Scholarly concern with Africa is of ancient origin. But modern African studies in departments at major universities date only from the aftermath of World War II. As I approach the age of seventy, I find myself a member of the diminishing group of scholars that helped to create this particular field, as well as also belonging to the last generation which, at one time, wished to serve the British Empire. An intellectual autobiography is not a confession. But this brief account does seek to delineate those forces which shaped my career as an Africanist during the last 40 years.

Since mid-December 2013, thousands of people have been killed in armed conflict in South Sudan. The fighting is entrenched in a power struggle between the main political contenders ahead of elections which were scheduled for 2015. This article examines the violence in South Sudan since the North–South war ended with a focus on the consequences of the introduction of electoral politics. Our research contributes to the literature on state-building and peace-building in war-torn societies, by exploring how the extreme levels of violence are linked to three groups of factors. First, the stakes involved in being part of the government are extremely high, since it is the only way to secure political and economic influence. Second, the actors involved in political life are dominated by individuals who held positions within the rebel groups, which increases the risk of political differences turning violent. Third, the institutions important for a legitimate electoral process, and which work to prevent violence, are weak or non-existent.

The footwear sector in Ethiopia is dominated by cheap imports from Asia, particularly from China. This has inflicted heavy impacts on the sector, and threatened its competitiveness in the domestic market. This study examines the impact of imports and coping strategies of firms to withstand the competition. Firm level data were gathered from micro, small and medium footwear enterprises. The findings revealed that Chinese shoes are superior in design, price and quality, with the result that they have taken over the domestic market. The impact of Chinese imports on local producers varied from downsizing, bankruptcy, loss of assets and property, to downgrading activities and informalising operations. Firms have pursued coping strategies that focused on improving design and quality, as well as lowering prices and profit margins. Coping strategies appear to be differentiated by size of firms, and have some association with the performance of firms. The ways forward for local producers should focus on collaborative engagements of stakeholders and government to overcome the competitive disadvantages of firms. Training, technology, quality control, benchmarking and reorganization of production should be designed as a package of intervention. In addition, strengthening local producers to engage in collective actions and promoting exports should also be given proper attention.

In the global effort to strengthen national identification systems (SDG 16.9), biometric identification technologies and civil registration systems have been associated with different motives and applications, thus fuelling their competition for public attention and resources. The case of Ghana illustrates how these alternative systems, along with further sources of personal data, have recently been integrated into the larger political vision of a centralised, national population data system. Based on ethnographic fieldwork, the paper traces the difficulties and institutional negotiations that accompany this integration into a centralised population data infrastructure. Acknowledging how sets of actors, infrastructures and power relations are layered onto each other to unintended effects, the article describes the historical process of institutional and infrastructural harmonisation in the production of biometric population registers in Ghana.

This article examines the relationship between the politics of ethnicity and road construction in Hawassa, Ethiopia. The Ethiopian state has recently invested unprecedented amounts of money in the construction of urban roads. These roads both undermine and reinforce longstanding ethnic hierarchies within Ethiopian cities. Contrary to the image promoted by the state of harmony among residents of different ethnic backgrounds, our research revealed a great deal of tension, particularly concerning the distribution of benefits from state-led infrastructural development. The experiences of residents in rapidly changing neighbourhoods, demonstrate that the benefits of recent road construction are not necessarily distributed according to the policies of the current regime. Instead, historical inequalities interact with contemporary urban development in ways that may actually disrupt the state's vision of unity through diversity. Stratification is built into the city and attempts to reshape the city necessarily interact with recent and long-standing inequalities.

In 1992, several national newspapers in America and Europe ran headline stories which accused Jonas Savimbi, the leader of UNITA, the nationalist movement which had been locked in a vicious civil war with the MPLA–PT government of Angola, of conducting witchcraft trials and burnings of witches at his liberation base at Jamba. The revelations, provided by two high-ranking defectors from UNITA, caused an outcry among both critics and supporters, with all predicting Savimbi's ignominious defeat. Savimbi's longtime critics expected the latest scandal to deprive him of his remaining credibility, and predicted that the support he had gathered as a fighter for Angolan nationalism and a supporter of democracy would evaporate.

On the contrary, the incident had little impact on Savimbi's stature among his Ovimbundu supporters. Later that year he went on to win the majority of the Ovimbundu votes in the United Nations sponsored elections, and gained a chance to be in a run-off election against José Eduardo dos Santos for the presidency of Angola. Details about these and similar incidents which have taken place in Africa from the time of conquest reflect a political legacy that has deep roots in Africa's pre-colonial past. They also illustrate some of the fundamental differences that exist between African and Western conceptions of political behaviour and ideology that need to be addressed.

