The concept ‘integration’, which came into general usage in the social sciences by way of nineteenth-century evolutionary thought, was eagerly seized upon as an heuristic device for the study of new states because it evoked the fundamental notion of making whole or entire by addition or combination. But the concept wears better as a signal of topical concern than as a building block in a rigorous theoretical edifice. The most obvious problem is that the very richness of suggestion embodied in the word ‘integration’ generates promiscuity.

Since Nigeria's transition from military to civilian rule in 1999, the country's Supreme Court has risen from a position of relative political obscurity and institutional vulnerability into a prominent and independent adjudicator of inter-governmental disputes in this chronically conflicted federation. Examined here is the Court's arbitration, during President Olusegun Obasanjo's two civilian constitutional terms (1999–2007), of fifteen different federal-state litigations over offshore oil resources, revenue allocation, local governance and public order. The Court's federalism decisions were remarkably independent and reasonably balanced, upholding the constitutional supremacy of the Federal Government in several findings, tilting towards the states in some declarations, and simultaneously underwriting federal authority and state autonomy in other rulings. Despite the Court's important and independent role, however, the Nigerian federation was vexed by violent conflicts, underscoring the structural, political and constitutional constraints on judicial federalism in this notoriously complex and divided country.

The ongoing dynastic dispute in the kingdom of Dagbon in northern Ghana, which led to the killing of the king in 2002, remains unresolved and perhaps unresolvable. This paper updates Staniland's account of Dagomba politics from 1880 to 1974, and elaborates on the contradictions inherent in the social pluralism of a post-colonial state.

Democratic politics embraces, inevitably and inescapably, an uneasy tension between conflict and consensus. If liberal democracy is defined as the institutionalisation of regular competition for political offices and policies, then clearly, there cannot be democracy without conflict. On the other hand, precisely because constitutional democracy is the institutionalisation of conflict, it is vulnerable to the decay of political order – and of the very political liberties that distinguish it from other governmental forms – that may result when conflict becomes to intense. The containment of political conflict within certain boundaries of behavioural restraint has, therefore, long figured prominently in the writing of theorists on the conditions for stable democracy.

Kenya has for many years enjoyed a reputation for political stability, democratic institutions, lack of corruption, and economic growth, unlike a number of other countries in Africa. The Government has sought to emphasise this image in order to retain and attract foreign investment and aid, and to maintain a booming tourist industry. But for some time a corrosion of the rule of law has been taking place behind the facade of legitimacy, a process so accelerated during 1990 and 1991 that many people have questioned the validity of Kenya's reputation.

Mauritius' position within the global division of labour has changed considerably since the country gained its independence from Britain in 1968. This reflects change in the country's employment structure and a re-articulation within global chains of production. In a transformation led by the state, the formerly plantation-based economy has become a predominantly service- and manufacturing-based one. Mauritius has since set its sights on becoming a ‘cyber-island’, a regional hub for computer-based service provision. In charting this developmental route, the Mauritian state has had recourse to favourable socio-historical conditions. By highlighting these cultural influences on the globalisation of the Mauritian economy, this study affirms the value of analysing new divisions of labour as an aspect of the centuries-old process of globalisation.

In the 1990s, Senegal and South Africa undertook decentralisation reforms that caused a considerable stir in academic and policy communities. But how much decentralisation actually occurred, and how autonomous are subnational governments in two of Africa's leading democracies? This article assesses the mix of decentralising reforms in these two countries. Subnational officials are now elected and receive revenue transfers, but remain limited by other measures, including low tax-raising capacity, tight central control over spending, limited access to capital markets, and even insecure legal rights in their own jurisdictions. While the decline of governing parties provides incentives for decentralisation in some areas, central states successfully resist attempts to devolve fiscal decisionmaking authority to subnational levels.

This article examines the problems of elite capture in community-driven development (CDD). Drawing on two case studies of non-governmental organisation (NGO) intervention in rural Mozambique, the authors consider two important variables – (1) the diverse and complex contributions of local elites to CDD in different locations and (2) the roles that non-elites play in monitoring and controlling leader activities – to argue that donors should be cautious about automatically assuming the prevalence of malevolent patrimonialism and its ill-effects in their projects. This is because the ‘checks and balances’ on elite behaviour that exist within locally defined and historically rooted forms of community-based governance are likely to be more effective than those introduced by the external intervener.

