Just as 1960 was characterised by independence and 1966 by military coups, so 1990 marked a cautious move in many states away from excessive centralisation towards a distribution of political power. Multi-party elections were held, or scheduled, in countries as diverse as Benin, Gabon, Somalia, Zaïre, and Zambia. The partial liberalisation these represented did not amount to a full transition to democracy — indeed, they did not amount to anything positive in some cases — but they did suggest that a potential rebalancing of certain aspects of political power was possible, if not probable. Since then, have any significant changes taken place in police systems and behaviour, and/or in the organisation of internal security? This article suggests some of the variables requiring discussion, and indicates areas for future research.

The example of Zimbabwe in 2000 shows that in a context of violent election campaigning, the role of international election observation is an ambiguous one. Unlike earlier elections organised by the Zimbabwean government, international donors wanted to observe its 2000 parliamentary election amidst a deepening crisis. They noted that the elections would not be free and fair in their view. Neighbouring countries with a more positive view joined the observation exercise. The government's discriminatory invitation and accreditation policy, the observers' emphasis on the peacefulness of the polling rather than free and fair elections, and the selective publication of their reports in various media, were affected both by the political agendas of the domestic players and by the governments which sent the observers. The difference between the Western view of the government, which had changed drastically since the 1980s and early 1990s, and the view of neighbouring governments, was crucial and may become significant elsewhere in Africa.

The paper is concerned with the unintended consequences of aid as a relation of governance: in this case, the failure of aid agencies to improve the lot of displaced Southerners living in North Sudan after more than a decade of engagement. It is argued that aid, as a governance relation, is complicit with wider forms of oppression to which Southerners are subject. The aid-based IDP (Internally Displaced Person) identity, for example, resonates with state forms of deculturation. At the same time, developmental ideas of self-sufficiency articulate with the commercial need for cheap agricultural labour. Developmental strategies have tended to reinforce the subordination of displaced Southerners rather than enhancing their autonomy. Examples of this collateral effect are examined in relation to share-cropping, food aid, debt and asset stripping. The paper ends by calling into question the appropriateness of aid as a vehicle for a shared duty of care.

The Ethiopian transition, that began with the overthrow of military dictator Mengistu Haile Mariam in May 1991, formally ended with the swearing in of the newly elected Government of the Federal Republic of Ethiopia in August 1995. The intervening four years were a contentious time of clashes among rival political forces to determine the rules under which the transition would be conducted and hence which forces would be favoured. The first act of the Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) after deposing Mengistu was to convene a National Conference and establish a Council of Representatives that initially included a wide array of political groups. The EPRDF led throughout this transitional period and capitalised on its commanding position to consolidate its power. The party dominated the political landscape by virtue of its military power, effective organisation and leadership, and control of the agenda and rules of competition. It structured the transition around new ethnically defined regions, a constitution that emphasised self-determination, and a series of largely uncontested elections.

The Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) has maintained a super-majority in the National Assembly for over forty years despite increasingly competitive elections. Several factors contribute to the BDP's continued legislative dominance, including features of the electoral system, fragmentation of the party system, and obstacles to strategic voting behaviour. Factional competition has played a particularly important role. Botswana's political institutions encourage factional competition, and factionalism interacts with the electoral system to hinder consolidation of the party system. Botswana's experience underlines the importance of internal party dynamics and their interaction with features of the electoral and party system in enabling the persistence of legislative dominance in competitive electoral systems.

The growth of business classes in Africa has attracted much interest since the 1980s when, in the context of severe economic malaise, the impact of the state on development was subjected to critical reappraisal.1 Out of this emerged a consensus that the abysmal economic record of the 1960s and 1970s could, to a large degree, be ascribed to the debilitating effect of an overstretched and swollen state. Official development thinking took this argument the furthest: at the core of the problem, it was asserted, was the expansion of the state's rôle from the preferred minimalist function of providing the legal and macro-economic regulatory framework for capital accumulation, to a more profound intervention in the productive process. As a remedy, the state would have to be restrained from usurping the primary rôle which the market's invisible hand ought to be playing.2

This article makes two major claims. The first is that independent Botswana was able to generate and sustain a type of developmental state because of the presence of an indigenous initiator state culture that was preserved by the Protectorate state and was inherited by the post-colonial state elites. The second is that the non-emergence of the developmental state in post-colonial Zimbabwe is explained by the presence of a non-initiator indigenous state culture which was preserved by the Rhodesian colonial state and was inherited by the post-colonial state elites. The article briefly reviews the literature, analyses the Tswana and Shona pre-colonial state cultures, and shows that these were preserved by the colonial states and inherited by the nationalist politicians.

