This chapter focuses not on the possible content of a Bill of Rights, such as whether it should contain social and economic rights or only civil and political rights, but on the form any such Bill needs to take to be legitimate in a manner congruent with the moral norms of equal concern and respect underlying both rights and democracy. It explores four conceptions of Bills of Rights and the different ways they relate to democratic theory and practice. I start with the view of a Bill of Rights as distinct from normal legislation and that is ultimately the responsibility of the courts to defend. I distinguish between substantive and procedural accounts, in which the first focuses on upholding the rights necessary to ensure the outputs of democratic decisions reflect democratic norms whereas the second seeks to uphold the rights required for a due democratic process. I then turn to legislated rights and the role of Parliamentary Bills of Rights. Finally, I examine the role of democratic constitutional politics as a means for justifying and legitimising such rights instruments, be they upheld by legislatures or courts.

Territorial jurisdiction will require tribes to further develop their legal systems. People often assume tribal law is exotic, based upon ancient customs. While tribal law often includes customs, many legal systems do. Moreover, tribal law is often indistinguishable from state law. This is not assimilation; rather, this is to be expected. Many laws are universal because people generally want the same basic things. For example, theft and murder are prohibited everywhere. Likewise, tribes banned these offenses long before Europeans arrived on the continent. Though tribal law can deviate from standard Anglo-American law, different does not necessarily mean bad. Additionally, tribal courts usually resemble state and federal courts. Despite negative stereotypes, studies show tribal courts treat non-Indians fairly. Nevertheless, lack of funding – largely due to state taxation – inhibits tribes’ ability to develop bureaucracy. Lack of funding also prevents some tribes from publishing their laws. A possible solution to tribal institutional capacity is the creation of intertribal business courts. The intertribal nature of the tribunal will provide more resources to increase administrative capacity and help eliminate perceptions of bias.

Marx first calls for the actualization of philosophy in his earliest philosophical writings: the Notebooks on Epicurean Philosophy and Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature. This chapter examines those texts. It shows that Marx’s simultaneous praise of Epicurus for a great insight and condemnation for his shrinking from that insight relate to the problem of thought and reality, and that Marx’s identification of a ceaseless oscillation between the positions of a ‘liberal party’ and ‘positive philosophy’ already points the way beyond his own Young Hegelian context to the genuine actualization of philosophy.

I introduce an important way to think about and construct a DCM: by implementing a yaw–pitch–roll sequence of rotations on a model aircraft. This does away with the widespread but rather involved method of describing the relative orientation of two axis sets by drawing them with a common origin. For this, we must distinguish the idea of a rotation in a sequence being about either a ‘space-fixed’ axis or a ‘carried-along’ axis. Users of these terms tend to fall into two groups, ‘active’ and ‘passive’. I state the ‘fundamental theorem of rotation sequences’, which does away with any need for the reader to stand in one group or the other. I also discuss the extraction of Euler angles from a DCM, and examine infinitesimal rotations. I discuss two methods of interpolating from an initial to a final orientation; one of these is used widely in computer graphics, but both methods must be discussed for the computer-graphics method to be understood. I end with a calculation of the position and attitude of a robot arm.

This final chapter in Part II looks at plea bargaining, which determines the outcome in most criminal cases in the United States. The main argument in Chapter 8 is that plea bargaining is incompatible with both retributivism and adversarialism, the major substantive and procedural goals of American criminal justice. It undermines retributivism because it implicitly posits that an offender “deserves” at least two punishments. It undermines adversarialism (here used in its positive sense as the process of ensuring both parties are allowed to make their case) because it eliminates trials. Thus, either plea bargaining should be prohibited or the system’s goals should be changed. Introducing the concept of “preventive justice” that permeates the rest of the book, this chapter imagines a system in which retribution is no longer the lodestar of punishment and party control of the process is no longer the desideratum of adjudication. If, instead, plea bargaining were seen as a mechanism for implementing a sentencing regime focused primarily on individual crime prevention rather than retribution (as in the salad days of indeterminate sentencing), and if it were filtered through a European-style system that is inquisitorial (i.e., judicially monitored) rather than run by the adversaries, it would have a much greater chance of evolving into a procedurally coherent mechanism for achieving substantively accurate results. Guilty pleas would be abolished and trials required in all serious cases. Although bargaining with the goal of influencing the judge would still continue, it would no longer be the one-sided take-it-or-leave-it exchange it is today. Instead, it would focus on the dispositions that best balance protection of the public with defendants’ need for certainty and willingness to change.

