Due to Gödel’s incompleteness results, the categoricity of a sufficiently rich mathematical theory and the semantic completeness of its underlying logic are two mutually exclusive ideals. For first- and second-order logics we obtain one of them with the cost of losing the other. In addition, in both these logics the rules of deduction for their quantifiers are non-categorical. In this paper I examine two recent arguments—Warren [43] and Murzi and Topey [30]—for the idea that the natural deduction rules for the first-order universal quantifier are categorical, i.e., they uniquely determine its semantic intended meaning. Both of them make use of McGee’s open-endedness requirement and the second one uses in addition Garson’s [19] local models for defining the validity of these rules. I argue that the success of both these arguments is relative to their semantic or infinitary assumptions, which could be easily discharged if the introduction rule for the universal quantifier is taken to be an infinitary rule, i.e., non-compact. Consequently, I reconsider the use of the $\omega $-rule and I show that the addition of the $\omega $-rule to the standard formalizations of first-order logic is categorical. In addition, I argue that the open-endedness requirement does not make the first-order Peano Arithmetic categorical and I advance an argument for its categoricity based on the inferential conservativity requirement.

We introduce self-divisible ultrafilters, which we prove to be precisely those $w$ such that the weak congruence relation $\equiv _w$ introduced by Šobot is an equivalence relation on $\beta {\mathbb Z}$. We provide several examples and additional characterisations; notably we show that $w$ is self-divisible if and only if $\equiv _w$ coincides with the strong congruence relation $\mathrel {\equiv ^{\mathrm {s}}_{w}}$, if and only if the quotient $(\beta {\mathbb Z},\oplus )/\mathord {\mathrel {\equiv ^{\mathrm {s}}_{w}}}$ is a profinite group. We also construct an ultrafilter $w$ such that $\equiv _w$ fails to be symmetric, and describe the interaction between the aforementioned quotient and the profinite completion $\hat {{\mathbb Z}}$ of the integers.

We calculate the possible Scott ranks of countable models of Peano arithmetic. We show that no non-standard model can have Scott rank less than $\omega $ and that non-standard models of true arithmetic must have Scott rank greater than $\omega $. Other than that there are no restrictions. By giving a reduction via $\Delta ^{\mathrm {in}}_{1}$ bi-interpretability from the class of linear orderings to the canonical structural $\omega $-jump of models of an arbitrary completion T of $\mathrm {PA}$ we show that every countable ordinal $\alpha>\omega $ is realized as the Scott rank of a model of T.

A theory T is tight if different deductively closed extensions of T (in the same language) cannot be bi-interpretable. Many well-studied foundational theories are tight, including $\mathsf {PA}$ [39], $\mathsf {ZF}$, $\mathsf {Z}_2$, and $\mathsf {KM}$ [6]. In this article we extend Enayat’s investigations to subsystems of these latter two theories. We prove that restricting the Comprehension schema of $\mathsf {Z}_2$ and $\mathsf {KM}$ gives non-tight theories. Specifically, we show that $\mathsf {GB}$ and $\mathsf {ACA}_0$ each admit different bi-interpretable extensions, and the same holds for their extensions by adding $\Sigma ^1_k$-Comprehension, for $k \ge 1$. These results provide evidence that tightness characterizes $\mathsf {Z}_2$ and $\mathsf {KM}$ in a minimal way.

In this paper we will show that for every cut I of any countable nonstandard model $\mathcal {M}$ of $\mathrm {I}\Sigma _{1}$, each I-small $\Sigma _{1}$-elementary submodel of $\mathcal {M}$ is of the form of the set of fixed points of some proper initial self-embedding of $\mathcal {M}$ iff I is a strong cut of $\mathcal {M}$. Especially, this feature will provide us with some equivalent conditions with the strongness of the standard cut in a given countable model $\mathcal {M}$ of $ \mathrm {I}\Sigma _{1} $. In addition, we will find some criteria for extendability of initial self-embeddings of countable nonstandard models of $ \mathrm {I}\Sigma _{1} $ to larger models.

