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The Nietzschean precedent for anti-reflective, dialogical agency

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  27 March 2018

Mark Alfano
Mark Alfano*
Affiliation:
Ethics & Philosophy of Technology, Delft University of Technology, Delft, Netherlands; Institute for Religion and Critical Inquiry, Australian Catholic University, Sydney, [email protected]
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Abstract

Nietzsche anticipates both the anti-reflective and the dialogical aspects of Doris's theory of agency. Nietzsche's doctrine of will to power presupposes that agency does not require reflection but emerges from interacting drives, affects, and emotions. Furthermore, Nietzsche identifies two channels through which dialogical processes of person-formation flow: sometimes a person announces what she is and meets with social acceptance of that claim; sometimes someone else announces what the person is, and she accepts the attribution.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 41 , 2018 , e37
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2018 

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