Freedom in a choice does not just requires the absence of interference by another, whether with a preferred option or with any option; it requires the absence of domination: the absence of vulnerability to a power of interference on the part of another. Law and only law can guard citizens equally against the domination of others by identifying a common set of basic liberties and by providing intuitively adequate resourcing and protection against others to enable people to exercise those choices. But the state that imposes law will itself dominate all or some of its citizens if it is not subjected to a system of intuitively adequate, democratic control over its imposition of law. Such a system should enable people to shape the framework of government, to impose operational checks, constitutional and contestatory, on officials in government, and to appoint or oversee the appointment of such authorities.

Despite huge challenges, the world has been transformed over the last thirty years in terms of avenues of accountability for torture. At international level, commissions of inquiry seek to document the truth and ad hoc international and hybrid criminal tribunals and a permanent international criminal court prosecute some of the offenders. Domestic courts are applying international law, including on the basis of universal jurisdiction wherever the crime of torture occurred, in small but ever increasing numbers. The International Court of Justice has been seized to persuade a recalcitrant State to put a former head of State on trial for widespread acts of torture. Other criminal prosecutions of torturers will be mounted in the years that follow.

Shelley was an adherent to the basic tenet of empiricism, that ‘the senses are the only inlets of knowledge’. Yet he also affirmed that there are things we only ‘feel’ to be true. Rooted in Hume’s distinction between ‘impressions’ and ‘ideas’ – between sensory perceptions and the pictures in our minds, distinguishable only by the relative strength of their appearances – Shelley developed the notion of an ‘inward sense’ that guides us in our feelings or intuitions and discerns between real and ideal things. Above and beyond the philosophy of the British empiricists and the scepticism of Hume, yet rooted in their works, Shelley also developed in his verse a notion of what it would mean for an ‘idea’ to outstrip an ‘impression’ – for the world of the imagination to surpass the real thing, and for poetry to offer up ideas of greater force than empirical reality.

Recent studies applying William Caplin’s form-functional theory to Richard Wagner’s music have focused on Das Rheingold and later music dramas. However, his earlier Lohengrin, the final work he titled ‘romantische Oper’, proves an ideal candidate for such a study, since it still retains certain conventions (such as subtly disguised ‘numbers’ and a fairly clear harmonic palette) while pushing the boundary on others (such as scenes built as ‘dialogue cycles’ and pervasive use of diminished-seventh harmonies). This study first focuses on the principal Leitmotivs of the work, those associated with Elsa, Ortrud, the Grail and the Frageverbot (forbidden question), examining their theme types and loosening features, then exploring their transformations in different appearances throughout the opera – particularly Elsa’s motive. It then considers selected passages constructed in ‘rotational form’, in which one or more of these leitmotivs are used as the backbone for the cyclic form.

This chapter examines the underlying logical failures that produce the strange effects on the surface of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right examined in the previous chapter. It turns out that Hegel did not merely make logical errors, but that his very logical procedures are philosophically defective. This is shown to rest on problems shared with Plato’s diairesis (method of division). The problem with Hegel’s treatment of the state is not that he has chosen to take a dialectical approach, but that his conception of dialectic is itself deficient.

Chapter 11 takes an empirical look at federal court decision-making in criminal cases and concludes that both its consistency and quality are declining. An increase in the number of judges would help. But a complementary (and, given political realities, more feasible) way of improving trial and appellate court decision-making would be to convert our generalist courts to specialized tribunals, at both the federal and state levels. Focusing solely on the federal domain, this chapter proposes a judicial system comprised of separate criminal trial courts, circuit courts of appeal, and a National Court of Criminal Appeals. Such a system would significantly enhance trial court efficiency and appellate court capacity to produce quality decisions. Because there would be a superior appellate court devoted to ensuring uniform nationwide rules, such a system could also resolve doctrinal conflict on criminal justice issues more easily than the current system, which relies on a Supreme Court that is failing to address most of the disagreements among the circuits. Another positive feature of a specialized criminal court system is its synergies with the trial and sentencing proposals in this book. Whether or not the parties bargain, the inquisitorial preventive justice regime described in previous chapters relies heavily on judicial involvement at adjudication; a specialized system is more likely to produce the experienced trial judges needed in such a regime. At the same time, its shift of most dispositional decisions to parole boards would reduce the psychological demands on trial judges at sentencing and lessen the appellate workload by reducing sentencing appeals.