I have come to the conclusion that General Haji Idi Amin Dada is not a bizarre or maverick intrusion upon the Uganda political scene,1 but deeply and significantly entwined in it. I wish to present what appear to me to be the most important interrelated factors in the conventional functional sense, but to do so diachronically, so that they become continuous themes or forces,2 in which successive events have causative effect on one another.3 This raises all kinds of interesting theoretical and epistemological questions which I shall not be able to dispose of at the same time. I shall also be forced to be selective, without being able to justify each choice and step of the argument as it deserves. Central to my interpretation is the fact that General Amin is a Nubi, and that the history of the Nubi is important for the understanding of contemporary events. The present régime is more and more dominantly a Nubi régime, and its core strength is a Nubi strength.

Pan-Africanism has been described as ‘essentially a movement of emotions and ideas’,1 and this description is equally applicable to négritude, which is its cultural parallel. Indeed, no better phrase could be found to sum up its double nature, first as a psychological response to the social and cultural conditions of the ‘colonial situation’,2 and secondly as a fervent quest for a new and original orientation.

In the former respect, the imaginative writings of the French-speaking Negro intellectuals offer a precious testimony to the human problems and inner conflicts of the colonial situation; in the latter respect, their propaganda writing and other activities represent an effort to transcend the immediate conditions of this situation by a process of reflection. Négritude is thus at the same time a literary and an ideological movement.

Since the decolonisation process in the continent began after World War II, West Africa stands out as the only zone of ‘negative’ peace. This terminology merely implies that the formal absence of international wars has been precariously maintained on an unstable basis by threats, deterrence, and/or a lack of will or capability to enter into interstate hostilities. Leaving aside the liberation struggle waged by Guinea-Bissau against Portugal 1965–74, and with the exception of a very brief armed conflict between Mali and Burkina Faso, there have been no wars among the 16 member-states of the Economic Community of West African States (Ecowas), which is quite remarkable given the region's multi-ethnic and multinational character, and the persistence of numerous territorial disputes. This starkly contrasts with widespread internal violence, military coups, and virulent civil wars, notably in Nigeria 1967–70, Liberia 1990–6, and Sierra Leone 1993–6. As the title of this article implies, the convoluted reality of West Africa can be characterised by relative international peace, in contrast to domestic conflicts.

A fundamental dilemma has long lain at the heart of the Organisation of African Unity. Two contradictory principles have helped it maintain solidarity: the first recognises that domestic jurisdiction rests at the foundation of sovereign equality, while the second stresses that national policies such as apartheid have international consequences. These principles clash directly in the broad area of human rights.

What lessons on the broad issue of successful democratic transitions and consolidation can be drawn from the Senegalese experience? The most import ant inference from this case is that transition is a function not of one factor alone, or even one dominant factor, but a combination of dynamic changes including institutional design and modification, and the attitudes, values and beliefs of the population. In Senegal, modernisation and political culture change activated a movement towards the transition that only became possible as a result of institutional modifications. Institutional reform creates opportunities but does not ensure a successful transition. The issues of social capital, materialism/post-materialism, education, economic security, regime performance, value change, and confidence in institutions in general all come into play to varying degrees. The gradual creation of democratic institutions precedes and contributes to political culture change, independent of economic development. The article draws on survey data, a replication of the world values survey conducted in Senegal, and an analysis of institutional (electoral system) reforms over the last twenty-five years, with comparative data from other African countries.

On St Patrick's Day 1967 Sierra Leone went to the polls to elect a new parliament. Four days later, on 21 March, Brigadier David Lansana, head of the Sierra Leone army, seized power. After two more days, on 23 March, Lansana was repudiated by a group of senior army officers; this second coup was followed by the creation of a National Reformation Council, including five army officers and two senior police officials, which was to take control of the government. Almost the last multi-party democracy in independent black Africa had come to an end, cancelling the first peaceful change of government through the ballot-box. Lansana's action was in some respects less defensible than Ian Smith's U.D.I. in Rhodesia. Smith acted against the presumed wishes of a majority of Rhodesians; Lansana acted against the majority wish which had just been expressed. Smith did not, within minutes of taking power, send troops to fire on protesting crowds in the streets of the capital.

Tanzania is engaged in a struggle to become a democratic socialist and developed nation. The implications of socialist ideology for actual policy planning and implementation still have not been fully clarified. Certain questions concerning the economic base are especially important, in particular the desirable relationship of every citizen to the production processes of the country. The possibility of further alienation of the worker from the process of production in the context of nationalisation and state-controlled industrialisation has already been identified by several observers.1 The pervasive nature of the dual economy in the ‘development of under-development’ has also been analysed with respect to Tanzania.2 What is consistently disregarded, however, is the peculiar place of women in the midst of change and counter-change.

Press Corporation, a large diversified Malawian company, was the personal property of Kamuzu Banda who ruled Malawi as a dictator for thirty years from independence in 1964. The history of Press is analysed in order to generate insights into the relationship between politics and economics in Africa. Comparative references are made to the experience of East Asian countries, as there are important similarities between their development paths and that of Malawi under Banda. The activities of Press Corporation were, in general, similar to parastatal companies elsewhere in Africa but, unlike the latter, Press was profitable and viable as a commercial entity. This challenges the idea that there is a compelling logic in African patrimonialist politics which necessitates parasitism on the economy. The experience of Press points to the value of such large multisectoral companies, as they can mobilise scarce local savings and channel them as venture capital into areas where investment has large external benefits, while the discipline of the profit and loss account in the company is not lost.