General Smuts was one of the first to draw attention to the diverse and often conflicting principles applied to Africa by the various European colonial powers. In his Rhodes Memorial Lecture delivered at Oxford in 1929, Smuts made a plea for a survey of the whole situation to find a way to exchange information about Africa. This proposal developed into Lord Hailey's African Survey, published in 1936. After World War II, European governments began to think seriously of co-ordinating their efforts in Africa. In 1945 the French and the British engaged in mutual discussions and were joined two years later by the Belgians, the Portuguese, the South Africans, and the Rhodesians. Scientists working in Africa expressed the need for a framework for co-operation at the Royal Society's Empire Scientific Conference held in London in 1946. This led to the convening of the African Regional Scientific Conference in 1949, where scientists working in nearly every country in Africa south of the Sahara met to review the role, problems, and possibilities of co-operation.2

West African elites have successfully argued for an Economic Partnership Agreement Development Programme (EPADP) as part of free trade negotiations with the European Commission. ECOWAS officials state that the EPADP is necessary to realise the ‘development dimension’ of trade. In particular, they have (re)articulated Europe's own narratives relating to Aid for Trade and private sector development – insisting that the European Commission delivers on its promises. Accordingly, European negotiators have conceded the principle of the EPADP, stating that around €6·5 billion will be delivered. This article, however, examines the likely (in)capacity of the EPADP to meaningfully marry trade and development in the context of premature liberalisation under Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs). Crucially, it argues that West African extraversion in terms of EPADP resources may entrench predatory elites while locking-in ECOWAS states into inequitable trade structures that re-embed poverty in the region.

Despite a competitive party system and regular free-and-fair elections, Botswana's polity has been characterised for almost 30 years by considerable authoritarianism focused on the extensive powers of the Presidency and based upon a hierarchical and highly inequitable society.1 But pressures have recently arisen within the country for more openness, participation, and equality, and their growing effects were clearly evident in the October 1994 elections and in the widespread disturbances soon after.

The orthodox tradition in studies and explanations of lab our migration has been to adopt the perspective of those who move. Such a framework of analysis has then addressed itself to (i) the reasons why individuals and groups decide to migrate, and (ii) the consequences. As regards the first issue, it has generally been accepted that the phenomenon of migration is in response to economic forces that push and/or pull people out of their own communities into others – the ‘invisible hand of the market’. As for the second issue, emphasis is placed on the problematics of adjustment or assimilation into the host community, and also on the new values, as well as the other stimulants – good or bad – that the returning migrants bring home.

The purpose of this article is to elucidate the factors underlying the rise of political opposition against the régime of Mobutu Sese Seko, and this should help clarify the background to the Shaba wars of 1977–8. The major argument is that these factors are intimately related to two major aspects of a continuous political crisis in Zaïre today, namely: the democratic struggle against Mobutu's dictatorship and reign of terror, and the popular movement for a ‘second independence’. In order to substantiate this argument, the article traces the growth of organised opposition to four interrelated phenomena: (1) the ideological split in the anti-colonial nationalist movement between ‘radicals’ and ‘moderates’, (2) the leadership struggle among the moderates themselves, (3) the neo-colonial character and tasks of the post-colonial state, and (4) the autocratic nature of Mobutu's oppressive rule.

Ideological conflict between capitalism and socialism is more than 150 years old in the industrial countries of Europe and North America. Its gradual extension to other parts of the world during the twentieth century has entailed a basic alteration of the terms of debate. Within the leading industrial countries, partisans have debated both the economic merits of privately-owned productive capital, and the justice of profit-taking as a right of such ownership. In socialist thought, ‘social justice’ has meant that the whole product of labour belongs to those who actually produce it; hence its value should be realised by the producers themselves, either individually, or collectively through public institutions. On that basis, socialists have promised to construct an efficient, humane, and just social order. With equal conviction, proponents of capitalism hold that no alternative economic system produces as large a volume of goods, jobs, and other material benefits for as high a percentage of the population; that social inequality is inevitable, regardless of the property system in effect or the organisation of economic production; and that justice, in any case, is always individual, never ‘social’.

