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Rationality as the end of thought
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 October 2022
Abstract
Bermúdez convincingly argues that framing effects are ubiquitous and that this is not a sign of human irrationality, but an unavoidable feature of any intelligent system. The commentary adds that framing effects arise even in formal domains, such as chess and mathematics, which appear paradigms of rational thought. Indeed, finding and attempting to resolve clashes between different frames is a major impetus for deliberative cognition.
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- Open Peer Commentary
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- Copyright
- Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press
References
Chater, N., & Oaksford, M. (2012). Normative systems: Logic, probability, and rational choice. In Holyoak, K. & Morrison, R. (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of thinking and reasoning (pp. 11–21). Oxford University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lakatos, I. (1976). Proofs and refutations: The logic of mathematical discovery. Cambridge University Press.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schwalbe, U., & Walker, P. (2001). Zermelo and the early history of game theory. Games and Economic Behavior, 34(1), 123–137.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Storer, J. A. (1983). On the complexity of chess. Journal of Computer and System Sciences, 27(1), 77–100.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Target article
Rational framing effects: A multidisciplinary case
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