Lewis makes a strong case for the interdependence and integration of emotion and cognitive processes. Yet, these processes exhibit considerable independence in early life, as well as in certain psychopathological conditions, suggesting that the capacity for their integration emerges as a function of development. In some circumstances, the concept of highly interactive emotion and cognitive systems seems a viable alternative hypothesis to the idea of systems integration.

the act/omission distinction is likely to lead to biases and be used as a moral heuristic. however, it is frequently difficult to determine whether this act/omission distinction is responsible for a judgment outside the lab. further, more encompassing theories of omission bias are needed to make progress in dealing with its harmful consequences. one such theory is briefly presented.

This commentary implicates the neostriatum in the production of the EEG sleep spindle and in the processing of motor procedural learning in sleep. Whether the sleep spindle may implement not only the consolidation-based enhancement of procedural learning, but also its initial consolidation, is considered; as is the fit between (1) corticostriatal anatomy and physiology, and (2) the physical properties of the sleep spindle.

Social animals need to share space and resources, whether sexual partners, parents, or food. Humans, however, are unique in the way they share as they evolved to become Homo negotiatus; a species that is prone to bargain and to dispute the value of things until some agreement is reached. This evolution had far-reaching consequences on the specific makeup of human psychology – a psychology that has for trademark a compulsive preoccupation with the self in relation to others. I propose that the understanding and sharing of intentions are probably the consequences of such evolution, and not its origins.

Henrich et al. reject the “selfishness axiom” within a narrowly-defined economic model, and are premature in claiming that they have demonstrated cross-cultural variability in “selfishness” as defined in broader evolutionary theory. We also question whether a key experimental condition, anonymity, can be maintained in the small, cohesive, social groupings employed in the study.

I discuss implications of Tomasello et al's hypothesis that humans exhibit distinctive collective intentionality for game-theoretic approaches to modeling human evolution. Representing the hypothesis game-theoretically forces a question about whether it implies only distinctively human motivations or both distinctive motivations and distinctive cognitive capacities for representation of intentions. I also note that the hypothesis explains uniquely human ideological conflict and invites game-theoretic modeling of this.

Alternative interpretations are proposed for the finding that market integration is positively related to fair behavior in experimental games. Market activities may produce market relevant concepts and stories that interpret experimental games as incidences of social exchange, and thus may enhance the relevance of (1) market-related preferences or (2) a decision heuristic designed for social exchange.

sunstein's review of research on moral heuristics is rich and informative – even without his central claim that individuals often commit moral errors. we question the value of positing such a normative moral framework for the study of moral judgment. we also propose an alternative standard for evaluating moral judgments – that of subjective rationality.

Lewis has missed an excellent opportunity to concisely demonstrate that a dynamical system can provide a bridge between emotion theory and neurobiology.

In this commentary the “incredibly robust” evidence for the relationship between sleep and procedural memory is questioned; inconsistencies in the existing data are pointed out. In addition, some suggestions about extending research are made, for example, studying REM sleep augmentation or memory consolidation in patients with sleep disorders. Last, the possibility of a relationship between dreaming and memory processes is discussed.

The dynamic developmental theory (DDT) has benefited from the insights of the commentators, particularly in terms of the implications for the proposed steepened delay gradients in attention-deficit/hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). The introduction of modified memory processes as a basis for the delay gradients improved the links to aspects of ADHD. However, it remains unclear whether the hyperactive-impulsive and inattentive subtypes are separate subgroups or may be explained as different outcomes of the same genetic factors and thus explicable by the same principles. The DDT suggests that altered reinforcement and extinction processes define an endophenotype in ADHD that can be related dimensionally to inattention, hyperactivity, and impulsivity. The relation between the suggested endophenotype, characterized by changes in basic learning mechanisms, and other endophenotypes characterized by delay aversion or response disinhibition, needs to be tested in future studies.

Lewis emphasizes the role of theta oscillations in emergent coupling among neural subsystems during emotionally relevant tasks or situations. Here I present some recent data on the relationship of rhythmic neuronal discharge in the supramammillary nucleus and the large-scale theta oscillations in the limbic system which provide support to many of his ideas regarding vertical integration in dynamic systems.

Examples are cited of group hunting in chimpanzees, lions, and hyenas consistent with evidence for intentionality, organization, and coordination. These challenge the claim for shared intentionality as uniquely human. Even when rarely performed in this way, the significance of such behaviors should not be minimized, especially if this level of “intelligent” action emerges spontaneously in the wild.

Does sleep restore brain function or does it consolidate memory? I argue that memory consolidation during sleep is an offshoot of restitution. Continual learning causes local synapse-specific neural fatigue, which then masks expression of that learning, especially on time-limited tests of procedural skills. Sleep serves to restore the fatigued synapses, revealing the consolidation-based enhancement observed as a “latent” overnight improvement in learning.

“Economic man” assumes not only self-interest, but also rationality of choices. The finding that ultimatum game offers can be explained by ambiguity aversion as well as pessimism, plus other findings, suggests the usefulness of taking bounded rationality more into account. Neurodevelopmental and heritability research supports the authors' emphasis on the importance of social learning and socialization.

Heuristics provide insight into the inconsistencies that characterize thinking related to the use of nonhuman animals. We examine paradoxes in judgments and policy related to the treatment of animals in science from a moral intuition perspective. Sunstein’s ideas are consistent with a model of animal-related ethical evaluation we developed twentyfive years ago and which appear readily formulated as moral heuristics.

the theory put forward by vallortigara & rogers (v&r) to explain the versatility of directional asymmetries at the population level argues that the strength of lateralization is controlled by social learning. this shaping of behavioral asymmetries by a non-stationary pressure probably involves a marked degree of neuroplasticity. i discuss the limits of neuroplasticity along with the evolution of the corpus callosum.

Initial claims that REM sleep is important in the consolidation of all memories have been revised and reduced to the claim that sleep has a role only in the consolidation of procedural learning. Now, Walker hypothesizes that sleep has no role in the “stabilization phase of consolidation” but only in the “enhanced learning” phase of procedural learning. Evidence for this vague, truncated hypothesis remains as inconsistent as that for prior claims.

by focusing on mistaken judgments, sunstein provides a theory of performance errors without a theory of moral competence. additionally, sunstein's objections to thought experiments like the footbridge and trolley problems are unsound. exotic and unfamiliar stimuli are used in theory construction throughout the cognitive sciences, and these problems enable us to uncover the implicit structure of our moral intuitions.

Tomasello et al. lay out a three-step ontogenetic pathway for infants' understanding of intentional action. By this account, before 9 months, infants do not understand actions as being goal directed. However, we caution against drawing strong conclusions from negative findings, and, based on recent findings, propose that a key aspect of goal knowledge is present well before 9 months.