Lewis discusses the dynamic mechanisms of emotional-cognitive integration. I argue that he neglects the self and its neural correlate. The self can be characterized as an emotional-cognitive unity, which may be accounted for by the interplay between anterior and posterior medial cortical regions. I propose that these regions form an anatomical, physiological, and psychological unity, the cortical midline structures (CMSs).

We would like to thank the commentators for their generous comments, valuable insights and helpful suggestions. We begin this response by discussing the selfishness axiom and the importance of the preferences, beliefs, and constraints framework as a way of modeling some of the proximate influences on human behavior. Next, we broaden the discussion to ultimate-level (that is evolutionary) explanations, where we review and clarify gene-culture coevolutionary theory, and then tackle the possibility that evolutionary approaches that exclude culture might be sufficient to explain the data. Finally, we consider various methodological and epistemological concerns expressed by our commentators.

The Walker model raises a number of questions, particularly about the nature of the sleep states involved in consolidation enhancement. While REM sleep, Stage 2 sleep, and Stage 3/4 sleep have been implicated in procedural learning, we still do not understand which types of learning are involved with specific sleep states. Several possible ideas for future research are suggested.

Matthew Walker's model overcomes the unrefined classical concept of consolidation as a unitary process. Presently still confined in its scope to selective data mainly referring to procedural motor learning, the model nonetheless provides a valuable starting point for further refinements, which would be required for a more comprehensive account of different types and aspects of human memory consolidation.

Emotion-science without basic brain-science is only superficially satisfying. Dynamic systems approaches to emotions presently provide a compelling metaphor that raises more difficult empirical questions than substantive scientific answers. How might we close the gap between theory and empirical observations? Such theoretical views still need to be guided by linear cross-species experimental approaches more easily implement in the laboratory.

We review evidence regarding Tomasello et al.'s proposal that individuals with autism understand intentions but fail socially because of a lack of motivation to share intentions. We argue that they are often motivated to understand others but fail because they lack the perceptual integration skills that are needed to apply their basically intact theory of mind skills in complex social situations.

Some implications of Tomasello et al.'s theory derive from incorporating a variant of a common assumption that humans are biologically adapted to take an intentional stance in relation to conspecifics. I argue that, rather than being cued, intentions and other dispositional states may be inferred logically from an evolved commitment to determinism and evidence of state-dependent behavior.

Cellular mechanisms hypothesized to underlie sleep-dependent memory consolidation are expressed throughout the brain during sleep. Use of sleep deprivation to evaluate the functional importance of these mechanisms is confounded by degradation in waking performance resulting from impaired vigilance. There is a need for methods that will permit disruption of specific mechanisms during sleep only in the neuronal circuits most critically involved in learning. This should be accomplished without global sleep disruption and with preservation of the restorative aspects of sleep.

Does Lewis imply that brain processes might be used to replace an as-yet-unavailable substantive organismic neuropsychology? To counteract this reductionist idea I argue for distinguishing between affects and emotions, and discuss a real-life example of implicit emotional appraisal. Failure to use organismic units of processing such as schemes or schemas makes the bridging attempt fall under a reductionist “mereological fallacy.”

We propose that sleep is linked to synaptic homeostasis. Specifically, we propose that: (1) Wakefulness is associated with synaptic potentiation in cortical circuits; (2) synaptic potentiation is tied to the homeostatic regulation of slow wave activity; (3) slow wave activity is associated with synaptic downscaling; and (4) synaptic downscaling is tied to several beneficial effects of sleep, including performance enhancement.

We find that the nature and origin of the proposed “dialogical cognitive representations” in the target article is not sufficiently clear. Our proposal is that (triadic) bodily mimesis and in particular mimetic schemas – prelinguistic representational, intersubjective structures, emerging through imitation but subsequently interiorized – can provide the necessary link between private sensory-motor experience and public language. In particular, we argue that shared intentionality requires triadic mimesis.

By emphasizing nonlinear dynamics between appraisal and emotions, Lewis's model provides a valuable platform for integrating psychological and neural perspectives on the emotion-cognition interface. In this commentary, I discuss the role of neuroscience in shaping new conceptualizations of emotion and the putative role of theta oscillation within frontocingulate pathways in depression, a syndrome in which emotion-cognition relations are dysfunctional.

the relative contributions of biological and cultural factors in determining category characteristics almost certainly vary for different categories, so that the results of these simulations on color categories don't necessarily generalize. it is suggested here that categories that pick out structure in the environment of strong behavioral significance to individual agents will be predominantly biologically determined and will converge without interagent communication, whereas those categories that serve primarily to coordinate behavior in a population will require communication to converge.

Although considerable attention has been paid to the possible involvement of sleep in memory processing, there is no substantial evidence for it. Walker describes a phenomenon of consolidation-based enhancement (CBE), whereby performance on select procedural tasks improves with overnight sleep; that is, without additional practice on the tasks. CBE, however, appears restricted to a few tasks, and even with these tasks CBE is not confined to sleep but also occurs during wakefulness. Sleep serves no unique role in this process. At best, CBE is a slow, time-dependent process of consolidation that begins with task acquisition in waking and can under some circumstances extend to sleep.

preferences for options that do not secure optimal outcomes, like the ones catalogued by sunstein, derive from two sources: cognitive heuristics and deontological rules. although rules may stem from automatic affective reactions, they are deliberately maintained. because strongly held convictions have important behavioral implications, it may be useful to regard cognitive heuristics and deontological rules as separate sources of nonconsequential judgment in the moral domain.

As Bruner so eloquently points out, and Gauvain echoes, human beings are unique in their “locality.” Individual groups of humans develop their own unique ways of symbolizing and doing things – and these can be very different from the ways of other groups, even those living quite nearby. Our attempt in the target article was to propose a theory of the social-cognitive and social-motivational bases of humans' ability and propensity to live in this local, that is, this cultural, way – which no other species does – focusing on such things as the ability to collaborate and to create shared material and symbolic artifacts.

steels & belpaeme (s&b) take technical and conceptual shortcuts that have significant negative consequences on simulation implementation and agent behavior. justifiably, their model represents a proof of concept of the role of culturalism in category formation; nevertheless, the absence of detailed information concerning the embodiment of agents and the superficial implementation of learning approaches make their results less relevant than they could be.

Although emotion may subserve social function, as with anger-maintaining dominance, emotions are more than variant cognitions. Anger promotes risk-taking, attention-narrowing, and cognitive impairment. The proposition that appraised “blameworthiness” is necessary for anger excludes young children's anger as well as adults' pain-induced anger. To be complete, any systems model of anger must account for its temporal characteristics, including escalation and persistence.

Following on from the target article, which presented a new model of procedural skill memory development, in this response I will reflect on issues raised by invited commentators and further expound attributes of the model. Discussion will focus on: evidence against sleep-dependent memory processing, definitions of memory stages and memory systems, and relationships between memory enhancement, sleep-stages, dreaming, circadian time, and sleep-disorders.

The issues addressed in this commentary include: (1) the appropriate conceptualization of “appraisal”; (2) the nature and unfolding of emotional episodes over time; (3) the interrelationships between the dynamic elements of the appraisal process and their effects on other emotion components, as well as repercussions on ongoing appraisal in a recursive process; and (4) the use of brain research to constrain and inform models of emotion.