No CrossRef data available.
Article contents
Framing is a motivated process
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 October 2022
Abstract
Frames group choices into categories, thus modifying the incentives for them. This effect makes framing itself a motivated choice rather than a neutral cognition. In particular, framing an inferior choice with a high short-term payoff as part of a broad category of choices recruits incentive to reject it; but this must be motivated by its being a test case.
- Type
- Open Peer Commentary
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Author(s), 2022. Published by Cambridge University Press
References
Ainslie, G. (1975). Specious reward: A behavioral theory of impulsiveness and impulse control. Psychological Bulletin, 82, 463–496. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/h0076860CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Ainslie, G. (1992). Picoeconomics: The strategic interaction of successive motivational states within the person. Cambridge University Press.Google Scholar
Ainslie, G. (2001). Breakdown of will. Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139164191CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ainslie, G. (2013). Grasping the impalpable: The role of endogenous reward in choices, including process addictions. Inquiry, 56, 446–469. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2013.806129CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ainslie, G. (2017). De gustibus disputare: Hyperbolic delay discounting integrates five approaches to choice. Journal of Economic Methodology, 24(2), 166–189. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/1350178X.2017.1309748CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Ainslie, G. (2021). Willpower with and without effort. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 44, e30. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X20000357Google ScholarPubMed
Ainslie, G. (in press). The behavioral construction of the future. Psychology of Addictive Behaviors.Google Scholar
Dell, P. F. (2009). Understanding dissociation. In Dell, P. F. & O'Neil, J. A. (Eds.), Dissociation and the dissociative disorders: DSM-V and beyond (pp. 709–825). Routledge.Google Scholar
Fujita, K. (2011). On conceptualizing self-control as more than the effortful inhibition of impulses. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 15, 352–366. http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/1088868311411165CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Gilead, M., Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2020). Above and beyond the concrete: The diverse representational substrates of the predictive brain. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 43, e121, 1–74. doi: 10.1017/s0140525x19002000CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Mischel, W. (2014). The marshmallow test: Understanding self-control and how to master it. Bantam.Google Scholar
Montague, P. R., & Berns, G. S. (2002). Neural economics and the biological substrates of valuation. Neuron, 36, 265–284. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0896-6273(02)00974-1CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Rachlin, H. (1995). Self-control: Beyond commitment. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 18, 109–159. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0140525X00037602CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Rachlin, H. (2016). Self-control based on soft commitment. The Behavior Analyst, 3, 259–268. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s40614-016-0054-9CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Read, D., Lowenstein, G., & Rabin, M. (1999). Choice bracketing. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 19(1), 171–197. http://dx.doi.org/10.1023/A:1007879411489CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Redish, A. D. (2016). Vicarious trial and error. Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 17, 147–159. http://dx.doi.org/10.1038/nrn.2015.30CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Shizgal, P., & Conover, K. (1996). On the neural computation of utility. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 5, 37–43. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/1467-8721.ep10772715CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Trope, Y., & Liberman, N. (2010). Construal-level theory of psychological distance. Psychological Review, 117, 440–463. http://dx.doi.org/10.1037/a0018963CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Target article
Rational framing effects: A multidisciplinary case
Related commentaries (27)
Ceteris paribus preferences, rational farming effects, and the extensionality principle
A reputational perspective on rational framing effects
Biases and suboptimal choice by animals suggest that framing effects may be ubiquitous
Competing reasons, incomplete preferences, and framing effects
Consistent preferences, conflicting reasons, and rational evaluations
Defining preferences over framed outcomes does not secure agents' rationality
Distinguishing self-involving from self-serving choices in framing effects
Even simple framing effects are rational
Explaining bias with bias
Four frames and a funeral: Commentary on Bermúdez (2022)
Frames, trade-offs, and perspectives
Framing is a motivated process
Framing provides reasons
Framing, equivalence, and rational inference
Incomplete preferences and rational framing effects
Probably, approximately useful frames of mind: A quasi-algorithmic approach
Quasi-cyclical preferences in the ethics of Plato, Aristotle, and Kant
Rational framing effects and morally valid reasons
Rationality as the end of thought
Reframing rationality: Exogenous constraints on controlled information search
Self-control modulates information salience
The ecological benefits of being irrationally moral
The framing of decisions “leaks” into the experiencing of decisions
The polyphony principle
The received view of framing
The study of rational framing effects needs developmental psychology
Why framing effects can be rational
Author response
Frames and rationality: Response to commentators