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Cognitive heuristics and deontological rules

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  26 September 2005

Ilana Ritov
Ilana Ritov*
Affiliation:
School of Education, Hebrew University, 91905Jerusalem, Israel
*
[email protected]
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Abstract

preferences for options that do not secure optimal outcomes, like the ones catalogued by sunstein, derive from two sources: cognitive heuristics and deontological rules. although rules may stem from automatic affective reactions, they are deliberately maintained. because strongly held convictions have important behavioral implications, it may be useful to regard cognitive heuristics and deontological rules as separate sources of nonconsequential judgment in the moral domain.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 28 , Issue 4 , August 2005 , pp. 559 - 560
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2005

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