they struggle to reconcile the differences in social norms between the rural settings in which they are brought up and the urban environment in which they now live. The experience of migration significantly impacts on the transition from youths to adults by influencing their perception of their own identity as well as the expectations of society. Young people often hold conflicting views of their rural and urban experiences, suggesting that understanding rural and urban realities as distinct entities does not reflect the complex relationship, and possible confusion, of the migrant experience. In contrast to existing literature on migrant identities, which has tended to focus on the identity shift experienced by adult transnational migrants, this reveals the particular challenges faced by youth migrants whose adult self is not yet formed.

‘The events of recent years have brought out the conflicts that can arise between the continuing pressures for political independence and the inescapable truths of economic interdependence in the modern world’. – Recent words from the horse's mouth, to wit the British– North American Committee, consisting of some 100 leading industrialists of the western world who view with alarm the strong desire on the part of the emerging nations to exercise ever-greater control over their own mineral resources. In a concise report, they sternly remind the governments of developing countries of the dire consequences of the hostile attitude to foreign investors as expressed in demands for higher taxes, more local participation, and – Heaven forbid – nationalisation.1

Managers are increasingly seen as having a critically important rôle to play in development and nation-building,1 and doubts concerning the appropriateness of transferring western ideas and practices to third-world countries are assuming urgent significance. Questions are posed about the impact of social and cultural factors on the management of organisations, and about relationships, between managerial thinking and behaviour and the national stage of economic growth. For example, A. Gladstone asserts that management is a key determinant in development in Africa's new nations, and notes that there has been little research and analysis concerning the evolving state of the managerial art in Africa, both in terms of what exists and what is needed … while management training for Africans has developed considerably, is this training the most appropriate? To what extent should traditional African management be discarded… are the various modern Western approaches relevant and effective in the setting up of African enterprises?2

On 30 May 1967, Lt.-Col. C. Odumegwu Ojukwu, Military Governor of Nigeria's Eastern Region, announced the secession of Eastern Nigeria from the Federation and the creation of the sovereign and independent state called the Republic of Biafra. The birth of Biafra was the product of a long and bitter blood feud between the conservative, Muslim, Hausa-Fulani people of the North and the progressive, Christian Ibos of the East. The roots of the hostility are deep, but the immediate impetus for the break-up began with the military coup d' état of I 5 January 1966, in which the civilian régime of Prime Minister Tafawa Balewa was overthrown and several leaders assassinated.

The economic crisis of the 1970s in sub-Saharan Africa led to a critical evaluation of the rôle of government policies by international agencies, including two contrasting views of the problem by the Economic Commission for Africa/Organisation of African Unity and the World Bank. The E.C.A./O.A.U. largely placed the blame on the deteriorating external environment, emphasising the reduction of income inequality, poverty, and unemployment through a continuation of the state-led introverted development strategy of the previous decade. The World Bank responded in the opposite direction, mainly blaming the inappropriate state policies of the post-independence period, while encouraging a re-focus on economic growth through a structural reversal of the state-imposed impediments to the efficient operations of markets.

The Ethiopian transition, that began with the overthrow of military dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam in May 1991, formally ended with the swearing in of the newly elected Government of the Federal Republic of Ethiopia in August 1995. The intervening four years were a contentious time of clashes among rival political forces to determine the rules under which the transition would be conducted and hence which forces would be favoured. The first act of the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) after deposing Mengistu was to convene a National Conference and establish a Council of Representatives that initially included a wide array of political groups. The EPRDF led throughout this transitional period and capitalised on its commanding position to consolidate its power. The party dominated the political landscape by virtue of its military power, effective organisation and leadership, and control of the agenda and rules of competition. It structured the transition around new ethnically defined regions, a constitution that emphasised self-determination, and a series of largely uncontested elections.

This study focuses on the relationship between political symbols and the legitimation of national leadership in Ghana, Guinea, Senegal, and Sierra Leone. We are particularly interested in ways in which their leaders have used myths and symbols in an attempt to foster or enhance the legitimacy of their régimes in the face of severe economic and political crises.

In December 2015, the African Union (AU) took the unprecedented step of threatening to use military force against the government of Burundi's wishes in order to protect civilians caught up in the country's intensifying domestic crisis. This article traces the background to this decision and analyses the effectiveness and credibility of the AU's use of coercive diplomacy as a tool of conflict management. After its usual range of conflict management tools failed to stem the Burundian crisis, the AU Commission and Peace and Security Council tried a new type of military compellence by invoking Article 4(h) of the Union's Constitutive Act. We argue that the threatened intervention never materialised because of (1) the Burundian government's astute diplomacy and (2) several African autocrats’ resistance to setting a precedent for future interventions where concerns about civilian protection might override state sovereignty.

This article analyses the nature of ideology in Nigeria and relates ideological competition to conflict between federal and local (especially urban) interests. It is argued that two strong ideologies exist: nationalism and populism. These two perspectives provide competing justifications for authority, and reflect the contradictory interests held by local-urban politicians and by the functional élites that dominate federal politics.

The Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) has maintained a super-majority in the National Assembly for over forty years despite increasingly competitive elections. Several factors contribute to the BDP's continued legislative dominance, including features of the electoral system, fragmentation of the party system, and obstacles to strategic voting behaviour. Factional competition has played a particularly important role. Botswana's political institutions encourage factional competition, and factionalism interacts with the electoral system to hinder consolidation of the party system. Botswana's experience underlines the importance of internal party dynamics and their interaction with features of the electoral and party system in enabling the persistence of legislative dominance in competitive electoral systems.

The paper is concerned with the unintended consequences of aid as a relation of governance: in this case, the failure of aid agencies to improve the lot of displaced Southerners living in North Sudan after more than a decade of engagement. It is argued that aid, as a governance relation, is complicit with wider forms of oppression to which Southerners are subject. The aid-based IDP (Internally Displaced Person) identity, for example, resonates with state forms of deculturation. At the same time, developmental ideas of self-sufficiency articulate with the commercial need for cheap agricultural labour. Developmental strategies have tended to reinforce the subordination of displaced Southerners rather than enhancing their autonomy. Examples of this collateral effect are examined in relation to share-cropping, food aid, debt and asset stripping. The paper ends by calling into question the appropriateness of aid as a vehicle for a shared duty of care.

The example of Zimbabwe in 2000 shows that in a context of violent election campaigning, the role of international election observation is an ambiguous one. Unlike earlier elections organised by the Zimbabwean government, international donors wanted to observe its 2000 parliamentary election amidst a deepening crisis. They noted that the elections would not be free and fair in their view. Neighbouring countries with a more positive view joined the observation exercise. The government's discriminatory invitation and accreditation policy, the observers' emphasis on the peacefulness of the polling rather than free and fair elections, and the selective publication of their reports in various media, were affected both by the political agendas of the domestic players and by the governments which sent the observers. The difference between the Western view of the government, which had changed drastically since the 1980s and early 1990s, and the view of neighbouring governments, was crucial and may become significant elsewhere in Africa.