Growth-friendly egalitarian distribution of land and smallholder farming notwithstanding, rural Ethiopia continues to face an ever-deepening livelihoods crisis. This paper synthesises the theoretical and empirical literature on Ethiopian and other comparable land institutions, in search of a coherent economic framework for pinpointing the roots of the problem and a menu for sensible policy options. It argues that land privatisation, as an integral part of a second agrarian reform, is necessary for attaining optimal farm sizes, thicker markets and robust industrialisation. A sordid history of political marginalisation of the peasantry makes freehold a superior alternative to more secure state leasehold. For a thoroughgoing agricultural transformation, however, sufficiency entails substantial increases in public investment that are designed to crowd-in private investment. Ethiopia's market-led agricultural development strategy must focus on boosting sustainable growth while ensuring subsistence for all.

A common claim, in public discourses and in post-colonial theory, is that colonialism, and more recently the aid industry and the media, have created global hegemonic norms, which have been enforced on non-Western societies. While this may be true in some respects, this article takes a different stance on the debate. It scrutinises perceptions of Western-influenced social change in Uganda, and differentiates between discourses on Westernisation and discourses on neo-colonialism. Both are analysed as forms of social critique – one internally and the other externally oriented. The largely elitist discourse on neo-colonialism is explicitly critical of the West and its interventions in Uganda. But it is not representative of the more ambiguous perceptions of Westernisation among ‘ordinary’ people, who use references to the West to comment on contemporary Ugandan society. The article is based on empirical research in Northern Uganda. It focuses on discourses on gender, kinship and sexuality, and the recent debate on homosexuality.

Black politics in South Africa changed dramatically after 1976. It spread far and fast, with black organisations multiplying at all kinds of levels. The African National Congress (A.N.C.) returned and the United Democratic Front (U.D.F.) emerged. The trade unions strengthened considerably and black youths demonstrated their power. Ideologies changed and evolved. Yet at the same time as the movement broadened and deepened its hold on black people, internal divisions grew more intense. Organisational, ideological, and strategic differences became more bitter, and leaders continued to accuse each other of betraying the struggle.

Eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo's (DRC) artisanal mining sector is often linked to the violent conflicts that have beset Central Africa for over two decades. While many analyses emphasise its ‘criminal’ and ‘illegal’ nature, less attention has been paid to the ambiguity of this economy, most prominently incarnated by the intermediate mineral traders called négociants. Focusing on their entrepreneurship, networks and everyday activities, this essay offers a more nuanced understanding of local mineral trade in the context of a ‘crisis economy’ framed by competing governable orders. It investigates the uncertainty along eastern DRC's mineral supply chains, that are undergoing major regulatory changes to curb the trade of so-called ‘conflict minerals’. Drawing from extensive fieldwork, this essay demonstrates how this uncertainty shapes the négociants’ role as brokers of socio-economic life in the provinces of North and South Kivu.

This article attempts to explain the rural–urban voting patterns in the 1992 Ghanaian presidential election. In this election, rural voters voted overwhelmingly for the incumbent and urban voters did the opposite. It is argued that Ghana's Structural Adjustment Programme (1983–92) was distributionally favourable to rural households and unfavourable to urban households. A link is therefore drawn between the distributional impacts of the Structural Adjustment Programme and the voting patterns of rural and urban households.

The relationship between the state of the economy and the fortunes of political parties at the polls is one which has generated a lot of debate. This debate has largely taken place within the confines of Western democracies, not least because of the absence of Western-style democracy in many developing countries. We are, however, seeing a movement towards ‘democracy’ in many developing countries, with pressures for economic liberalisation going hand in glove with those for political liberalisation. The increasing democratisation by many African countries undertaking Structural Adjustment Programmes provides us with an opportunity to investigate the relationships between the welfare implications of these programmes and the voting behaviour of the electorate. Is voting behaviour in Africa any different from that in Western democracies?

In this article, I trace the emergence of Pentecostal FBOs in the South African city of Cape Town. By focusing on their involvements in HIV/AIDS programmes, including practices such as health education, counselling and material support, I analyse the organisational dynamics and consequences ensuing from their activities. Pentecostal involvements in development work engender complex connections between two distinct processes: On the one hand, they offer Pentecostal communities new social spaces for promoting their faith and moral agendas. On the other hand, development work urges Pentecostal communities to recast their activities in the logic of formal organisation and accountability (proposals–grants–projects). On the ground, these logics are constantly subverted as beneficiaries construe FBOs as patrons and deploy Pentecostal identities for mediating access to FBOs and the resources they command. My argument is that Pentecostal faith works to mediate the entire set of social relationships, expectations, imageries and practices that structure FBO work on the ground. More than belief and ritual, it is Pentecostal belonging that links organisations, people, opportunities and resources.