I have attempted to provide a concept of societies that will foster productive cross-disciplinary discussions, namely one incorporating these three elements: (1) A mechanism for group identification, by which members distinguish those who belong from those who do not; (2) the potential for this membership to last for generations; and (3) control over a shared physical space. Herein, I respond to thoughtful commentaries from academics across the social and biological sciences, addressing their insights on the importance of identity in determining society boundaries, how institutions and nations relate to identity, the complications of territoriality as a definition component, how societies fragment, the workings of multitier sociality, and the significance of cooperation.

Moffett's definition of societies and fascinating comparisons will help us understand some aspects of societies that apply across species, however, both definitions and the dynamics of deeply rooted cultural institutions that so transformed human communities will be critical to understanding “societies.”

Shared group identifications can significantly subdivide populations. However, groups with mutual recognition may not be territorial. In the deep ocean, territoriality is absent but some species have important groups based upon shared identification. Control over access to physical space should be dropped from the definition of “society,” although “territorial society” could be retained as an important subcategory.

Moffett points to humans' use of physical markers to signal group identity as crucial to human society. We characterize the developmental and cognitive bases of this capacity, arguing that it is part of an early-emerging, intuitive socio-physical interface which allows the inanimate world to encode rich social meaning about individuals' identities, and the values of the society as a whole.

One of the key features of society is a sense of belonging to the same thing. But what should “what is the same” be? The article points out that categories, social roles, and place in power structures are primary to the sense of belonging, not secondary. And the criterion for belonging in society should be shared moral values.

The definition of society as identity group is most likely to be useful when combined with the instrumental functions of identity groupings. These take two key forms, with important differences. First, identity groupings are useful for individual decision making. Second, societies can be units of collective behavior and information processing. Disentanglement of these forms is needed.

Moffett's outstanding paper offers a thought-provoking definition of a human society as an identity group. This commentary reflects on the centrality of shared group identification in societies, and discusses two important phenomena related to group identity, that is (i) the perceived temporal persistence of the group, and (ii) the processes leading to group fragmentation and schism.

We present several arguments for the preeminence of social interactions in determining and giving shape to societies. In our view, a society can emerge from social interaction and relationship patterns without the need for establishing an a priori limit on who actually belongs to it. Markers of group identity are one element among many that allow societies to persist.

Identity formation and maintenance is a complex process operating at many levels, with identity markers and affiliations often contested, negotiated, rejected, revised, and replaced, both within and between groups, by parties with competing interests. This needs to be considered if identity is to serve as a useful criterion for defining society.

Moffett presents a robust proposal for a comparative study of societies as the basis for studying the human condition and behavior. This theoretical framework has implications for the study of deceptive behavior. I discuss how this framework might describe the adaptation of deceptive behavior within human societies and shed light on the dynamics of collaborative deceptive behavior through interpersonal commitment.

A clear definition of society helps prevent conceptual misunderstanding. When making practical measurement of societies, it is worth noting that social complexity is actually a jagged concept that encompasses multiple weakly correlated dimensions. Understanding such jaggedness assists interpretation of the divergence between anonymous societies and the social brain hypothesis.

To understand the nature and evolution of different kinds of societies, we must characterize the psychological mechanisms members use to identify who belongs. Across both individual recognition- and anonymous-societies, these range from physiological responses to individuals up to powerful conceptual representations of the group that license generalization and novel predictions. Sketching these mechanisms helps us understand the transition from the individual recognition societies of our ape ancestors to uniquely human forms of anonymous society.

Moffett contends that societies should be considered the “primary” group with respect to their social ramifications. Although intriguing, this claim suffers from insufficient clarity and evidence. Rather, if any group is to be crowned supreme it should surely be the family, with its unique capacity to encourage pro-group behavior, shape other groups, and provide meaning.

We expand on Moffett's discussion of societies in the context of multilevel social systems, for which Moffett proposes the core unit to constitute a society. Moffett's definition of a society, however, suggests that it is more parsimonious to assign this label to the upper (band) level. An understanding of multilevel systems is critical for informing discussions about what a society is.

Moffett's article asserts that human societies are distinct from other social groups because they must maintain control over specific territories. In our commentary, we challenge this argument, aiming to enrich it by highlighting the pivotal role of history and collective memories and their underestimated significance in shaping societies across time and beyond territorial ownership and resource control.

Moffett's paper is an important contribution to the multidisciplinary discussion of the notion of “society.” This comment aims to clarify and nuance some points considered important from an anthropological perspective. In particular, it stresses the importance of controlled social interaction and historical dynamics.

Moffett's definition of society is broadly applicable to all group-living animals from insects to nation states. Presenting examples from primates, I illustrate difficulties in defining boundaries between societies and even what societies defend to demonstrate the complexity of using an understanding of the processes effecting primate societies to understand those effecting human societies. However, finding similarities and differences in processes shaping societies is intriguing and Moffett's definition provides an excellent starting point.

Moffett's interdisciplinary definition of society seeks to distinguish itself from the prevalent, political understanding of the term. Through engagement with international relations literature, we outline how Moffett's proposed “society” results in a recapitulation of the definition of a nation-state. We suggest that this tension could be addressed by adopting a functional, rather than identity-based, approach.

We embrace Moffett's call for more rigorous definitions of social organizations but raise two intersecting critiques: (1) The spaces controlled by societies are not exclusively physical, and (2) cooperation is required to maintain control over spaces, physical or otherwise. We discuss examples of non-physical societal spaces across species and highlight the top-down group cooperation challenge that is maintaining them.

We examine the similarities and differences between Moffett's conceptualization of society and the core configuration model of social groupings. Anonymous societies correspond to the macrodeme level of coordination in the core configuration model, and recognizing that identity-based groups are defined by shared distinctiveness rather than territory encourages a more organic understanding of social groups.