AFFIRMATIVE action in South Africa – sometimes referred to by euphemisms such as ‘corrective action’, ‘reverse discrimination’, or ‘positive action’ – can be understood as a remedial strategy which seeks to address the legal historical exclusion of a majority. Unlike most other countries in which minorities are targeted, in South Africa a previously disenfranchised majority is the beneficiary of such policies. Quite distinct from North American notions of affirmative action, a labour/union driven vision of transforming the living and working conditions of the majority competes with a narrower business advocacy of black advancement as managers in response to market demands. Little resistance is found among white-owned corporations to broaden their recruitment pool by including qualified blacks and women.

The brutal nine-year conflict in Sierra Leone has defied both military solutions adopted by various governments and peace accords imposed by the international community and regional powers. The latest casualty is the controversial Lomé Accord, which gave power and amnesty to the rebels in a power-sharing government. This article offers explanations for the failures by focusing on the interplay between the policy choices of decision-makers and the country's governance institutions and social structure. The policies of decision-makers can have negative consequences on societies if they are grounded on institutions that are at variance with a country's social structure. The article develops three main arguments to support this conclusion. First, the country's bipolar ethnic structure and majoritarian presidential system of government act as serious constraints on policies that seek to forge a national coalition to end the war. Second, conventional armies in ethnically polarised settings are a poor instrument for fighting rebel groups that deliberately use mass abductions and terror as war strategies. Third, peacemakers do not understand the institutional contexts in which violence-prone rebel groups can be made to reclaim their humanity and observe peace agreements. The logic of the interconnections between territory, resources and civilisation suggests that Sierra Leone's rebels are unlikely to accept disarmament and honour the democratic road to peace.

In 2000, Ghana's landmark elections ushered in a new era of democracy. Scholars, however, have yet to scrutinise the structural underpinnings of the country's electoral system. This article offers a detailed assessment of Ghana's bloated voters' register, patterns of voter turnout and the lingering accusation of electoral irregularities in the Volta and Ashanti Regions in the 2000 elections. Most significantly, it critically analyses the severe malapportionment of the country's 200 parliamentary seats. While the 2000 elections helped to consolidate the democratic process in Ghana, structural inequalities continue to plague the country's electoral system.

The press in Tanzania mirrors the political consciousness of a newly independent state and reflects some of the ambiguities that accompany political articulation in a one-party democracy. In this analysis of the four daily newspapers, special attention has been given to the ‘news geography’ which is presented in an attempt to anticipate the world image or ‘psychological geography’ which results from reading the daily newspaper. For even the selection of what news to print reflects the tensions and conflicts between an ideal news policy and the limitations imposed by the lack of funds, personnel, and the influence of the western news services.

Over the last decade or so scholars in the social sciences have been reassessing works on the rise of nationalism in Africa published in the 1960s and early 1970s. These earlier studies, written during the euphoria following independence and the spread of liberation ideology, regarded the transfer of power to the African élite as signalling the end of subjugation to European control and the emergence of modern African states.1 This revision focused on the post-colonial state and its rôle as a mediator between competing groups for power and the allocation of resources.2 Since then, the trend has generated a revival in understanding ethnicity which is again seen as a major force in most of the crises which have troubled Africa.

The Mbeki government's failure to take action against the blatantly undemocratic behaviour of the Mugabe regime in Zimbabwe, despite its commitment to the peer review mechanism proposed under the New Partnership for African Development, is highlighted by South Africa's armed intervention into Lesotho to quell post-electoral disturbances in 1998. Although initially accompanied by immense controversy, the South African military and diplomatic involvement was to prove crucial to a restructuring of Lesotho's previously recalcitrant Defence Force, and to the promotion of inter-party negotiations that led to the adoption of a new and more appropriate electoral system. Alongside other international pressures, these initiatives led to a further election in 2002, whose undoubtedly legitimate outcome appears to have laid firm foundations for democratic consolidation and stability. Despite this ‘unlikely success’, and despite its formal commitment to an idealist foreign policy, the South African government has consciously downplayed its role in promoting democracy in Lesotho. The article argues that this is because of the exceptionality of that country, and South Africa's reluctance to have the use of force used as a precedent by its critics for cajoling it into adopting a more activist stance for dealing with the more complex situation in Zimbabwe.

This paper analyses the declining importance of political parties in the Central African Republic (CAR). The country can be considered an extreme example of the lack of viability of a state in general, and democracy in particular. However, the quality of elections has exceeded the average in the sub-region over a substantial time-span. Hopes for a democratic future only faded in recent years. The paper hypothesises that both political parties and rebel movements are failing to adequately represent (ethnoregional) interests, but that parties are suffering more in the course of the enduring war and the peace process. Patterns of elite behaviour are presented as the main explanation for the resulting crisis of representation, with international actors' preference for inclusionary power-sharing deals seen as the main aggravating factor.