We employ the lens provided by formal truth theory to study axiomatizations of Peano Arithmetic ${\textsf {(PA)}}$. More specifically, let Elementary Arithmetic ${\textsf {(EA)}}$ be the fragment $\mathsf {I}\Delta _0 + \mathsf {Exp}$ of ${\textsf {PA}}$, and let ${\textsf {CT}}^-[{\textsf {EA}}]$ be the extension of ${\textsf {EA}}$ by the commonly studied axioms of compositional truth ${\textsf {CT}}^-$. We investigate both local and global properties of the family of first order theories of the form ${\textsf {CT}}^-[{\textsf {EA}}] +\alpha $, where $\alpha $ is a particular way of expressing “${\textsf {PA}}$ is true” (using the truth predicate). Our focus is dominantly on two types of axiomatizations, namely: (1) schematic axiomatizations that are deductively equivalent to ${\textsf {PA}}$ and (2) axiomatizations that are proof-theoretically equivalent to the canonical axiomatization of ${\textsf {PA}}$.

We answer some questions about graphs that are reducts of countable models of Anti-Foundation, obtained by considering the binary relation of double-membership $x\in y\in x$ . We show that there are continuum-many such graphs, and study their connected components. We describe their complete theories and prove that each has continuum-many countable models, some of which are not reducts of models of Anti-Foundation.

The current paper studies the formal properties of the Global Reflection Principle, to wit the assertion “All theorems of $\mathrm {Th}$ are true,” where $\mathrm {Th}$ is a theory in the language of arithmetic and the truth predicate satisfies the usual Tarskian inductive conditions for formulae in the language of arithmetic. We fix the gap in Kotlarski’s proof from [15], showing that the Global Reflection Principle for Peano Arithmetic is provable in the theory of compositional truth with bounded induction only ( $\mathrm {CT}_0$ ). Furthermore, we extend the above result showing that $\Sigma _1$ -uniform reflection over a theory of uniform Tarski biconditionals ( $\mathrm {UTB}^-$ ) is provable in $\mathrm {CT}_0$ , thus answering the question of Beklemishev and Pakhomov [2]. Finally, we introduce the notion of a prolongable satisfaction class and use it to study the structure of models of $\mathrm {CT}_0$ . In particular, we provide a new model-theoretical characterization of theories of finite iterations of uniform reflection and present a new proof characterizing the arithmetical consequences of $\mathrm {CT}_0$ .

The complete characterisation of order types of non-standard models of Peano arithmetic and its extensions is a famous open problem. In this paper, we consider subtheories of Peano arithmetic (both with and without induction), in particular, theories formulated in proper fragments of the full language of arithmetic. We study the order types of their non-standard models and separate all considered theories via their possible order types. We compare the theories with and without induction and observe that the theories without induction tend to have an algebraic character that allows model constructions by closing a model under the relevant algebraic operations.

We analyze the precise modal commitments of several natural varieties of set-theoretic potentialism, using tools we develop for a general model-theoretic account of potentialism, building on those of Hamkins, Leibman and Löwe [14], including the use of buttons, switches, dials and ratchets. Among the potentialist conceptions we consider are: rank potentialism (true in all larger $V_\beta $ ), Grothendieck–Zermelo potentialism (true in all larger $V_\kappa $ for inaccessible cardinals $\kappa $ ), transitive-set potentialism (true in all larger transitive sets), forcing potentialism (true in all forcing extensions), countable-transitive-model potentialism (true in all larger countable transitive models of ZFC), countable-model potentialism (true in all larger countable models of ZFC), and others. In each case, we identify lower bounds for the modal validities, which are generally either S4.2 or S4.3, and an upper bound of S5, proving in each case that these bounds are optimal. The validity of S5 in a world is a potentialist maximality principle, an interesting set-theoretic principle of its own. The results can be viewed as providing an analysis of the modal commitments of the various set-theoretic multiverse conceptions corresponding to each potentialist account.

Let ${\cal T}$ be any of the three canonical truth theories CT− (compositional truth without extra induction), FS− (Friedman–Sheard truth without extra induction), or KF− (Kripke–Feferman truth without extra induction), where the base theory of ${\cal T}$ is PA (Peano arithmetic). We establish the following theorem, which implies that ${\cal T}$ has no more than polynomial speed-up over PA.

