Much has been written and assumed about the impact of World War II on the political consciousness of African soldiers. It has been stated that as a result of their military service the veterans developed a new political awareness, and that consequently they played a singnificant rôle in the nascent nationalist movements of the post-war period. This argument has been presented more persuasively for East Africa, although some of the evidence produced to support the thesis appears at times rather thin. It has been strongly contested for West Africa.

Since 1950, the rise of African national movements and the attainment of independence has been paralleled by an equally rapid growth in the number and scope of national development plans. Such a plan is viewed by almost all African states as one of the standard attributes of sovereignty.1

True, economic planning preceded independence. Indeed Ghana (then the Gold Coast) had its first, 10-year economic plan in 1919, and the British adoption of colonial economic development planning as a desired standard policy dates back to 1939–40. However, the rapid postwar surge of colonial public expenditure plans was closely related to attempts first to counter the popularity of the nationalist movements and later to strengthen the economic infrastructure during the terminal colonial phrase prior to independence.2

Community forest management is often advanced as a remedy for failing top-down approaches to nature conservation. Contingent on the property rights theory, it assumes that local participation in natural resource management results in sustainable structures. There is, however, insufficient empirical evidence on the intra-community dynamics – especially when households have unequal access to the local institutions managing the natural resource. This paper looks at the socio-cultural, economic and institutional situation of households with and without access to management institutions in communities around the Kilum-Ijim Mountain Forest in Cameroon and analyses whether livelihood differences are associated with variations in management patterns. The analysis reveals differences by household type and a mixed picture of the evolution of species in the community forests over time, questioning the role of the community in natural resource conservation. Furthermore, the paper discusses the potentials of wildlife domestication for livelihoods and conservation in forest communities. The results are important in the light of ongoing conservation efforts in natural resource hot-spots in sub-Saharan Africa.

In April 1992, after nearly 11 years of military rule in Ghana, a draft democratic constitution of the Fourth Republic was overwhelmingly approved in a national referendum.1 The ban on multi-party politics was lifted by the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) Government in the following month. An independent interim National Electoral Commission was established, and a hotly contested presidential election in 200 constituencies monitored by teams of international observers was held in November 1992. After multi-party parliamentary elections to the National Assembly, boycotted unfortunately by opposition groups, the democratically elected Government of Ghana's Fourth Republic was inaugurated in January 1993.2

A COMMON premise in the study of central–local relations in new states is the belief that governments attempt to extend their authority into most areas of socio–economic and political life. By exerting influence within a variety of distinct spheres of activity throughout the national territory, central authorities are supposed to create connections between national institutions and potential arenas for the exercise of central power. These ‘structures’, such as local administration, political parties, schools, and programmes as diverse as agricultural extension and family planning, are intended to be the orgartisational skeleton of the new state. Their success in relating central authority to specific localities, political movements, and development problems is supposed to indicate the degree of institutionalisation of a regime and its level of development.1 Observers of this process examine the ‘penetration’ of public policy into local areas, the expansion of the influence of central authority on traditional political and administrative arrangements, and the gradual incorporation of the ‘periphery’ into the process of decision-making at the ‘centre’. While differing in form and content across national boundaries, the ‘crisis of penetration’ is understood to be a common experience in the political development of new states.2

The South African elections of 1994 constituted one of those rare historical moments when humankind made a significant step forward. The peaceful culmination of a liberation struggle, which for years many had feared would end in a bloodbath, registered not only a triumph for the democratic ideal but the resounding defeat of racism as an organising principle of government. If its more recent reference point was the collapse of dictatorial régimes throughout Eastern Europe during 1989–90, it can more distantly be identified as following in the grand tradition of 1789, confirming and extending and elaborating the ‘rights of man’. Yet historical ‘progress’ rarely unfolds in an uncomplicated way, and — however momentous and however much the external world may be willing it to succeed — South Africa's new democracy, by fairly general agreement, faces daunting tasks.

The landslide victory by the Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP) in the 2002 elections was due not to any ideological or policy differences with opposition parties, but to the perception among a plurality of voters that the party delivered on its promise to end the war and therefore deserved re-election. The elections were in effect a referendum on the incumbent president and his ruling SLPP, with voters overwhelmingly concluding that Ahmad Tejan Kabba, the SLPP leader, was preferable to the legion of certified scoundrels seeking to replace him. Signs of the All Peoples Congress (APC), the party that was in power from 1968–92, making a political comeback galvanised otherwise unenthusiastic voters into supporting Kabba and the SLPP. In contrast to the APC, against whom the rebel war was launched, or the Revolutionary United Front Party (RUFP), which initiated and prosecuted the insurgency, or the People's Liberation Party (PLP), whose earlier incarnation prolonged the war by colluding with rebels, Kabba and the SLPP claimed to have ended a war that was caused, launched and sustained by assorted elements of the political opposition. The SLPP, however, can ill-afford to bask in electoral triumph or ignore the festering problems of rampant official corruption and mass poverty that led to armed conflict in the 1990s. Tackling the problem of corruption and mass deprivation may hold the key to democratic consolidation, but it is doubtful whether the SLPP, as presently constituted, is capable of leading the fight against these scourges. The SLPP may be reaching out to become a national party but it still remains an unreconstructed patronage outfit that is unresponsive to popular currents and mass aspirations.

