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A reputational perspective on rational framing effects

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  25 October 2022

Charles Adam Dorison Open the ORCID record for Charles Adam Dorison [Opens in a new window]
Charles Adam Dorison*
Affiliation:
Kellogg School of Management, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60208, USA [email protected]
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Abstract

To assess whether behaviors like framing effects are rational, researchers need to consider decision makers' goals. I argue that researchers should broaden the scope of analysis to include impression management goals. Under predictable conditions, behaviors traditionally considered irrational (e.g., loss–gain framing effects on risk preferences) can be reputationally rewarding, casting doubt on strict claims of irrationality.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 45 , 2022 , e226
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Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press

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