Percy Shelley once joked, ‘self, that burr that will stick to one. I can’t get it off yet’. But a burr, if annoying, often carries seeds. That ‘self’ abided with those he left behind. The crop of major biographies and memoirs of Shelley written during the period 1823–78 came from those who knew him. While their portraits are often consistent in details, each offers a different facet of a chameleonic figure. This chapter surveys some of the Shelleys from which one might choose.

Chapter 3 focuses on the debate about the concept of parameter which took place during the first decade of the twenty-first century. The first two positions discussed are Kayne’s (2000, 2005) microparametric approach and Baker’s (2001, 2008) macroparametric approach. These two approaches are then confronted with Newmeyer’s (2004, 2005) criticism. Finally, two lines of linguistic inquiry which are particularly relevant to the evaluation of the notion of parameter are presented, namely Roberts and Holmberg’s (2010) hierarchical parametric model and Longobardi’s and his collaborators’ Parametric Comparison Method (PCM). On the one hand, Roberts and Holmberg’s (2010) model overcomes the limitations of micro- and macroparameters by combining a lexically based, microparametric view of linguistic variation with the idea that parametric variation is an emergent property of the interaction of Universal Grammar, primary linguistic data, and third factor considerations. On the other hand, the unprecedented results achieved by the PCM in establishing the genealogical relations among languages on the basis of syntactic comparison arguably attest to the validity of the parametric model.

This chapter examines the relationship between the administrative state and constitutional values and structures with reference to German and American legal and political theory. It recovers from these intertwined traditions three analytical approaches to the administrative state. The first analytical approach understands the administrative state to implement the constitution. The second understands the administrative state to generate new constitutional structures and values. The third understands the administrative state to displace the constitution with patterns and practices of rule that lie outside of the existing governance framework. These frameworks foreground normative analysis of how the administrative state ought to relate to general democratic principles and the specific constitutional rules that institutionalize them. I argue for a differentiated and developmental understanding of the relationship between democracy, constitution, and administration. The concrete administration of democratic values should allow constitutional rules to shift in light of social and historical context. The administrative state should not be strictly limited by, but rather should facilitate critical interrogation of, the constitution’s current instantiation of democratic values. The administrative state can and should hold the constitution open for the introduction and proliferation of new institutional configurations and forms of public life.

“Cost-benefit analysis” (CBA) denotes the class of qualitative or quantitative methodologies that evaluate governmental policy choices in light of overall well-being. CBA plays a major role in non-constitutional U.S. public law. Executive agencies are required by Presidential order to employ CBA; courts construe ambiguous statutory language as permitting or requiring CBA; and courts also frequently find that administrative agencies’ mistakes in applying CBA are “arbitrary and capricious” under the Administrative Procedure Act. By contrast, CBA plays virtually no role in US constitutional law. It is generally absent not only from constitutional rights doctrine, but also from separation-of-powers and federalism doctrines. If overall well-being indeed plays a significant ethical role in determining the ethical status of governmental choices – which is what would justify the centrality of CBA to non-constitutional U.S. public law – its absence from constitutional law is quite puzzling. This can’t be justified by the premise that constitutional rights “trump” overall well-being (since CBA is absent even from those various parts of constitutional law where no such trumps are in play); nor the Constitution’s text (since the actual practice of the Supreme Court is only loosely textualist); nor original meaning (since the Court’s doctrines, on many questions, are not originalist); nor democratic legitimacy (since the Court could accommodate democratic legitimacy via a deferential version of CBA).

As the United States expanded west, it encountered the tribes of the Great Plains. Many of these tribes had military cultures. Their warriors were skilled with the horse and gun, making them formidable foes. Unable to defeat them militarily, the United States slaughtered their primary food source – the buffalo. Lack of food forced warriors to lay down their arms and agree to life on reservations. On reservations, tribes were supposed to be able to self-govern, but the federal government exerted extreme control over tribes. When the Supreme Court ruled intratribal crimes were beyond the United States jurisdiction, Congress enacted the Major Crimes Act (MCA). The MCA allowed the United States to prosecute Indians for committing crimes against another Indian while on a reservation. Although the Supreme Court acknowledged that no constitutional provision enabled Congress to pass the law, the Court held Congress could enact the law because Indians were “the wards of the nation.”

This chapter examines the genuine dialectic at work in Capital Volume 1 (to be contrasted with the failed dialectic of Hegel). A focus of the chapter is the role of opposition and contradiction in this non-pre-determined dialectic. Attempts to read Marx as if he meant to speak of opposition instead of contradiction are rejected; opposition is, instead, shown in much of the material in question to develop into contradiction. Contradiction does not follow one pre-established pattern; but Marx, throughout, works under the aegis of the Principle of Non-Contradiction. In a sense, the chapter outlines the methodology of Marx’s mature work, but only insofar as it is recognized that this methodology cannot be spelled out other than by retracing actual arguments in Marx.

Chapter 5 builds on the observational findings from the previous chapter to test the hypotheses using two survey experiments performed on a sample of British Labour voters. The first experiment manipulates the selective incentives available to members by changing the cost of joining. Not surprisingly, people are more interested in joining when fees are low. The second experiment manipulates the party’s instrumental incentives by stating members can (or cannot) select party leaders and parliamentary candidates, as well as attend events where they may formally participate in determining the party’s future policy direction. The findings support the hypotheses generated by Chapter 2’s formal model: decentralization increases membership, conditional on voter-party alignment.

The witholding of equal public recognition of national, cultural and language identity often causes severe anguish to sub-state peoples and sometimes leads to war. For this reason, political philosophy has an important responsibility to think through the moral grounds and the appropriate means of recognition. This chapter draws a moral map of the recognitional debate, outlining three normative camps: nonrecognition, monorecognition, and recognitional pluralism. I argue for recognitional pluralism, in two steps. The first step establishes, contra nonrecognition, that nations, cultures and languages are recognition-worthy, and that this is so for two reasons: they give people access to cultural life-worlds, and they are sources of dignity. The second step builds the case for a pluralistic means of according public recognition. To do so, I argue, against monorecognition, that egalitarian recognition of life-world access and dignity is to be the driving principle. Within the pluralist camp, I argue for the principle of equal services, which implies that the state accords comparable cultural services to the cultural groups that share a state or territory. Examples of this can be found in equal language rights regimes, egalitarian public holiday systems, as well as in multinational federalism.

This chapter starts by showing that the DCM is a rotation matrix, and vice versa. I introduce Euler matrices as important examples of rotation matrices. I give examples extracting angle–axis information from a DCM. This chapter includes a study of what tensors are, and their role in this subject.

Wagner’s music had theorists continuously scratching their heads. Its fabled newness challenged not only established analytical systems to flex their theoretical muscles but also called for wholly new approaches. This chapter examines early attempts (c.1880–1910) to come to terms with Wagner’s formal and harmonic challenges – crystallised, as ever, in the iconic Tristan chord. Early efforts, by such figures as Karl Mayrberger, Cyrill Kistler, Max Arend, Cyrill Kynast and Emil Ergo, were focused on identifying the most suitable model of tonal harmony among Hauptmann’s, Sechter’s and, later, Riemann’s influential systems and expanding its reach to encompass Wagner’s progressive harmonies. In these discussions, Wagner’s musical structures became nothing less than a battleground for the validity and theoretical prowess of rival conceptions of harmony. It was left to a younger generation of theorists, chief among them Georg Capellen and Ernst Kurth, to reject these nineteenth-century models altogether and to reformulate extended theories of harmony on new foundations.