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Biases and suboptimal choice by animals suggest that framing effects may be ubiquitous
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 25 October 2022
Abstract
Framing effects attributed to “quasi-cyclical” irrational complex human preferences are ubiquitous biases resulting from simpler mechanisms that can be found in other animals. Examples of such framing effects vary from simple learning contexts, to an analog of human gambling behavior, to the value added to a reinforcer by the effort that went into obtaining it.
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Target article
Rational framing effects: A multidisciplinary case
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