Whilst the middle class are often heralded as forerunners for consolidating democracy, the experiences of Kikuyu in Kenya's 2013 election reveal how under-problematised the socio-economic group is for understanding the pressures faced in voting. The article presents evidence from diary entries of young middle class Kikuyu residing in Nairobi who recorded their feelings and impressions across a period of one month surrounding the country's elections. The diary writers describe the key moments at which they felt the need to switch from supporting third-placed presidential hopefuls to supporting one of the two favourites. Topics felt to pressure voters most keenly were ethnicity, social media, debate surrounding the International Criminal Court and the lack of confidence in others of the middle class. Unlike election analyses which assume static preferences and voting blocks, this methodology allows exploration of the ongoing negotiations and deliberations that influence voting intentions over time. The tensions felt by middle class Kikuyu during the election period made them wish they were members of either of the two other classes, who were in turn viewed as able to influence politics through money or popular power. These feelings of disempowerment ensured voting attitudes fell closely in line with ethnic affiliations, despite members of the middle class remaining wholly dissatisfied with ethnic labelling throughout. It is argued that the economic autonomy of middle class voters did not help disengage them from political tribalism in assessing how to vote.

Sierra Leone has recently emerged from a long period of political instability and civil war, and is ranked among the world's poorest countries. Thousands of displaced people are in the process of returning to their villages to rebuild their mainly farming-based livelihoods, and many are growing food crops for the first time in a decade. With pressure on food production increasing in rural areas, the inland valley swamps have been identified by the government as a vital resource for sustaining rural livelihoods and achieving food security through the production of rice and other commodities. However, previous government policies directed at enhanced wetland production have largely failed to achieve their goals, and have been criticised for neglecting the institutional challenges of development. Drawing on recent fieldwork carried out in two rural communities in the Eastern Province, this paper considers how institutional arrangements function in Sierra Leone's swamp wetlands, and explores how stresses associated with a post-conflict environment are shaping land-use decisions and mediating access to resources in new ways. The findings of the enquiry have implications for Sierra Leone's recently adopted commitment to decentralisation, a move that has, in theory, seen the state strengthen its position at the local level, and will allegedly create new spaces for increased interaction between state agencies, traditional leaders and communities. Two institutional challenges are examined – access to land and access to labour – that must be addressed if decentralised reforms to resource management are to be effective for wetland rice production. The analysis concludes by considering one recent initiative at the forefront of efforts to decentralise the Ministry of Agriculture, the ‘Agricultural Business Unit’ (ABU) initiative, to elucidate some of the challenges faced in post-conflict wetland rehabilitation.

The Mozambican Land Law of 1997 intends to provide flexible rules of access to land, while securing local people's customary rights, as well as equal rights for women and men. Drawing on participant observation during a ‘land delimitation’ process in central Mozambique, this article analyses the complex negotiation ensuing from the implementation of the Land Law in a local community. It shows how the delimitation process provided spaces for asserting – male – roles of power and authority, while local women were increasingly marginalised in the process. By presenting oral testimonies from women in the community, the authors seek to balance the account, providing women's perspectives on the highly gendered character of interests in, access to, and exclusion from land. The analysis ends with the question: What would be required to provide a space for local women to articulate their interests in a secure access to land during the delimitation process itself?

Hunger is the most immediate, visible, and compelling symptom of a continent-wide agricultural breakdown in tropical Africa. The crisis of food deficits has now become so perennial and so widespread that it can no longer be understood as the outcome of particular political or climatic occurrences such as wars, ethnic strife, or drought. SubSaharan Africa is the only region in the world where food production per capita has declined during the past two decades. As a result, the average calorie intake per capita has now fallen below minimal nutritional standards in a majority of African countries. By current estimates, approximately 150 million out of Africa's 450 million people suffer from some form of malnutrition originating in an inadequate supply of foodstuffs. This abysmal picture is further highlighted by the fact that the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations recently indicated that no fewer than 28 African countries were faced with food shortages so critical that further famine might occur imminently. This stark reality challenges fundamentally our earlier assumptions about the possibility of economic devlopment.

Historians, political scientists, and scholars in other fields will be occupied for years to come, seeking to understand why and how the Biafra conflict began. Clues and anticipations will be sought in antecedent events and, at present, the Kano riots of May 1953 are generally regarded as having been the first major outburst of violence between Northern Nigerians and those who later assumed the name of Biafrans. Without wishing to detract from the enormity of the Kano events, I feel it is necessary to place on record the following neglected episode in the history of conflict between these peoples.

Most African states have been engaged in market-oriented economic reforms for the better part of a decade, if not longer. One characteristic of their liberalisation efforts that stands out in empirical studies is the unevenness with which measures have been agreed and implemented. But how do we understand what has been proposed and pursued? Who have been the principal players, what have been their motivations and strategies, when have they been able to influence the choices to be made, and have these conditioned the environment for successive proposals? In short, what are the dynamics of economic liberalisation in contemporary African economics, and what are the prospects for the durability and extension of market-oriented reforms? These questions motivate reflections on the checkered history of agricultural liberalisation in Madagascar.