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Not a bridge but an organismic (general and causal) neuropsychology should make a difference in emotion theory

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  12 August 2005

Juan Pascual-Leone
Juan Pascual-Leone*
Affiliation:
Psychology Department, York University, Toronto, OntarioM3J 1P3, Canada
*
[email protected]
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Abstract:

Does Lewis imply that brain processes might be used to replace an as-yet-unavailable substantive organismic neuropsychology? To counteract this reductionist idea I argue for distinguishing between affects and emotions, and discuss a real-life example of implicit emotional appraisal. Failure to use organismic units of processing such as schemes or schemas makes the bridging attempt fall under a reductionist “mereological fallacy.”

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 28 , Issue 2 , April 2005 , pp. 213 - 214
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2005

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