Theorem.${\cal T}$is feasibly reducible to PA, in the sense that there is a polynomial time computable function f such that for every${\cal T}$-proof π of an arithmetical sentence ϕ, f (π) is a PA-proof of ϕ.

This paper explores the relationship borne by the traditional paradoxes of set theory and semantics to formal incompleteness phenomena. A central tool is the application of the Arithmetized Completeness Theorem to systems of second-order arithmetic and set theory in which various “paradoxical notions” for first-order languages can be formalized. I will first discuss the setting in which this result was originally presented by Hilbert & Bernays (1939) and also how it was later adapted by Kreisel (1950) and Wang (1955) in order to obtain formal undecidability results. A generalization of this method will then be presented whereby Russell’s paradox, a variant of Mirimanoff’s paradox, the Liar, and the Grelling–Nelson paradox may be uniformly transformed into incompleteness theorems. Some additional observations are then framed relating these results to the unification of the set theoretic and semantic paradoxes, the intensionality of arithmetization (in the sense of Feferman, 1960), and axiomatic theories of truth.

This paper consists in the formulation of a novel categorical set theory, MLCat, which is proved to be equiconsistent to New Foundations (NF), and which can be modulated to correspond to intuitionistic (denoted with an “I” on the left) or classical NF, with atoms (denoted with a “U” on the right) or not:

Simpson [6] showed that every countable model ${\cal M} \models PA$ has an expansion $\left( {{\cal M},X} \right) \models P{A^{\rm{*}}}$ that is pointwise definable. A natural question is whether, in general, one can obtain expansions of a nonprime model in which the definable elements coincide with those of the underlying model. Enayat [1] showed that this is impossible by proving that there is ${\cal M} \models PA$ such that for each undefinable class X of ${\cal M}$, the expansion $\left( {{\cal M},X} \right)$ is pointwise definable. We call models with this property Enayat models. In this article, we study Enayat models and show that a model of $PA$ is Enayat if it is countable, has no proper cofinal submodels and is a conservative extension of all of its elementary cuts. We then show that, for any countable linear order γ, if there is a model ${\cal M}$ such that $Lt\left( {\cal M} \right) \cong \gamma$, then there is an Enayat model ${\cal M}$ such that $Lt\left( {\cal M} \right) \cong \gamma$.

In this article, we will show that ${\rm{R}}{{\rm{T}}^2} + WK{L_0}$ is a ${\rm{\Pi }}_1^1$-conservative extension of ${\rm{B\Sigma }}_3^0$.

In ZFC, the class Ord of ordinals is easily seen to satisfy the definable version of strong inaccessibility. Here we explore deeper ZFC-verifiable combinatorial properties of Ord, as indicated in Theorems A & B below. Note that Theorem A shows the unexpected result that Ord is never definably weakly compact in any model of ZFC.

Theorem A. Let ${\cal M}$ be any model of ZFC.

1. (1) The definable tree property fails in ${\cal M}$: There is an ${\cal M}$-definable Ord-tree with no ${\cal M}$-definable cofinal branch.

2. (2) The definable partition property fails in ${\cal M}$: There is an ${\cal M}$-definable 2-coloring $f:{[X]^2} \to 2$ for some ${\cal M}$-definable proper class X such that no ${\cal M}$-definable proper classs is monochromatic for f.

3. (3) The definable compactness property for ${{\cal L}_{\infty ,\omega }}$ fails in ${\cal M}$: There is a definable theory ${\rm{\Gamma }}$ in the logic ${{\cal L}_{\infty ,\omega }}$ (in the sense of ${\cal M}$) of size Ord such that every set-sized subtheory of ${\rm{\Gamma }}$ is satisfiable in ${\cal M}$, but there is no ${\cal M}$-definable model of ${\rm{\Gamma }}$.

Theorem B. The definable ⋄Ord principle holds in a model ${\cal M}$ of ZFC iff ${\cal M}$ carries an ${\cal M}$-definable global well-ordering.

