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Probably, approximately useful frames of mind: A quasi-algorithmic approach
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 October 2022
Abstract
Frames for interpreting situations are necessary in the face of time constraints for action and indeterminacy of the “right or optimal thing to do” given multiple objectives but not all frames are equally useful. We need a way of modeling representational frames according to the informational gain of using them and the computational cost of synthesizing a decisive reason for acting from them.
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- Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press
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Target article
Rational framing effects: A multidisciplinary case
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