An emerging perspective on Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) in Zimbabwe is that increased authoritarianism in governance has enabled elite capture of wildlife resources and silenced local people's voices. This paper qualifies this perspective, showing how ordinary people continue to raise their concerns about local governance. In the Mbire district, people's interpretations of an upsurge in lion attacks on livestock and people in early 2010 took on a dimension of social commentary on the evolving governance arrangements in the district and beyond. Beneath an apparent human–wildlife conflict lie complex human–human conflicts about access to, and governance of, wildlife resources. Interpretations of the lion attacks built on two distinct epistemologies – a local religious discourse on spirit lions and an ecological one – but invariably construed outsiders as the ones accountable for local problems. This construction of outsiders is also a salient feature of Zimbabwean political discourse. Local voices thus constitute a widely understood discourse of protest.

The official result of Lesotho's general election of 1998, which saw a 79 out of 80 seat victory for the ruling Lesotho Congress of Democrats (LCD), was repudiated by the opposition, notably the former ruling Basotho National Party (BNP) and the Basutoland Congress Party (BCP). These latter parties were historic enemies but forged an alliance of convenience to contest the outcome of the election. By mobilising their supporters to occupy Maseru they successfully paralysed the capacity of the LCD to govern. After diplomatic preliminaries, this led to military intervention by South Africa and Botswana in September 1998 and their brokering of an agreement which restored the LCD to power, on the condition that a new election would be held within eighteen months, with the rules for that contest being discussed between the parties in the interim. That election has now been scheduled for April 2000.

The article reviews the conduct and result of the general election of 1998. It concludes that the opposition's objections were largely spurious, but notes that the unbalanced nature of the LCD's victory – a product of the first-past-the-post electoral system – was a major cause of the wider crisis. It therefore proposes that any lasting settlement of political differences in Lesotho is going to require a new electoral system which will allow for a more inclusive outcome.

The end of the cold war has coincided with, and in some cases fuelled, the politicisation of ethnically based nationalism, particularly in Eastern Europe and sub-Saharan Africa. The international political environment had previously been characterised by ideological competition and conflict between the United States on the one hand and the Soviet Union and Communist China on the other. Both of these ideological camps stressed the cohesion and viability of multi-ethnic nation-states, and as a matter of policy discouraged the representation of groups based upon a distinctive ethnic identity,1 a tendency reinforced in social science scholarship, which often focused on what was described as the process of national political integration. To the extent that it existed and was relevant, scholars generally agreed that ethnic solidarity was different from nationalism in that it did not require the creation of an ethnically pure nation-state. Today, however, the notion of the inviolability of certain internationally recognised entities is being seriously called into question as ethnic groups assert their right to self-determination up to, and including, separation from the multi-ethnic state.

Mauritius became independent on 12 March 1968, and was then said to be the paradigm of the small isolated, poor, dependent country, only emerging from the colonial era to fall immediately into neocolonialism – the Third World's Third World.

Switzerland is usually not looked upon as a substantial economic actor in Africa. Taking Zambian copper as a case study, we show how important Swiss companies have become in the global commodities trade and the services it depends on. While big Swiss trading firms such as Glencore and Trafigura have generated increasing scholarly and public interest, a multitude of Swiss companies is involved in logistics and transport of Zambian copper. Swiss extractivism, we argue, is a model case for trends in today's global capitalism. We highlight that servicification, a crucial element of African mining regimes today, creates new and more flexible opportunities for international companies to capture value in global production networks. These opportunities partly rely on business-friendly regulation and tax regimes in Northern countries, a fact which makes companies potentially vulnerable to reputation risks and offers opportunities to civil society actors criticising their role. New and different Swiss–Zambian connections emerge from civil society networks organising around companies’ economic activities.

A sparse literature examines African legislatures, generally thought to be weak and unimportant. Unlike many African countries that reintroduced multiparty politics in the 1990s, Senegal did so in the 1970s. In 2000, it joined the select group of African countries to experience democratic alternance. What role does the National Assembly play in light of these important steps in democratic consolidation? This article describes the operation of the National Assembly, with attention to its role in legislation, appropriations, executive oversight, constituent service and representation. The article concludes that despite Senegal's democratic advances, the operation of the National Assembly echoes much earlier studies of other African legislatures. These studies found that the legislatures did not play strong roles in legislation, appropriations or executive oversight, but instead played less formal roles such as constituent service and lobbying the administration for spending in their districts.