Theorems A and B above can be recast as theorem schemes in ZFC, or as asserting that a single statement in the language of class theory holds in all ‘spartan’ models of GB (Gödel-Bernays class theory); where a spartan model of GB is any structure of the form $\left( {{\cal M},{D_{\cal M}}} \right)$, where ${\cal M} \models {\rm{ZF}}$ and ${D_{\cal M}}$ is the family of${\cal M}$-definable classes. Theorem C gauges the complexity of the collection GBspa of (Gödel-numbers of) sentences that hold in all spartan models of GB.

Theorem C. GBspa is ${\rm{\Pi }}_1^1$-complete.

Gödel introduced the original provability predicate in the proofs of Gödel’s incompleteness theorems, and Rosser defined a new one. They are equivalent in the standard model ${\mathbb N}$ of arithmetic or any nonstandard model of ${\rm PA} + {\rm Con_{PA}} $, but the behavior of Rosser’s provability predicate is different from the original one in nonstandard models of ${\rm PA} + \neg {\rm Con_{PA}} $. In this paper, we investigate several properties of the derivability conditions for Rosser provability predicates, and prove the existence of a Rosser provability predicate with which we can define any consistent complete extension of ${\rm PA}$ in some nonstandard model of ${\rm PA} + \neg {\rm Con_{PA}} $. We call it a universal Rosser predicate. It follows from the theorem that the true arithmetic ${\rm TA}$ can be defined as the set of theorems of ${\rm PA}$ in terms of a universal Rosser predicate in some nonstandard model of ${\rm PA} + \neg {\rm Con_{PA}} $. By using this theorem, we also give a new proof of a theorem that there is a nonstandard model M of ${\rm PA} + \neg {\rm Con_{PA}} $ such that if N is an initial segment of M which is a model of ${\rm PA} + {\rm Con_{PA}} $ then every theorem of ${\rm PA}$ in N is a theorem of $\rm PA$ in ${\mathbb N}$. In addition, we prove that there is a Rosser provability predicate such that the set of theorems of $\rm PA$ in terms of the Rosser provability predicate is inconsistent in any nonstandard model of ${\rm PA} + \neg {\rm Con_{PA}} $.

This paper addresses the structures (M, ω) and (ω, SSy(M)), where M is a nonstandard model of PA and ω is the standard cut. It is known that (ω, SSy(M)) is interpretable in (M, ω). Our main technical result is that there is an reverse interpretation of (M, ω) in (ω, SSy(M)) which is ‘local’ in the sense of Visser [11]. We also relate the model theory of (M, ω) to the study of transplendent models of PA [2].

This yields a number of model theoretic results concerning the ω-models (M, ω) and their standard systems SSy(M, ω), including the following.

• $\left( {M,\omega } \right) \prec \left( {K,\omega } \right)$ if and only if $M \prec K$ and $\left( {\omega ,{\rm{SSy}}\left( M \right)} \right) \prec \left( {\omega ,{\rm{SSy}}\left( K \right)} \right)$.

• $\left( {\omega ,{\rm{SSy}}\left( M \right)} \right) \prec \left( {\omega ,{\cal P}\left( \omega \right)} \right)$ if and only if $\left( {M,\omega } \right) \prec \left( {{M^{\rm{*}}},\omega } \right)$ for some ω-saturated M*.

• $M{ \prec _{\rm{e}}}K$ implies SSy(M, ω) = SSy(K, ω), but cofinal extensions do not necessarily preserve standard system in this sense.

• SSy(M, ω)=SSy(M) if and only if (ω, SSy(M)) satisfies the full comprehension scheme.

• If SSy(M, ω) is uniformly defined by a single formula (analogous to a β function), then (ω, SSy(M, ω)) satisfies the full comprehension scheme; and there are models M for which SSy(M, ω) is not uniformly defined in this sense.

We show that R.J. Thompson’s groups F and T are bi-interpretable with the ring of the integers. From a result by A. Khélif, these groups are quasi-finitely axiomatizable and prime. So, the group T provides an example of a simple group which is quasi-finitely axiomatizable and prime. This answers questions posed by T. Altınel and A. Muranov in [2], and by A. Nies in [12].