Analysing the dynamics of agrarian change and economic diversification is central for understanding the current transformation of African countries under market reforms. This article examines the complex changes taking place in the densely populated Uluguru Mountains of Tanzania, and places the Uluguru case in the context of wider debates dealing with market liberalisation, economic diversification, poverty, and inequality. It argues that rural households are not ‘trapped in decline’ on the Uluguru Mountains, as depicted in previous literature. Under the harsh realities of farming in this area, households can improve their livelihoods in three ways – short of migrating and in addition to relying on remittances. These are to expand land cultivated in the surrounding plains, to experiment with alternative farming systems, and to increase non-farm income. Uluguru households are doing all of the above, with a certain degree of success. Economic diversification can thus play an important role in improving rural livelihoods in Tanzania and beyond, but this process is more likely to take place in locations with well-established economic ties and relatively good access to major markets.

The politically effervescent Frene Ginwalla has had to relinquish the editorship of The Standard in Tanzania, sacked by President Nyerere. The revolutionary wing of the student body of the University of Dar es Salaam has had its political claws blunted. Militantly zealous expatriates in Dar es Salaam have declined in influence. And those who used Uganda's problems following the January 1971 coup as an additional excuse for radical slogans have now been forced to cool down following the official rapprochement between the Governments of Tanzania and Uganda.

The creation in November 1979 of a Transitional Government of National Unity under the leadership of Wodei Goukouni was greeted by most observers with a sigh of relief and a measure of guarded optimism. The composition of the new régime in Chad, and especially the enhanced rôle of the defeated Sara south within it, may possibly stabilise a situation still exceedingly volatile and inherently unstable. Yet, as West Africa cautioned, ‘twenty years of government by a group unrepresentative of the country, pretending to fill the vacuum at the centre of power and doing so with conspicuous ineffectiveness, cannot be easily erased’.1 Even given the sincerity and goodwill of all 11 groups in the new power hierarchy – which is far from assured, because every conceivable opportunistic faction has been included – the attempt to bring unity and stability to a land that has never experienced either may easily founder against the harsh realities of sharp internal divisions.

The current international debate on aid to Africa seems to assume that public opinion matters, i.e. it presupposes the existence of a ‘bottom-up’ relationship between public opinion and aid policy. This paper shows that it is rather the other way round. It is only possible to understand the relationship between decision-making on aid and public opinion as a ‘top-down’ relationship. The conclusion is supported by case studies of five European aid donors: France, the UK, Germany, Denmark and the European Union. The ‘missing link’ between opinion and policy-making is mainly to be explained by the high degree of centralisation of decision-making and the weak link between government and society in this particular policy field. On the other hand, opinion surveys show that there are strong popular sentiments in Europe in favour of ‘helping the poor’. Also, surveys indicate that European public opinion believes that emergency assistance basically is the rationale for development aid. The humanitarian attitudes in favour of ‘helping the poor’ find an outlet in the growing amount of emergency assistance going to Africa, thus leaving decision-making on development aid to the elite in a typical top-down way.

While African civil society seemed a beacon of hope for democracy in the early 1990s, by the end of the decade many scholars had come to view it as extremely weak, lacking a domestic constituency and therefore any significant political or civic impact. Critics have been particularly concerned about urban-based ‘democracy and governance’ NGOs' limited influence on and connection with the rural majority of the citizenry. This article examines this question in Kenya, looking at four NGOs that have used civic education and paralegal programmes to establish a rural presence. Based on a survey of participants, it concludes that although the programmes are relatively new, they have begun to have a measurable impact on citizen understanding of politics, and have given the NGOs a noticeable rural presence. They have done so, however, by relying on ethnic, clan, partisan and other ‘non-civil’ networks to build supporters.

This paper discusses the principal findings of a new integrated dataset of transnational armed conflict in Africa. Existing Africa conflict datasets have systematically under-represented the extent of cross-border state support to belligerent parties in internal armed conflicts as well as the number of incidents of covert cross-border armed intervention and incidents of using armed force to threaten a neighbouring state. Based on the method of ‘redescribing’ datapoints in existing datasets, notably the Uppsala Conflict Data Project, the Transnational Conflict in Africa (TCA) data include numerous missing incidents of transnational armed conflict and reclassify many more. The data indicate that (i) trans-nationality is a major feature of armed conflict in Africa, (ii) most so-called ‘civil wars’ are internationalised and (iii) the dominant definitions of ‘interstate conflict’ and ‘civil war’ are too narrow to capture the particularities of Africa's wars. While conventional interstate war remains rare, interstate rivalry using military means is common. The dataset opens up a research agenda for studying the drivers, patterns and instruments of African interstate rivalries. These findings have important implications for conflict prevention, management and resolution policies.