The ruling National Party (N.P.) asked white voters during the 1989 election campaign for a mandate to negotiate with all concerned about a new constitution, an undivided South Africa, one citizenship, equal votes, protection of minorities, and the removal of stumbling blocks such as discrimination against people of colour.1 Although the N.P. achieved a cleat majority – 93 seats against 39 for the Conservative Party (C.P.) and 33 for the Democratic Party (D.P.) – the right-wing opposition made destinct progress by gaining 17 seats. After the C.P had captured a further three from the N.P. in by-elections, including Potchefstroom in February 1992, President F. W. de Klerk announced in Parliament that whites would be asked the following month to vote in a referendum in order to remove any doubts about his mandate. The carefully worded question which the electorate had to answer was as follows: Do you support continuation of the reform process which the State President began on February 2, 1990 and which is aimed at a new constitution through negotiation?

The defeat of Amin and the liberation of Uganda by Nyerere's Tanzania is the most significant African event of the last decade. With it Africa came of age, able to criticise itself, no longer determined to support the honour of corrupt rulers against the world simply because they are black. Amin's buffoonery at last grew tiresome with surfeit. He was a clown who lived his life of power, self-indulgence, and tyranny to the utterance, making himself and his country a total jest, so that all the world must recognise the basic absurdity and iniquity of post-uhuru military régimes in Africa.

Since independence in 1974 the military of Guinea-Bissau have succeeded in controlling the political system, even attempting to impose their rule directly in the aftermath of the 1998/9 war. What makes the analysis of civil–military relations and political order in contemporary Guinea-Bissau particularly challenging is the overlapping of political, ethnic and personal considerations of the politico-military elite and their fluctuating and ambiguous short-term alliances. Guinea-Bissau's armed forces include an amalgam of veterans, claiming historical legitimacy from the liberation war, and officers who use their positions for personal gain rather than furthering democracy and national interests. This article examines the logic of civil–military relations against the heterarchical political figuration and the specific character of the politico-military elite of Guinea-Bissau.

Gambian irregular migration is a phenomenon that is well known and discussed within this small African nation, yet little is understood of the deep personal and socio-cultural motives to embark on the perilous journey across the Sahara towards Europe. This paper explores the ambitions and capabilities of Gambians who embark on irregular migration, or the so-called ‘backway’.

Nearly two decades ago Aristide Zolberg suggested that the most visible feature of independent Africa might well be instability and not stability, cleavage and conflict rather than unity and consensus. This observation holds equally true today. The elusive formula assuring the establishment of a viable and integrative political order has eluded many African states. Their failure politically to institutionalise themselves and to forge ahead in the direction of national integration and socio-economic development has been documented in the voluminous literature that has sprung up since Zolberg's original analysis. Ravaged now by natural disasters, international conflict or civil war, and military coups, early expectations of a relatively smooth transition from colonialism to meaningful independence have been dashed. While striking exceptions do exist, neither the richer nor the more developed nations are necessarily assured of stability and unity, given the continental context of scarcity and conflict.

This article problematises the role of the state in what is claimed to be the ‘flagship’ of the South African Spatial Development Initiative (SDI) programme, the Maputo Development Corridor (MDC). The purpose is to assess to what extent the state is best understood as a ‘transmission belt’ for transnational capital or as a ‘facilitator’ for development. The study reveals several flaws in the MDC which reinforce the role of the state as a transmission belt for transnational capital, rather than as a facilitator for development. For instance, the neo-liberal market fundamentalism and big-bang approach inherent in the MDC spells ‘jobless growth’. Similarly, the notion that ‘good governance is less government’, implies that the state is to a large extent reduced to an ‘investment promotion agency’. Having said this, the MDC does contain several novel and positive features, and its problematic aspects can be overcome through some strategic changes in the MDC approach. These may be summarised as a heavier focus on ‘development’, a more pro-active state, and more comprehensive and inclusive governance structures.

Zimbabwe today is the site of a surprisingly vigorous debate over the one-party state. Some students of Africa might find the issue stale and the conclusion foregone, but Zimbabweans do not look at their political future that way. The first task of this article is to present the arguments of the Zimbabwe African National Union (Patriotic Front) in favour of one-party rule and the rebuttals this has provoked. Documenting this debate is worthwhile given various popular misconceptions about Zimbabwean political life; in addition, doing so sheds light on the character of political thinking in Africa. The arguments are also important enough and of sufficient interest to be assessed philosophically, and this is my second task. Since Z.A.N.U.(P.F.) officially embraces a Marxist ideology, I shall, in particular, scrutinise its case for one-party rule from within its own political-theoretical framework. I contend that Marxist theory does not dictate such a system of government, and that viewed from this perspective the arguments for it are flawed and the party's faith in it is problematic.